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| OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY
AMEDD REGIMENT |
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HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF MEDICAL HISTORY |
Chapter XI - continued |
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CHAPTER XI - CONTINUED 387-394 TABLE 36.-Operating strength of Medical Department units in oversea areas,1 30 April 1943-31 August 1945
1Basic data for April 1943 from Troop Section, Logistics Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, Overseas Troop Basis, 1 May 1943: for all other dates from Troop List for Operations and Supply for dates approximate thereto; all data include non-Medical Department personnel. Data for April 1943 comprise actual strength; data for all other periods comprise "operating strength" which is either table-of-organization strength or strength authorized within the theater. April 1943 data also include non-table-of-organization organizations, and Air Transport Command personnel. Divisional medical units are not included at any time. All rates greater than unity are rounded to the nearest whole number. Rates for April 1943 are per 1,000 troop strength for that date as shown in table 31 and rates for April and August 1945 are per 1,000 adjusted troop strengths shown for these dates in table 31, appendix. Rates for September and December 1944 are based on adjusted strengths, determined in a manner similar to that used in determining April and August 1945 rates, as follows: 395
aFrom source of area data reported in table 31,
footnote 2. 2Total "Oversea" strength is the aggregate of strengths shown for individual areas. 396 The veterinary care of animals was a more important function of the Medical Department in the China-Burma-India area than elsewhere, but even there it did not increase the proportion more than a few points (table 36). The prevention of disease is one of the major functions of the Medical Department yet, in terms of special personnel for the purpose, it too increased the proportion only slightly in most areas. In certain small theaters, however, it was of considerable significance primarily because of the malaria control and survey teams which were stationed there. This results from the fact that the need for antimalaria personnel is more a matter of geography than of the troop strength to be served. Besides the organizations directly concerned with hospitalization, most theaters possessed Medical Department units whose functions were accessory to the provision of hospital service. Among such units were dispensaries of various types, ambulance companies, medical depots, medical laboratories, clearing companies, collecting companies, medical gas treatment battalions, and sanitary companies. In the European theater in the latter part of the war, they constituted a substantial element of medical strength which helped to give that area its preeminent position in this respect among the major theaters and its high position among all of them. The European theater utilized more types of Medical Department units (including hospitals) than any other theater (table 37), distributed among air, ground, and service force units. For the most part, Medical Department personnel in oversea areas were assigned to and served in table-of-organization units. Some medical personnel were in units that had been set up overseas under the non-table-of-organization allotments of the various theaters. Although the maximum number of medical officers who might come under the allotment was fixed by the War Department, TABLE 37.-Types of Medical Department units in use in the various theaters of operations, by area, 30 September 1944
Source: Troop List for Operations and Supply, 1 Oct. 1944. 397 TABLE 38.-Estimated additions by Air Transport Command to theater medical strength per 1,000 troops, 19441
1For the estimated medical strengths of the Air Transport Command on the dates shown and the adjusted theater strengths on the same date, see table 36, footnote 1. other types of officers could be substituted. In the case of nurses, no substitutes could be made. In either case, the theater surgeon could make representations concerning the size of these allotments, and this was one of the few opportunities he had to deal directly with strength; that is, strength consisting of individuals rather than strength composed of units. Thus, the chief surgeon of U.S. Army Forces, Far East, dispatched an emissary after V-E Day on a successful mission to obtain a large increase in the overhead allotment of medical officers for the Southwest Pacific.19 Yet, it does not appear that the theater surgeons materially augmented the medical strength ratios of the areas under their jurisdiction through increases in medical allotments. In the larger theaters, especially, it would have been difficult to do so because of the relatively small role played by overhead in the strength of such theaters. The medical personnel of the Air Transport Command, the Airways Communication System, and certain other troops under the command of the Army Air Forces were counted as part of the strength of the individual theaters only in the early part of the war. From the limited statistics available, it would appear that they contributed a substantial proportion of the strength in the South Atlantic and Africa-Middle East theaters and to a lesser degree in the North America and China-Burma-India areas. In the major theaters, on the other hand, they were of infinitesimal importance (table 38).20
398 Distribution of Oversea Strength by Major Commands At the end of September 1944, approximately 5.7 percent of all oversea medical personnel excluding overhead were serving with the Air Forces, 36.9 percent with the Ground Forces, and 57.8 percent with the Service Forces or in communications zone installations.21 The percentage of medical strength actually assigned to the Air Forces but 1 month earlier was 7.74, but this included overhead personnel (table 39). It represented a decline from a higher percentage prevalent in 1943. At all times, however, the percentage was lower than the Air Forces fraction of the worldwide Medical Department strength. The ratio of medical Air Forces strength to total Air Forces strength was always lower than the ratio of medical strength to general Army strength both worldwide and overseas, but because of the lack of Air Forces hospitals abroad, the strength of the Medical Department personnel assigned to Air Forces organizations in oversea areas was always lower proportionately than the like strength in the Zone of Interior. While the majority of oversea medical personnel served in the Services of Supply or communications zones, the proportionate strength of such personnel fluctuated greatly. For example, in the European theater in September and October 1942, during the buildup for the North African invasion, medical personnel comprised approximately 30 percent of total personnel in the Services of Supply. After the invasion of North Africa, the total Services of Supply strength in the theater declined approximately 20 percent while Medical Department Services of Supply strength increased by nearly 60 percent (table 35). During November, a number of medical units had landed in the United Kingdom because, although they were destined for North Africa, port facilities which would have made possible their debarkation in the Mediterranean area had not yet become available, and were therefore probably counted as part of the European theater strength.22 As 1943 progressed, however, emphasis was placed on supplying Air Forces and Engineer troops to the British Isles. The result was a decline of the percentage of medical troops in the Services of Supply from the peak attained in February 1943. Despite resumption of shipments of medical units in the latter part of the year, the influx of ground troops in preparation for invasion of the Continent led to a continued decline of the percentage of medical personnel under the Services of Supply.23 Before the end of the year, it had fallen below 50 percent.
399-403 TABLE 39.-Strength of Medical Department personnel assigned to Air Forces,1 30 September 1942-31 May 1945
1No Pharmacy Corps personnel were
assigned to Air Forces organizations on any date shown except May 1945, when
there were two in the Zone of Interior. 404-409 After the invasion of Normandy began, however, it was necessary to increase the rear echelon medical support of the campaign and more fixed hospital installations were brought into the theater.24 The percentage ascended somewhat above the 50 percent mark although it may have been held down by the reduction of table-of-organization strength of fixed hospital units. By mid-March of 1945, the Medical Department strength in the communications zone of the European theater was less than 45 percent of the total medical strength in the theater. This was exclusive of headquarters personnel, but it is unlikely that even with such personnel it reached 50 percent.25 By that time, the theater had returned much of its patient load to the Zone of Interior.26 Use of civilians and prisoners of war also may have reduced the proportion of military personnel in the Communications Zone medical service. COMPOSITION OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT OVERSEAS Army Components For some time after mobilization began in 1940, the majority of U.S. troops overseas were Regular Army due to the time element necessary to train the other components. At the same time, the proportion of Regulars in the Army as a whole was greater than it was in the Medical Department. This was true overseas in the early part of 1942 although the reverse had been the case in the middle of 1941 (tables 40 and 41). But as the relative strength of the Regular Army declined in the Medical Department overseas, that of every other component increased, at least for a time.
410 TABLE 41.-Strength of male personnel by Army components, worldwide and overseas, on 31 July 19411
1Basic data from "Strength of the Army,"
31 July 1941. The actual size of the components, however, cannot be traced beyond the early part of 1943 except in the case of Regular Army officers. In April 1944, Regular Army officers, numbering 618, constituted 2.01 percent of the male Medical Department officer strength in foreign areas. The corresponding figure for all male officers (6,323) was 2.37 percent.27 It can be said with certainty, however, that by the closing days of the war at least 80 percent of the oversea medical enlisted strength comprised selectees and not less than half of the male Medical Department officers abroad were so-called Army of the United States personnel; that is, neither Regulars, National Guardsmen, nor reservists. The trend of Army components among nurses probably was the same as that among male officers until about the middle of 1942. At that time, a large reclassification of members of the Army Nurse Corps took place, and many who had been considered reservists were given Regular Army status. Some delay occurred, however, in the reclassification of those nurses who were abroad or at least in the recording of this reclassification. Thus, on 31 August 1942,
411 the proportion of nurses serving in oversea areas and who were reported to be in the Regular Army was considerably smaller than the corresponding worldwide ratio (table 32). By the end of October, this situation had changed, and by 30 April 1944, the proportion of Regular Army personnel among nurses serving in foreign areas was not much different from the corresponding ratio among other personnel. Negroes In the early part of the war, proportionately fewer Negroes were shipped overseas by the Medical Department than whites, partially because of the reluctance of theater authorities to utilize such personnel. Manpower shortages together with the War Department policies to better utilize Negro personnel and to ship abroad personnel that had not seen foreign service reversed the proportion of Negro and white Medical Department personnel overseas.28 For much of the period between October 1944 and the end of hostilities, the number of Medical Department Negroes overseas was proportionately greater than the oversea portion of the Medical Department as a whole. Contributing to this change was a decline in the Medical Department's overall Negro strength, a decline which was relatively greater than the corresponding loss to the Army as a whole. While every Negro table-of-organization hospital unit organized in the Zone of Interior eventually went overseas,29 the number of such units did not exceed five. The increasing use of Negro medical personnel outside the United States was perhaps primarily manifested in regard to sanitary companies. As late as June 1943, only two of these companies were abroad; one, the 708th, had gone overseas in 1942 and was operating in the North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, and the other, 716th, had arrived on Guadalcanal in the spring of 1943. Between August and December 1943, only five more sanitary companies were shipped abroad, three to the European theater and two to the Pacific. In 1944, however, at least 35 medical sanitary companies were moved overseas; in January 1945, one additional company was activated in Hawaii. Thus, if January 1945 be taken as the month marking the peak oversea Negro medical strength (14,150), it may be assumed that at least 5,000, or more than one-third of this oversea strength, were allotted to sanitary companies (tables 31 and 42). Virtually all of the companies were concentrated in the European theater and the Pacific (table 42). These were the areas which were receiving the largest number of personnel of all types and this at a time when the War Department policies to promote oversea use of Negroes were becoming effective. The sanitary companies were trained primarily for the purposes of malaria control, but even in the Pacific, many were occupied in hospital construction and some were used as pools of Medical Department common labor.30
412 TABLE 42.-Negro Medical Department units overseas, Pearl Harbor to V-J Day1
1Compiled chiefly from copies of unit cards, W.D., A.G.O. Form
016, 1 Feb.
1942. In the absence of a serious malaria problem in the European theater the personnel of the sanitary companies serving therein, though used principally as litter bearers, were also used to guard prisoners of war occupied as Medical Department labor, to perform elementary carpentry and masonry tasks, to handle mail, and to pack supplies as well as operate small dispensaries and carry out basic sanitary measures in the vicinity of Medical Department units.31 Among other Negro Medical Department organizations that served overseas, the most important from a numerical point of view were the motor ambulance companies. Many of these units were employed in the European theater and lesser numbers in the North African theater and in the Southwest Pacific (table 42).
413 Distribution by Sex For much of the period of hostilities, female personnel of the Medical Department serving in oversea areas constituted a larger percentage of total Medical Department strength in such areas than they did of total Medical Department strength worldwide (tables 43 and 44). This situation existed until the threat of a draft brought the Army Nurse Corps up to authorized strength. Furthermore, Medical Department female personnel constituted the large majority by far of military female personnel in oversea areas during World War II. In the Zone of Interior, this ceased to be true as early as January 1943 (table 43). TABLE 43.-Proportion of Army female personnel in the Medical Department1
1Female strength is that of the female components
and excludes the small number of women who served in the Medical Corps. For
worldwide strength of women doctors, see table 1, footnote 3. In oversea areas,
probably no more than 18 women doctors saw service. 414 TABLE 44.-Oversea strength of Medical Department-male and female officer components, 30 September 1942-30 September 1945
1From table 32. Officer Strength Overseas, as in the Zone of Interior, the Medical Department contained a greater proportion of officers than did the Army in general, and between 16 and 19 of every 100 officers serving overseas were members of the Medical Department. For reasons already set forth, however, officers ordinarily constituted a somewhat smaller percentage of the Medical Department's strength overseas than they did of its worldwide strength. The year 1943 witnessed an exception to this rule (table 45). 415-416 TABLE 45.-Medical Department officer strength, worldwide and overseas, 30 November 1941-30 September 1945
1Includes all commissioned officers
as well as warrant officers, flight officers, and WAAC officers. Worldwide
strength except for March 1942 is worldwide officer strength as shown in
"Strength of the Army," for 1 October 1945, minus worldwide Medical
Department officer strength as shown in table 1 plus worldwide Medical
Department officer strength as shown here. Worldwide strength for March 1942
consists of Medical Department officer strength shown here plus worldwide
non-Medical Department officer strength as determined in accordance with
procedures for determining all strengths on that date described in table 31,
footnote 2. Oversea strength for all months except March 1942 from
"Strength of the Army," 1 October 1945.
Oversea strength for March 1942 determined in accordance with procedure for
ascertaining all oversea strength on that date described in table 31, footnote
2. Quality Medical Corps By the middle of 1945, the great majority of Medical Corps officers-amounting to at least 69 percent of the peak strength of the corps-had seen service overseas. The early shipment overseas of medical officers in affiliated units resulted in a decided improvement in the professional quality of medical care in those areas. Medical officers in these units were by experience and professional training highly skilled physicians. At the same time, the gains obtained in oversea theaters by the acquisition of these officers were a loss to Zone of Interior installations. Many older specialists who had served long in the Zone of Interior as specialists were transferred by their own request to oversea assignments. In mid-1945, about half the medical officers over the age of 50 who were not Regular Army personnel were overseas. A sizable majority of this age group serving in the Zone of Interior were assigned to the Veterans' Administration. In the entire medical service, including both Regulars and non-Regulars, the majority of the group in the over-50 category were overseas. 417 On the other hand, in the Zone of Interior, as large medical requirements for definitive and specialized care built up during the war, it was necessary concurrently to retain highly qualified specialists in the United States and, in fact, to return some from oversea theaters. In the early part of the war, despite the departure of affiliated units, the Zone of Interior retained more specialists than it released for oversea shipments. As the war progressed and the Zone of Interior installations were stripped of their specialists, the oversea theaters were considerably better staffed. Toward the end of the war, with the return of some specialists to the Zone of Interior and the induction of others, the two areas became approximately equal in quality. After V-E Day, the Zone of Interior again was better staffed. A greater proportion of its doctors were specialists than was the case overseas, and a greater proportion of these also had proficiency ratings above the minimum of D. What was more significant was the fact that this advantage was centered in the A and B categories (table 46). TABLE 46.-Strength and proficiency ratings of Medical Corps specialists, worldwide and overseas, 20 June 19451
1Basic data from "Summary
Sheet, Specialists Inventory Report Form as of 20 June 1945" in
"Classification Count" (prepared in the Personnel Service, Military
Personnel Division, Office of The Surgeon General). It is very difficult to compare with any degree of accuracy the overall quality of the medical officers in the individual theaters. In the early part of the war, because of the military strategy adopted, the Mediterranean and European theaters were favored from a qualitative point of view. But as the war progressed, efforts were made to raise the level of professional quality in the Pacific and in China-Burma-India as those theaters gained in military importance. 418 Dental Corps In the early part of the war, the distribution of dental personnel according to quality probably resembled that of the Medical Corps. The affiliated units which went overseas early contained highly skilled dentists as well as doctors. But the dental service overseas was never augmented to the same degree that the medical service was. One reason for this may be the fact that the Dental Corps never had as much as half its strength abroad, with the consequent likelihood that a great many of its members failed to see oversea service. It is also possible that the need for high quality dental personnel in oversea areas was relatively limited. Thus, the Zone of Interior managed to retain more of its highly qualified dental personnel than it sent overseas.32 Enlisted personnel There may have been a tendency for a brief period early in the war to retain the better type of Medical Department enlisted man in the Zone of Interior and to send abroad the misfits and other less desirable persons. One observer, at least, found that in the Southwest Pacific certain station hospitals activated just before departure for that area in 1942 contained what he considered an "abnormally high proportion" of problem cases.33The same observer noted, however, that many other units were not staffed in this manner and that the personnel authorities in the Office of The Surgeon General made vigorous efforts to prevent the objectionable practice. The various regulations covering oversea service of enlisted men issued after the beginning of 1944 increased the difficulty of retaining higher quality medical enlisted personnel in Zone of Interior installations. It is significant that The Surgeon General stated in October 1944 that the personnel most suited to be commissioned in the Medical Administrative Corps were warrant officers and Medical Department noncommissioned officers serving overseas.34 Late in the war, conditions overseas leading to a large-scale exchange of enlisted personnel between the Medical Department and the combat branches served to lower the quality of the enlisted personnel in the oversea medical service. A similar exchange and like deterioration also was taking place in the continental United States. Hence, it is difficult to determine whether, at the end of the war, the quality was higher at home or abroad. The later stages of the war also witnessed a tendency to send limited-service men overseas, particularly as members of communications zone units. Thus, in the communications zone of the European theater, there were 36,042 Medical Department
419 enlisted men who, as of 15 March 1945, were so classified and who constituted nearly 38 percent of the total strength of such personnel in the zone. The corresponding percentage for all the theater personnel was somewhat under 22 percent.35It need not be assumed, however, from the fact that large numbers of Medical Department enlisted men were regarded as unable to perform general duty, that they could not accomplish the tasks assigned to them in a satisfactory manner. Furthermore, it is likely that the limited-assignment Medical Department enlisted personnel in the communications zone constituted the great bulk of such personnel in the theater; in relation to the total Medical Department enlisted strength in the broader area, they were less than 16 percent. Non-Medical Department Personnel Overseas As in the Zone of Interior, chaplains, engineers, and other officer specialists worked in Medical Department installations overseas although, as already indicated, it is difficult to state the strength of such personnel with the precision possible in the case of Medical Department personnel proper.36 A similar group comprised the workers of the American Red Cross Hospital Service-field directors, assistant field directors, medical social workers, recreation workers, staff aides, and their assistants-who were assigned to or worked with Army medical units in virtually every oversea area. As in the continental United States, the Red Cross personnel handled patients' communications with their homes, aided soldiers with their financial and personal problems, and, in general, did all kinds of welfare work for members of the Army. They not only set up recreation programs in the hospitals, but also obtained social histories of the patients for their own or the medical officers' use. It was originally planned that Red Cross personnel assigned to the Army for service overseas should be placed only in general and station hospitals, but the importance of field, evacuation, and convalescent hospitals made it desirable to assign workers to these units too, and this at least in the case of evacuation hospitals was done within the theaters. Normally, Red Cross personnel were assigned to Army hospitals as follows: 5 workers per 1,000-bed general hospital, with 3 more for each additional 500 beds; 3 per station hospital (between 500 and 1,000 beds); 10 per convalescent center (in the European theater); and 2 for each field and 400-bed evacuation hospital. In cases where more workers were available, more might be assigned. Smaller medical units were usually covered by Red Cross field directors. Available statistics do not differentiate Red Cross personnel working in Army hospitals from those employed overseas in Navy and civilian medical
420 installations, but it is safe to assume that the bulk of oversea hospital workers of the American Red Cross worked in Army establishments. The total number of these workers increased from 73 in mid-1942 to 2,197 in the middle of 1945 (table 47).37 TABLE 47.-The American National Red Cross: Oversea hospital workers on duty and en route, 1942-45
Source: "Oversea Hospital Workers on Duty and Enroute as of June 30 (or nearest comparable date) 1943 through June 30, 1949," enclosure to letter, C. H. Whelden, Jr., Chief Statistician, The American National Red Cross, National Headquarters, to Historical Unit, Office of The Surgeon General, 6 June 1952. Members of the Women's Army Corps, civilians, and prisoners of war also swelled the strength of the medical service overseas beyond the figures revealed by statistics of Medical Department elements proper. PERMANENT LOSSES OF PERSONNEL Influences Affecting the Rate of Loss Factors tending to reduce the Medical Department's temporary as well as permanent losses, in comparison with those of the Army at large, were the location of the great bulk of medical personnel overseas in Army service areas, various communications zones, and base sections where the hazards of combat, though not absent, were minor, and the location of large numbers of personnel in the Zone of Interior. The extent to which these factors operated to reduce the dangers of combat is indicated by a comparison of the battle-casualty rates of the Medical Department with that of the Army as a whole (table 48). For officers, the Army rate was 36.6, while the Medical Department rate was 3.2; for enlisted personnel, the Army rate was 32.6, the Medical Department rate, 11.6; for officers and enlisted men combined, the Army rate was 32.6, the Medical Department rate, 10.1. (See also tables 49, 50, and 51.)
421-423 TABLE 48.-Battle casualties of the Medical Department, officers and enlisted men:1 Total battle casualties, deaths among battle casualties, and killed in action, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946
1Basic data, unless otherwise noted, from
"Battle Casualties by Duty, Branch, Type, and Disposition: 7 December
1946" in Department of the Army "Army Battle Casualties and
Nonbattle Deaths in World War II. Final Report 7 December 1941-31 December
1946," pp. 48-69. A full explanation of the categories of casualties is
found in the same document pp. 1 to 4, inclusive. Although casualty data, as
reported in this source, are cumulative, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946, it is
here assumed that all casualties were incurred prior to 1 October 1945, since
the number reported as having occurred subsequent to that date is negligible. (See
pp. 10-11 of the report.) 424-426 TABLE 49.-Battle casualties of the Medical Department, officers and enlisted men:1 Wounded and injured in action,2 7 December 1941-31 December 1946 427-429 TABLE 50.-Battle casualties of the Medical Department, officers and enlisted men:1 Captured and interned,2 7 December 1941-31 December 1946 430-431 432 The battle-casualty rates for individual officer groups of the Medical Department were: Medical Corps, 5.2; Dental Corps, 2.2; Veterinary Corps, 1.3; Sanitary Corps, 0.3; Pharmacy Corps, 0; Medical Administrative Corps, 3.5; Army Nurse Corps, 1.0; Dietitians, 0; Physical Therapists, 0. Location in rear areas not only reduced the dangers of combat but the likelihood of diseases and injuries that were more prevalent at the front than elsewhere-for example, malaria and cold injury. Little information is available on the incidence of noncombat injury in the Medical Department, but figures for nonbattle deaths amply bear out this statement (table 52). On the other hand, the Medical Department contained a higher than average proportion of women, limited-service troops, and persons of a high age level, many of whom had waived disabilities, all factors that tended to raise the rate of loss through hospitalization or discharge. Types of Permanent Loss Permanent losses of the Army comprised not only persons who were formally relieved from active service but those who, though nominally still in service, were absent from their duties because they were hospitalized, imprisoned for misconduct, captured by the enemy, missing in action, absent without leave, or had deserted. The total numbers of Medical Department personnel who were captured and missing in action have been determined (tables 50 and 51), but how many in either group were restored to the service before the end of hostilities is unknown. No figures are available for those who were permanently hospitalized, imprisoned as deserters, or absent without leave, but it is known that a very considerable number of persons hospitalized remained under treatment until the end of the war. 433-435 TABLE 52.-Nonbattle deaths in the Medical Department:1 Actual, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946; estimated, 7 December 1941-30 September 1945 436 Deaths In the Medical Department, the death rate from enemy action was a little more than one-fourth that in the Army as a whole, although there was a great variation in rate among the several Medical Department components (table 53). TABLE 53.-Deaths from enemy action: Medical Department and Army as a whole, 7 December 1941-30 September 19451
1Basic data on deaths are in tables
50 and 52. 437 Returns to civilian life The basic reasons for returns to civil life were physical and mental disabilities, the attainment of a certain age, inefficiency or misconduct, hardship and civilian needs, and demobilization in its early stages. Statistics on these causes for the entire war period are available only in the case of male Medical Department officers. A breakdown so far as enlisted men are concerned is available only for the period October 1943-June 1945 (tables 54, 55, 56, and 57). TABLE 54.-Returns to civil life: Officers of the Medical Department and of the Army as a whole, 7 December 1941-30 September 1945
1From table 52 for all officers, Army and Medical
Department, as well as for Medical, Dental, Veterinary, Medical Administrative,
and Army Nurse Corps, individually. All other median strengths were computed on
the basis of the dates used in computing the median strengths of the groups
already mentioned. Strength data constituting the course for the determination
of the median strengths of the combined male Medical Department personnel, the
combined Sanitary and Pharmacy Corps, and the combined Dietitians and
Physical Therapists are in table 1. Corresponding data for WAAC and WAC and all
Army male officers appear in "Strength of the Army," 1 Jan. 1947. 438 Physical and mental disability-The rates of discharge of Medical Department personnel for physical and mental disability were frequently high in comparison with those of the Army as a whole, particularly in the case of officers. The rate for male officers in general was 11.1. The higher rates of discharge were concentrated almost entirely in the Medical and Dental Corps; the Medical Administrative Corps and the combined Sanitary and Pharmacy Corps had rates well below those of male officers in the Army at large (tables 55 and 58). It will be noted that in the latter part of 1943 the rate of discharge for medical and dental officers was particularly high despite the fact that at that time the regulations authorizing release on physical grounds were less lenient for them than for other Army officers: In July of that year, the General Staff authorized the release of line officers qualified only for limited service, but specifically excepted doctors and dentists from the terms of its directive.38 Late in 1943, the rate at which male Medical Department officers of all corps were being granted discharges for physical reasons caused an investigation. At that time, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 (personnel) of the War Department General Staff, called the attention of Army Service Forces headquarters to the fact that in September 1943 the rate of discharge for Medical Department officers on grounds of physical disqualification was almost four times that for the rest of the Army. It was intimated that more careful scrutiny of doctors under consideration for discharge on those grounds might lead to their retention in a limited-service capacity.39 At the request of Army Service Forces headquarters, The Surgeon General appointed a board of officers to investigate the matter. The board reported that a careful review of the 143 separations for physical causes in September 1943 showed the action of retiring boards to be justified in 84 percent of the cases and unjustified in the remaining 16 percent. With regard to the latter groups, the board emphasized that, in the review, professional judgment rather than rigid interpretation of existing regulations was used to evaluate the officers' status. In the group of 123 whose separation appeared justified, 49 were retired because of defects which had existed prior to appointment. It was evident, the board declared, that none of the 49 should have been commissioned. "The chief apparent explanation of the acceptance of doctors who later had to be separated from the service lay in the fact that the urgent need for medical officers made it necessary frequently to commission individuals who did not meet the strict physical requirements of Army regulations."40
439-441 TABLE 55.-Returns of male Medical Department officers to civilian life, December 1941-September 19451 442 TABLE 56.-Returns of Medical Department enlisted men to civilian life, October 1943-June 19451
TABLE 57.-Returns to civil life: Enlisted men of the Medical Department and of the Army as a whole, October 1943-June 1945
1Revised figures exist for the Army, indicating that some revision of the Medical Department figures is also needed. The revised Army figures (from "Strength of the Army," 1 Jan. 1950) are as follows: October-December 1943, 190,187 (rate, 114.2); January-June 1944, 159,853 (rate, 46.0); July-December 1944, 262,958 (rate, 73.1); January-June 1945, 340,920 (rate, 94.5). The Army and Medical Department figures in the text are contemporaneous, both being drawn from data in the Monthly Progress Reports, Army Service Forces, for the periods shown. The same data for the Medical Department appear in table 56, where the mean strengths of medical enlisted personnel are shown. The mean strengths of Army male enlisted personnel were: October-December 1943, 6,664,339; January-June 1944, 6,949,670; July-December 1944, 7,193,678; January-June 1945, 7,217,133. Mean strengths are the average of the monthly means for the periods covered. Monthly means are the average of end-of-month strength of the particular month and the strength at the end of the preceding month as shown in "Strength of the Army," 1 Oct. 1945. 443 TABLE 58.-Rates of discharge for mental and physical disability: Male officers of the Medical Department and of the Army as a whole, December 1941-September 19451
1Basic data on disqualifications of all male officers are from "Strength of the Army," 1 Oct. 1950; of Medical Department officers, from table 55. Mean strengths for male officers in general, including warrant and flight officers, were computed from monthly means of end-of-month strengths shown in "Strength of the Army," 1 Jan. 1947. These mean strengths are as follows: December 1941-June 1943, 286,887: July-December 1943, 602,393; January-June 1944, 668,487; July-December 1944, 708,695; January-June 1945, 811,693; July-September 1945, 831,028. For mean strengths of male Medical Department officers, see table 55. The board report also stated that "the racial distribution of medical officers separated by reason of physical disability may be significant," but it did not explain this statement further. Although admitting it was conceivable that professional relations between members of a disposition board and the officer whose record was under review could have been a factor in the high rate of Medical Department officer separation, the board considered this "highly improbable." The board also suggested that the high discharge rate of Medical Department officers in general was attributable partly to the fact that they were older, on the average, than other officers. A report on Medical Department officers retired in September, October, and November 1943 added the following points:41 There is a relative excess of Medical Corps officers among the Medical Department officers retired. There is a relative excess of 1st lieutenants in the group * * *. The average period served by retired Medical Department officers was approximately 14 months. In nearly 90 percent of cases the disability leading to retirement was judged not contracted in line of duty. The types of disability leading to retirement and their incidences were similar to those in the retirement of non-Medical Department officers. The rate of discharge of Medical Corps officers for physical disability was markedly lower in the first half of 1944 than it had been previously. Possible reasons for the decline may have been the influx into the corps of younger men of greater stamina from the medical schools, the elimination
444 earlier of some officers who might otherwise have been discharged during this period, and perhaps also a less liberal attitude on the part of reviewing boards in consequence of criticism. The rate of discharge of dental officers declined at the same time, though not so sharply as that of doctors, and in the last half of 1944, it leaped upward while the rate for doctors continued to decline. The policy of discharging dentists to avoid a surplus had been inaugurated as early as April 1944, and in the same month, the authorization to discharge limited-service officers had been extended, under certain conditions, to dentists. The upward trend in discharges for disability during 1945 among male officers throughout the Army no doubt represented, in part, the effect of physical deterioration as the war was prolonged. The fact that the rate was so much higher in the Medical Department than in the Army as a whole probably reflects the higher age level of the group, as well as its larger proportion of men who had waived disability in entering the Army. So far as enlisted men were concerned, the disability-discharge rate from October 1943 until June 1945 was not greatly different in the Medical Department from what it was in the Army as a whole (table 59). Physical and mental disability caused most of the separations of male Medical Department officers from service during the war period. The same is true of separations of Medical Department enlisted men during the period from October 1943 to June 1945; in this case, physical and mental disability caused two-thirds of the discharges (table 56). Data on discharges resulting from this cause exist for all three women's officer components of the Medical Department for the period 1 September 194--30 June 1945 and also for the following 3 months. One cause of the great disparity between these two periods in the rates of discharge is the fact that during the first period the reporting was very incomplete. Since pregnancy caused the great majority of disability discharges, the rates for that cause are shown separately in table 60. TABLE 59.-Disability-discharge rate: Enlisted men of the Medical Department and of the Army as a whole, October 1943- June 1945
1Basic data on Army discharges are from Monthly Progress Reports, Army Service Forces; on Medical Department discharges, from table 53. For mean strengths of Army enlisted men, see footnote to table 54. For mean strengths of Medical Department enlisted men, see table 55. Revised figures for medical discharges of enlisted men of the Army as a whole are given in "Strength of the Army," 1 Oct. 1950, as follows: October-December 1943, 167,148 (rate, 100.3); January-June 1944, 120,570 (rate, 36.4); July-December 1944, 262,958 (rate, 60.2); January-July 1945, 162,022 (rate, 44.9). 445 TABLE 60.-Discharges for disability: Army Nurse Corps, Dietitians, and Physical Therapists, 1 September 1944-30 September 19451
1Basic data are from records in Statistical and
Accounting Branch,
Statistical Section, Personnel Statistics Unit, Office of
The Adjutant General. Attainment of a certain age.-Age alone caused the discharge of very few male officers of the Medical Department. Retirements, which also included retirements for physical disability after 20 years' service, occurred at the rate of 0.56 not materially different from the rate of 0.67 for male Army officers in general.42 Another basis for the discharge of officers was "overage in grade." Of the very few male Medical Department officers released for this reason, the majority came from the Medical Corps (table. 55). In December 1943, the War Department authorized the discharge of all Army officers 45 years of age and over for whom no suitable assignment existed. A month later the age limit was lowered to 38.43 At the end of 1944, the age limit for discharges on this ground was removed, but it was indicated that persons over 38 would be given more consideration than others.44 Actually, the great majority discharged afterward under this rule were over 38. In the approximately 21 months of war during which the rule was in operation, more male Medical Department officers were released through its workings than were discharged throughout the war for any other reason except physical and mental disability, and more than 80 percent of those so
446 released were members of the Dental Corps. The rates for the various corps were as follows:
Nevertheless, the Medical Department rate for most of this period was much lower than that for male officers of the Army at large. Thus, the Medical Department rate for January-June 1944 was 0.8; the Army rate, 9.2; for July-December 1944, the rates were 4.5 and 11.5; and for January-June 1945, 9.2 and 8.0. The return of enlisted men to civilian life for reasons involving age included retirements. Comparative figures on retirements are available only for the year 1 July 1944-30 June 1945. They show a slightly higher rate for the Medical Department 0.3 than for the Army as a whole (0.2) (table 56). Beginning in December 1942, the Army permitted the release of enlisted men over 38 years old who were less useful to the Army than to industry and who could show that a job was waiting for them in an essential war industry. Under this rule, men were discharged outright, but at least as early as 1943 they could be transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps,45 although some continued to be discharged. Then, in April and May 1945, when the war in Europe was ending, successive directives46 permitted the discharge of enlisted personnel, at first over 42 years of age and then over 40, almost without restriction. Figures for the Army at large show heavy discharges in the age category for the months following December 1942, and then a decline. In the last few months of 1943, when comparative figures for the Medical Department first became available, the rates for the Army and the Medical Department were on the way to becoming insignificant until they shot upward during the period when the directives of April and May 1945 took effect. Comparative rates for October-December 1943 were: Medical Department 1.07, Army 0.23; for January-June 1944, Medical Department 0.16, Army 0.14; for July-December 1944, Medical Department 0.03, Army 0.04; and for January-June 1945, Medical Department 7.43, Army 7.08. Meanwhile, the rates of transfer to the Enlisted Reserve Corps, at first much higher than the rate of discharges, descended without a break. In this case, the comparative rates for November-December 1943 were: Medical Department 3.5, Army 5.0; for January-June 1944, Medical Department 2.2, Army 2.4; for July-December 1944, Medical Department l.5, Army 1.2; and
447 for January-June 1945, Medical Department 1.3, Army 1.4.47 The majority were transferred for reasons of age. Among the minority transferred for other reasons, probably most returned to active duty before the end of hostilities. Inefficiency and misconduct-Among male officers of the Medical Department, 324 were discharged specifically for inefficiency and misconduct during the course of the war (table 55). Of these, 120 were separated from the service through the action of reclassification boards. Another eight were discharged for unsatisfactory service, presumably without such proceedings. Of the remainder, 139 were given discharges without honor and 57 received dishonorable discharges; as already noted, these are to be understood as separations in addition to those resulting from action by reclassification boards, although the latter could recommend any type of discharge-honorable, dishonorable, or without honor. These boards, which existed throughout the Army, could propose (among other things) the separation of officers brought before them on allegations of inefficiency, misconduct, or undesirable habits and traits of character. The person involved might be returned to his command for trial by court martial. A board was to recommend honorable discharge if it found the officer to be merely incompetent; it could recommend a dishonorable discharge or one without honor in case of misconduct or undesirable habits or traits.48 For both officers and enlisted men, the rates of discharge for misconduct in the Medical Department were lower than those for the Army as a whole, reflecting, in part, a greater degree of professionalism and a higher age and maturity level; in part, the psychological effect of feeling that they were saving rather than taking lives. Another important factor was the fact that Medical Department personnel were less subject to the hazards and strains of combat. Hardship and civilian needs-Very few male Medical Department officers were separated from the service because of "undue hardship" to themselves or their families, the pertinent annual rate being only 0.3 per 1,000. Somewhat more were discharged on the score of their importance to the Government or the community in a civilian capacity. Provision was made for releasing individuals who were "keymen in industry and Government" or who were essential to "the national health, safety, or interest." Both provisions applied to enlisted personnel as well as officers. Only 19 male officers of the Medical Department were released under them up to the end of 1944. Well before that time, the Procurement and Assignment Service had advocated releasing physicians who came from communities where there was a shortage, but this plan failed to obtain tangible results. After a conference in January 1945 between representatives of the Army and the Procurement and Assignment Service, the Army announced its new policy: Medical officers over 39
448 years of age who were qualified for general service or who were practicing a specialty in the Medical Department, who were deemed "worthy cases" could be discharged. This procedure resulted in virtually no discharges before the end of June 1945, but by 30 September of that year, a total of 75 medical officers and 4 other male Medical Department officers had been discharged under the "National and community health" provision. By the same date, 44 male Medical Department officers, mostly members of the Medical and Medical Administrative Corps, had obtained release as "keymen." These factors produced an annual rate of loss among male Medical Department officers amounting to 0.5 per 1,000. The number of enlisted men discharged for the same reasons is not available. Demobilization-Among the permanent losses of the Medical Department during the war must be counted that group of personnel discharged in accordance with established demobilization procedures, limited as they were, between May 1945, when these regulations went into effect, and the end of hostilities. The regulations apparently had no effect on the discharges of male Medical Department officers before July 1945, and by the end of September had caused the release of less than 90 officers. For nurses, on the other hand, the demobilization regulations were operative as early as May; up to the end of September, somewhat more than 200 nurses had been discharged under them.49 The number of Medical Department enlisted men demobilized before the end of the war is available only through June 1945; by that date, it amounted to 4,942 (table 56). Transfers to other branches of the Army Transfers of Medical Department personnel to other branches of the Army represented another type of Medical Department loss. Although figures on this point are lacking, transfers of officers from the Medical Department were necessarily less than that of Medical enlisted personnel, the highly specialized training of most of the Department's officers and the fact that a large proportion of them were women made it difficult and inadvisable to transfer them. The majority of those transferred were Medical Administrative Corps officers who were transferred to combat or other service branches of the Army. Transfer of enlisted men, on the other hand, was considerably more important numerically; the repeated efforts of medical authorities to stop the flow of medically trained enlisted men out of the Department are an indication that the loss was substantial. This was particularly true toward the end of the war when personnel were desperately short. In the Mediterranean theater in November 1944 to February 1945, 25 percent of general-assignment enlisted men in station and general hospitals were replaced by limited-service men.
449 This impression is confirmed by the experience of the European theater. There the number of enlisted men scheduled to be given up in the latter part of 1944 and in 1945 was in excess of 12,000, and even though by special arrangements the great majority of these eventually were retained in the medical service, more than 4,000 were transferred out of it.50
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