Headquarters Second Infantry
Division
Office of the Surgeon
Medical Bulletin
DEC 1944
HEADQUARTERS SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Surgeon
APO #2, U.S. Army
1 January 1945
The Second Infantry Division until December 12, 1944
was in a holding position generally along the Siegfried Line with front
line units being located in the Schnee Eifel Forest on the western
border of Germany. On December 12th the Division closed in the
Elsenborn-Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld area in preparation for an attack
eastward. The attack proceeded satisfactorily until the recent
German counteroffensive occurred on December 16th. At this time
the Division took up a stubborn defensive position in the
Elsenborn-Wirtzfeld-Berg area and aided greatly in stopping the German
counteroffensive from advancing farther to the north and the
west. The Division remained in a holding position in the
Elsenborn-Berg area at the end of the month.
The total battle casualties for the Division for the
month was 1966, of which 80 were officers. It is impossible to
accurately determine the ratio of killed to wounded since it is
impossible to determine in the recent engagement how many MIA actually
lost their lives. The total non-battle casualties evacuated from
the Division to the Clearing Station for the month was 1971. 148
cases were returned to duty from the Clearing Station within 24
hours. Practically all of these 148 were mild combat exhaustion
cases. The ratio of battle casualties to non-battle casualties
was approximately 1 to 1. Due to intensive combat in the
Krinkelt-Wirtzfeld area there was a marked increase in the ratio of
battle casualties over non-battle casualties compared with the previous
several months. Thirteen cases of "new" acute gonorrhea
were incurred during the month. The large percentage of these
cases had their contact in Paris while on pass. Forty-nine cases
of gastrointestinal conditions in comparison to forty-one last month
were admitted to the Clearing Station. Fourteen cases of
trichophytosis pedis (athlete’s foot) in comparison with
six last month were admitted to the Clearing Station. 153 case of
“trench foot” in comparison to thirty-eight last month were admitted to
the Clearing Station. This noticeable increase is due to living
and fighting under winter conditions. 134 cases of respiratory
disease in comparison with 139 last month were admitted to the Clearing
Station. Considering the environmental conditions this is
believed to be a small number. There were 651 cases of combat
exhaustion as compared to fifty-nine cases last month. The marked
increase is due to intensive combat under marked hardships of winter
weather. Combat exhaustion this month accounted for thirty-three
percent of the non-battle casualties. There was a total of 1696
diseases (all causes) in comparison to 1019 last month. The
increase is accounted for by the higher incidence of combat
exhaustion. 3192 cases were evacuated from the Division to the
Clearing Station during the month of December. 352 or 11% were
returned to duty directly from the Clearing Station. This small
number of returnees is due to two reasons. The large number of
evacuations and the rearward displacement of the Station made it
impossible to hold many patients. During the latter part of the
month due to inadequate housing facilities the forward Clearing Station
has been operating under tentage.
[Statistical tables on pages 2-4 covering admissions from 30 November
to 31 December 1944 are withdrawn.-ed.]
4
There were a total of 178 medical casualties as
compared with 49 last month. The difficulties encountered in intense
winter warfare notably increased the number of exhaustion cases.
During the past month several factors concerning
Division Medical service are of interest. The Division was fighting
under winter conditions with a variable amount of snow on the
ground. Secondly, in the recent German counteroffensive it was
the first time in this war that the Division was ordered to make a
withdrawal. The hardships of winter warfare caused an increase in
non-battle casualties, particularly in the incidence of combat
exhaustion, trench foot and frostbite. As mentioned above,
respiratory disease and gastrointestinal conditions showed no
increase. The front line troops all have quartermaster issue of
current combat clothing, sleeping bags and overshoes (arctics).
The arctics, the large majority of which are the fabric type, have been
a great help in lowering the incidence of trench foot and frostbite but
have not completely prevented it. The front line troops are
literally living and sleeping in fox holes. This has prevented
normal exercise of the lower extremities. By necessity the
position underground has also been a factor in inhibiting proper
circulation of the feet. It is strongly urged, even though
sleeping in fox holes, that the shoes be removed before going to
sleep. Massage of the feet is of material help in stimulating the
circulation. The shoes and leggings should always be laced
loosely to prevent any inhibition of circulation to the feet.
In the recent German counteroffensive problems
encountered by the Collecting Companies are covered in this bulletin by
the Commanding Officer, 2d Medical Battalion. The problems
encountered by the Infantry Battalions are covered by the Surgeon, 38th
Infantry.
5
At the beginning of the recent German
counteroffensive on December 16th the Clearing Station was set up with
a platoon on each rear flank of the Division. The platoon and
adjacent field hospital set up on the flank receiving the unexpected
German counteroffensive had to be rapidly withdrawn with resulting loss
of medical equipment but no personnel or patients. The Clearing
Station on the north west flank of the Division, though four miles from
our front line elements, was in an excellent building and continued to
function there until the front line units were withdrawn to that
vicinity. This forward Clearing Platoon during the first two days
of the counterattack received casualties from three Divisions plus
attached units. Due to the road from the Collecting Stations
being cut by enemy action evacuation by ambulance was impossible during
certain periods. In addition there were insufficient army
ambulances to evacuate the Clearing Station so Medical Battalion trucks
and other available vehicles were utilized. In a situation of
this nature, where a withdrawal movement is probable and actually
occurred, it is necessary to keep the Clearing Station evacuated and
mobile so that it can move on short notice. Also in an action of
this nature it is believed that the Clearing Station should be
echeloned into a forward and rear platoon, the forward platoon to give
necessary treatment to battle casualties for further evacuation to the
rear. The value of the rear Clearing Platoon is in holding minor
cases which can be returned to duty status in several days and also to
take over in case the forward Clearing Platoon has to be withdrawn on
short notice.
During the recent German counteroffensive more than
ninety percent of the battle casualties were due to shell fragments,
particularly from enemy fire. The casualties due to mines and
enemy aerial activity, namely bombing and strafing, have been very
small in number. Of note is the fact that an unfortunate landing
of a V-1 (buzz bomb) on the 702d Ordnance Company accounted for 1
KIA and 18 wounded requiring evacuation.
[signed]
Walter R. Cook
Lt. Col., M.C.
Surgeon
6
Headquarters Second Infantry Division
Office of the Surgeon
APO #2, U.S. Army
1 January 1945
The following data of combat exhaustion in the 2d
Infantry Division has been compiled for your information. The
period concerned in this report is from 1 to 31 December 1944,
inclusive.
Cases Admitted to 2d Division Clearing Station:
|
9th
Infantry |
23d
Infantry |
38th Infantry |
Hq Co |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Sv Co |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Med
Det |
27 |
21 |
6 |
Cn Co |
1 |
0 |
0 |
A-T Co |
2 |
0 |
1 |
Hq 1 Bn |
5 |
1 |
2 |
Co A |
182 |
611 |
36 |
Co B |
19 |
1 |
15 |
Co C |
36 |
0 |
12 |
Co D |
8 |
6 |
3 |
Hq 2d Bn |
5 |
2 |
1 |
Co E |
56 |
10 |
10 |
Co F |
20 |
3 |
13 |
Co G |
29 |
1 |
5 |
Co H |
20 |
1 |
4 |
Hq 3d Bn |
5 |
3 |
1 |
Co I |
28 |
13 |
5 |
Co K |
36 |
58 |
4 |
Co L |
14 |
7 |
5 |
Co M |
9 |
10 |
4 |
Total |
332 |
148 |
97 |
Other Units in 2d Division:
2d Engr Bn |
30 |
2d Med
Bn |
2 |
12th FA
Bn |
2 |
15th FA
Bn |
4 |
37th FA Bn |
13 |
38th FA Bn |
3 |
2d Q.M. Co |
6 |
2d Div Hq |
10 |
M.P.
Platoon |
4 |
Total |
74 |
Total Casualties admitted to Clearing Station:
1314 764 727
387
Percentage of Combat Exhaustion of all admissions:
25.2% 19.4% 13.3%
19.1%
Total number admitted to Clearing Station, December 651
Admitted to Clearing Station second time for exhaustion
141
Number evacuated to Evac Hospital 522
Number returned to duty from Clearing Station
129
Percentage of Combat Exhaustion of all admissions 20.3%
Of the total number of cases none were recent replacements.
During the month there were 141 cases of exhaustion
who had previously been evacuated for the same condition. There
were no cases with less than 30 days combat.
7
[Admission statistics, 1-31 December 1944, withdrawn.-ed]
8
There were 651 cases of combat exhaustion during the
month of December as compared to fifty-nine cases for the month of
November. This marked increase is due to difficult weather
conditions, the attack on heavily fortified positions, the increase in
enemy artillery, and the psychological outlook of the men who made the
attack beginning December 13th.
When the Division moved into the vicinity of
Elsenborn they left heated shelters and slept in the cold, snow, mist,
and rain. Everything that would assist in the comfort of the men
was done, but naturally in such a situation it was impossible to keep
them dry and warm. any of the men diagnosed as combat exhaustion
were actually cases of exposure.
When the attack occurred on December 13th and the
men were having difficulty moving forward against strongly fortified
positions they were subjected to very intense enemy artillery
fire. Their positions were made even more intolerable because
they were in a forest with innumerable tree bursts. This was the
exciting cause in over ninety-five percent of the cases.
The predisposing factors mentioned in the previous
bulletin have been well exemplified by the attack of December
13th. Over ninety percent of the exhaustion cases fell into one
of three categories. In the first group were men who had been
wounded and evacuated past the division level and had developed a
conditioned fear complex. The second group comprised of those who
had previously been evacuated for exhaustion and had been returned to
the division. The third group were men who had been fighting since the
Division landed in Normandy and might be termed battle fatigue cases.
There were very few who could be thought of as
malingerers. A cursory inspection by even a layman would reveal
that they were chilled, wet, and exhausted. Such expressions as
–“I’m no good up there any more”, “I can’t stand those shells”, “I go
crazy”, “My luck has run out”, “I can’t drag myself forward”, and “I’m
a coward”– are typical. The self condemnation used in a great
many cases might be taken as true had not the background of these
soldiers been known. The only logical conclusion to be drawn is
that many are no longer fit for combat and should be evacuated or
rotated to non combat duty. There are of course exceptions to
this and a few are ready and willing to rejoin their units after a
brief treatment.
The large number of exhaustion cases in the initial
phases of the assault did not come as a complete surprise. In
truth it was to be expected. It could be predicted that a great
number would reach their point of tolerance when they approached their
first difficult objective and the artillery became intense.
It is interesting to note that after December 14th,
which was the second day of the attack by the 9th Infantry, the
exhaustion cases decreased markedly. December 15th and 16th were
fairly inactive days for the infantry units. On December 17th the
men were aware of the German offensive and the seriousness of the
situation. There was very little means of evacuation and the men
who were considered exhaustion cases were sent to camp Elsenborn to
rejoin their units. In a period of two days over five hundred men
were interviewed at Camp Elsenborn and approximately four hundred of
those were returned to their units. Unquestionably a great many
men rejoined their units because of a deep feeling of individual and
unit pride and that now if ever they were needed.
The total number of exhaustion cases appears higher
than it actually is because approximately one hundred of the exhaustion
cases were in the Division Clearing Station, marked duty, and then seen
at Division rear and evacuated to the exhaustion center. Their
names appeared of the Division Clearing Station’s Admission and
Disposition sheet a second time.
Considering the difficult mission of the Division
under the handicap of weather and terrain with an enemy offensive
striking them in their rear and on their right flank the exhaustion
rate could not be considered excessively high.
[signed]
GILBERT B. KELLEY
Major, MC, Neuropsychiatrist
9
Office of the Surgeon, 38th
Infantry
APO 2, U.S. Army
1 January 1945
The three-day action 17 to 19 December, inclusive,
had three difficult situations for evacuation, namely a daylight
withdrawal, a holding action against a very stubborn enemy, and a night
withdrawal under enemy artillery fire. The first phase of this
engagement, the daylight withdrawal, was made with a minimum number of
casualties and no difficulties were encountered until one battalion was
entering the northern part of Rocherath, Belgium. A large volume
of artillery and small arms fire was placed on the road used by this
battalion with a resulting forty to fifty casualties in a very short
time. The road from this point to the nearest Aid Station was
jammed with double banked vehicles which made evacuation
impossible. The casualties were carried into any available house
for first aid treatment and a short time later were collected and
transported to the Collecting Station. At this time there was a
great volume of traffic from many other units evacuating the town in a
state of near rout. When there were casualties in these units it
was difficult to evacuate them due to the fact that our vehicles and
medical personnel were completely denied the use of the roads.
Had the enemy closely followed our withdrawal from the north,
evacuation of all casualties would have been impossible.
By 2000 on 17 December an organized defense had been
established, the road had been closed and all casualties had been
evacuated to the Collecting Station. At that time there was no
known route of evacuation leading to the rear and the Collecting
Station served as a holding Station for the area. On the morning
of 18 December the Collecting Station was in great danger of being
overrun by enemy Infantry and tanks. A number of vehicles of all
kinds were assembled with all available ambulances and more than one
hundred casualties were evacuated in a two hour period. During
the preceding night and that day casualties were evacuated very soon
after being hit. This was due to the fact that Aid Stations were
very close to or almost in the front lines and that litter squads could
use houses for defilade from small arms fire. The Aid Station of
the left flank Battalion was located less than one hundred yards from a
road junction almost constantly occupied by enemy tanks. One
ambulance made at least ten trips to this station the last day, very
often under direct observation by the enemy. Ambulances and
ambulance jeeps made numerous trips up the only road under all types of
fire with the result that all of them were hit at least once and some
several times with the resultant loss of three ambulance jeeps and one
ambulance. Remarkably enough none of the drivers were wounded
although one patient was killed and one wounded in the rear of an
ambulance.
A regimental collecting point was established in a
central location of Krinkelt and casualties from all Battalions were
evacuated through that point. The main difficulty arising at this
time was that it took about four hours for an ambulance to make the
round trip over the nearly impassable evacuation route. 2
½ ton trucks were utilized for evacuation and even
severely wounded patients seemed to survive this rough ride
unusually well. During the nite of 18 December thirty-five
casualties from another unit which had been surrounded were evacuated
from a point just inside the German lines. The withdrawal began
1730 on 19 December.
Prior to the withdrawal all excess medical personnel
were sent to the rear due to the fact that the short lines of
evacuation did not require large numbers of men. All wounded were
evacuated prior to the withdrawal. Four ambulances and three 2
½ ton trucks remained available. The Battalion
Surgeon with an ambulance or other vehicle followed each Battalion from
the area dropping all casualties at the Regimental Collecting point in
order to have empty vehicles for further evacuation. Wounded were
loaded on every vehicle that passed. After two Battalions had
passed all wounded were loaded on vehicles and sent to the rear leaving
two ambulances and one 2 ½ ton truck for the rear
battalion. This Battalion Surgeon, with these vehicles, followed
the foot column out of the area picking up all casualties along the
route. The enemy failed to react until the last Battalion
10
was nearly past the critical point and only a few casualties were then
sustained. Total casualties incurred during the nite withdrawal
in the Regiment were approximately fifty.
The danger of being cut off completely made it
necessary to evacuate casualties immediately as they occurred.
Due to the fact that all necessary vehicles were made available for the
evacuation and that a road was kept open to the rear a difficult
problem of evacuation was facilitated. In this type of winter
warfare the wounded go into immediate shock even with slight wounds and
it was necessary for each litter squad to carry four blankets.
Aid Stations must be located in heated houses whenever possible.
Large amounts of plasma must be given to patients that normally would
not receive it. The supply difficulty in this operation was
facilitated by the use of abandoned medical supplies which were
ample. In the last stages of the withdrawal the treatment of all
patients was cursory but this seemed unavoidable. The incidence
of combat exhaustion was less than would be expected but it is believed
that many of them who would have presented themselves for evacuation
stayed because of the determination to stop and defeat the enemy.
The American Infantryman at this stage of combat showed an extreme
anger at the enemy for certain incidents that occurred.
[signed]
David F. Weaver
Major, M.C.
Surgeon, 38th Infantry
11
HEADQUARTERS SECOND MEDICAL BATTALION
APO #2 - U. S. ARMY
1 January 1945
From 1 December to 12 December 1944, the Second
Medical Battalion functioned in support of the Second Infantry Division
and attached units in defensive positions along the Siegfried Line with
front line combat elements being located in the Schnee Eifel Forest
region. During this period the Collecting Stations were
comfortably established in farm houses in close proximity to their
respective combat teams. The Clearing Station was set up in
excellent building in St. Vith, Belgium, the building space being
adequate to hospitalize one hundred patients.
On December 12 1944, the Division closed into the
Elsenborn-Krinkelt area. In the recent German counter-offensive
on the morning of 17 December 1944, a strong enemy force which had
penetrated the American lines to the south, arrived in the town of
Bullingen, Belgium. Upon their arrival the sole route of evacuation was
cut from the Collecting Station “A” at Rocherath, Collecting Station
“B” at Murringen and Collecting Station “C” at Krinkelt to the
Collecting Stations at Dom Butgenbach and Elsenborn.
During the period 16 December to 18 December 1944,
the Medical Battalion learned for the first time the concrete
implications for a Divisional medical service of retrograde movement
and deep enemy penetration. The impact was felt seriously by the
Collecting Companies within whose zone of action the penetration
occurred. The experiences of Collecting Company “C”, normally a
part of the 38th Combat Team, may be cited as an example as follows.
Not until 1200 17 December 1944, was it learned by
the Company Commander that a German counter-offensive had cut the
supply and evacuation route of the 38th Combat Team. Persistent
enemy artillery fire had destroyed electric power and telephone
communication lines. The Combat Teams were ordered to hold the towns of
Rocherath and Krinkelt. At first it was contemplated moving the
Collecting Station forward into a woods where it would be safer from
enemy action threatening the rear from the direction of
Bullingen. It was later decided to remain in buildings in the
center of town next to the church and cemetary [sic]. Since the
route of evacuation was cut, plans were made for accumulating all
casualties from fighting units in and around the town for an indefinite
period of time.
Geneva markers were placed on the roof, red cross
flags were put up on all building corners, ambulances were parked in
front of doorways, windows were sandbagged, water and food were
accumulated and personnel were dispersed in three separate locations in
the town. Additional space in buildings was made available at strategic
points for the accumulation of casualties, each with a cellar for cover.
During the evening of 17 December 1944, casualties
which had begun to accumulate in large numbers were transported out of
town in all available ambulances and trucks, including the Collecting
Company kitchen truck, by volunteer drivers who had no assurance that a
back road, improvised by the 2nd Engineer Battalion, was yet
open. These drivers were not seen again until the Collecting
Company hiked out about twenty-four (24) hours later.
Space in buildings was now available to accumulate
more casualties throughout the night. Shortly after dusk of 17 December
1944, Collecting Station “C” was under intense artillery
barrage. Casualties occurring outside the station were brought
in. A near air burst shattered all the windows, partially
destroyed one wall and rendered a station attendant unconscious from
blast injury. Casualties again began to accumulate in the
buildings of the Station. By this time the barrage had lifted and
Germany infantry and tanks were infiltrating into the streets of the
town. A German "Tiger" tank had taken up position twenty-five yards
from the Collecting Station. Members of the Company could hear
German commands in broken English as he ordered American soldiers
driving
12
trucks and jeeps around the corner to “Dismount and be
recognized.” These were shot in cold blood where they stood and
two of them, still breathing, were brought into the Collecting Station
where they died of their wounds despite frantic efforts to save them.
By daybreak of 18 December 1944, one hundred (100)
casualties had accumulated in the Collecting Station. Essential
medical supplies were running low since it was impossible for
transportation to return from the rear. At 0900 three (3)
commandeered 2 ½ ton trucks were loaded with casualties and
transported over a cross country evacuation route made available for
one-way traffic to the rear. After this the Company made its way
out and returned to the rear on foot.
At this time it was impossible to assess some of the
damage that had been incurred the night before. Two ambulances
had been crushed against a wall outside the Collecting Station by the
tank battles that raged in the street. Two (2) 3/4 ton weapon
carriers had been irrevocably crushed by “Tiger” tanks. The
Medical Battalion “Wrecker”, which had arrived the previous day to
retrieve a wrecked ambulance, had received a direct artillery hit and
was completely burned out. An ambulance continued to operate
after having its roof partially torn off by an unexploded armor
piercing shell fired by a “Tiger” tank while the ambulance was parked
outside the Collecting Station. The buildings housing some one
hundred (100) casualties and medical personnel during the night had
been miraculously spared except for partial destruction of one
wall. Because of the one-way traffic rule over the only available
route to the rear, transportation was unable to return and the Company
was forced to abandon its remaining medical equipment.
The accomplishment of medical records was very
difficult in a situation of this nature. It is estimated that
some three hundred (300) battle casualties were evacuated during the
two days by Collecting Company “C”. There were three (3) deaths
in the Station. These were all severe gunshot wounds of the chest
and it is likely they would have died in any case. No casualties
were left behind although it was necessary to abandon the three (3)
dead for lack of transportation.
The experiences of the other two Collecting
Companies were equally unconventional and hazardous during the period
16 to 18 December 1944. However, the program of casualty
collection from the Division as a whole was never at any time in
jeopardy. By the time that Collecting Company “C” had exhausted
its usefulness in Krinkelt, the Division had only three (3) battalions
of the 38th Infantry on the line. Collecting Company “A” by this
time was ideally situated in the town of Elsenborn to take up where
Collecting Company “C” had left off. By combination and rotation
of ambulances, litter bearers, station personnel and equipment among
the three (3) Collecting Companies, continuous casualty collection was
maintained for the Division as a whole. Collecting Company “B”,
echeloned behind Collecting Company “A” in Sourbrodt, constituted an
alternative casualty collecting point should further withdrawal have
become necessary.
[signed]
CECIL F. JORNS
Lt Colonel, Medical Corps
Commanding
Source: National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 112,
Entry 54A, 2d Infantry Division, 1943-45, Box 388.
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