U.S. Army Medical Department, Office of Medical History
Skip Navigation, go to content







AMEDD MEDAL OF HONOR RECIPIENTS External Link, Opens in New Window






Chapter XXVI

Field Operations, Table of Contents


SECOND PHASE - Continued


At the beginning of the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation, the Fifth Corps, which held the center of the attacking lines, consisted, from right to left, of the 3d and 32d Divisions. During the previous night and the forenoon of October 4, the 91st Division (less the 58th Field Artillery Brigade), had been relieved from the front line and had passed to the corps reserve in the vicinity of Bois de Very and Bois de Cheppy.1 The 32d Division had moved over to the left, relieving the 91st, and divided the corps front with the 3d Division.2 The 42d Division, in the vicinity of Recicourt, had now passed from the army reserve and was attached to the Fifth Corps as reserve.3 The corps was ordered to attack the heights on both sides of Romagne. The 3d Division was ordered to assist the left division, Third Corps, to capture the Bois de Ogons, Bois de Cunel, and the heights east of Romagne. The 32d Division was ordered to capture Gesnes and the heights west of Romagne, and to assist the 1st Division on its left in the capture of Bois de Moncy.4

On October 4, at 5.25 a. m., the attack began, the troops being preceded by a barrage at 300 meters (327 yards). During the afternoon both divisions encountered strongly organized machine-gun resistance and artillery fire. Advance elements of the 3d Division reached as far north as the Romagne—Cunel road. At 5 p. m. the 32d Division reported that their troops had passed through Gesnes. The 3d Division reported that they were attacking Romagne and that their troops were along the Romagne—Cunel road. At 7.45 p. m. the 3d Division reported its inability to get the Cierges—Romagne road because of machine-gun fire from the Bois de Gesnes. During the night the 32d Division occupied a position south of Bois de la Morine and had elements of this division entrenched along the Gesnes—Cierges road.2, 5

On October 5 the attack continued at 6.30 a. m. At noon the line of the 32d Division was near the edge of Bois du Chene Sec. At the same hour the corps line ran approximately through the Bois du Chene Sec to the northern exit of Gesnes to the Bois de Cunel. At midnight the line taken was practically as follows: Hill 268, Hill 253, Gesnes, Bois du Chene Sec. 2, 5

No attack was ordered for the morning of October 6. Field Orders, No. 62, Fifth Corps, directed the Fifth Corps to organize for further attack and to establish the general line of resistance for defense, as follows: Nantillois—Bois de Beuge—Bois Emont—Bois Communal de Cierges—Bois Communal de Baulny.

On October 7 Field Orders, No. 64, Fifth Corps, provided for the continuance of the advance on "D" day at "H" hour. The Fifth Corps was again


ordered to attack the heights east and west of Romagne. The troops of the corps now comprised the 3d Division, 32 Division, 1st Division, 42d Division, 181st Brigade (91st Division). The elements to be in line from right to left were as follows: 3d Division, 32d Division (with 361st Infantry Regiment and 347th Machine Gun Battalion of the 91st Division attached), the 1st Division with 362d Infantry Regiment attached. The 42d Division was the corps reserve. No operations were attempted on October 7 or 9.5, 6

On October 9, at 8:30 a. m., the attack was launched, the advance of the corps being made under a rolling barrage. The 3d Division encountered a short, violent counterbarrage and considerable machine-gun fire on entering Bois de Cunel; but by noon this division had passed through these woods, and its advance elements had occupied Tranchee de la Mamelle. Units were then pushing on toward the Romagne—Cunel road. At noon the 32d Division had advance units in the southern portion of Romagne, had advanced to the army objective, and was progressing through the Bois de Moncy. The 1st Division encountered considerable machine-gun resistance during the morning as far as Cote 263 in Le Petit Bois. On the left this division was in position 1 km. (0.6 mile) south of Sommerance. During the afternoon there was a general advance along the entire corps front excepting in the vicinity of Cote 255, where little progress was made. By nightfall the line from left to right was approximately as follows: From point about 0.75 km. north of Fleville the line ran northeasterly through center of Cote de Maldah, then through center of Cote 263 in Le Petit Bois, then to center of woods at Cote 255. From there the line ran due north to the army objective and along it about 1 km., turning sharply due east, skirting southern edge of Romagne, and then to a point just 400 meters (436 yards) below Cunel.2, 7

On the morning of October 10 the 1st Division advanced, and by noon had established its left just north of Sommerance, its center in the vicinity of Ravin du Gras Faux, and its right just south of La Cote Dame Marie. During the afternoon little progress was made, the time being spent, however, in preparation for a vigorous offensive in the morning.2, 7

On the morning of the 11th much opposition was encountered. During the night of October 11-12 the 42d Division moved into the line and took over the front occupied by the 1st Division. The 181st Infantry Brigade (91st Division) withdrew from the line and the 32d Division extended into the gap caused by its withdrawal.

On October 12 Field Orders, No. 71, Fifth Corps, changed the sector limits of the corps. It also transferred the tactical control of the 3d Division to the Third Corps, to be effective at 3 p. m. Field Orders, No. 72, Fifth Corps, moved the 89th Division (which was transferred from the Third Corps to the Fifth Corps) from the vicinity of Recicourt to the area Bois de Montfaucon-Bois de Very and Bois de Chehemin. After completion of the reliefs, the morning was used in making adjustments in the line and in improving its positions, as well as in keeping contact with the enemy. At the end of the day the situation was practically unchanged. The corps front was shortened by the 3d Divsion's transfer to the Third Corps. The 32d Division


held the right of the corps front and the 42d Division the left, with the 89th Division in reserve.2

On October 12 Field Orders, No. 73, Fifth Army Corps, setting forth the plans for further attack, were issued. The Fifth Corps was to seize La Bergerie Ferme and Cote 253, flanking the Bois des Hazois. It was ordered to advance to the line—ridge running southwest from Hill 300 in Bois d'Andevanne—La Bergerie Ferme—Bois l'Epasse—Cote 253—ridge 1 km. (0.6 mile) northwest of St. Georges. The 32d Division was to attack on the right and the 42d Division on the left, with the 89th in reserve.

On October 14 the attack was launched at 5.30 a. m. The advance was made under a rolling barrage. Much opposition from artillery fire and machine guns was encountered at the start. By noon the line of the 42d Division was just below St. Georges and over 1 km. (0.6 mile) below Landres et St. Georges, then down in the vicinity of La Musarde Ferme. The 32d Division had passed Romagne by noon.2 At night the line extended approximately along a line 1 km. (0.6 mile) south of St. Georges—Landres et St. Georges, thence southeast to Bois de Gesnes, thence northeast to Bois de Chauvignon, southeast just northwest of Romagne, thence to a point about 400 meters (436 yards) northeast of Romagne.7

On the morning of October 15 no pronounced advances were made. Progress was very difficult, especially in wooded areas. The 42d Division captured Hill 242 and at noon was attacking La Tuilerie Ferme. During the afternoon the attack resulted principally in minor advances. Penetrations were made into the Bois de Bantheville.2

No attack was ordered for October 16, and the divisions of the line made readjustments of their positions, in compliance with Field Orders, No. 76, Fifth Corps. In the morning troops were in La Tuilerie Ferme, and at noon the 42d Division reported the capture of La Musarde Ferme. In the afternoon Cote de Chatillon and La Tuilerie Ferme were captured. No attack was ordered for the 17th. The corps commander directed that the region in the vicinity of Cote de Chatillon, La Tuilerie Ferme, as well as the road leading to Bantheville, be cleared of the enemy and that patrols be pushed forward into the Bois de Bantheville.2

On October 17 patrols and outposts were pushed well forward. Patrols from the 32d Division found the northern and western parts of the Bois de Bantheville practically free of the enemy, and one element of this division during the morning of October 18 established itself on the La Dhuy Ferme—Bantheville road.2

During the night October 19-20 the 32d Division (less the 57th Field Artillery Brigade) was relieved by the 89th Division, after which it was assembled in the vicinity of Bois de Cheppy, Bois de Very, and the western part of the Bois de Montfaucon, where it was held as corps reserve. The 57th Field Artillery Brigade was attached to the 89th Division.8

From October 21 until the end of the month no change was made in the general situation of the corps. However, the period was used in a general preparation for the next advance. This included the clearing of the Bois de


Bantheville by the 89th Division.9 On October 24 a new plan of attack was laid down in Field Orders, No. 90, Fifth Corps. The ridge of the Bois de Barricourt and the heights northeast of Bayonville at Chennery were to be carried. The troops for the attack comprised the 89th and 2d Divisions in line, 1st Division as corps reserve. Provisions were made for the 42d in reserve to pass to the First Corps. As the 42d Division was to remain in line until the attack, the 2d Division was ordered to pass through the 42d Division to the point of departure, whereupon the 42d Division was to be assembled in the vicinity of Exermont, passing to the control of the First Corps, after the new plan of attack (for November 1).


On September 30, when the 32d Division relieved the 37th Divsion, the triage was located 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) southwest of Montfaucon. The 3d Division replaced the 79th on that same date, and its triage was located next day about 1 km. (0.6 mile) southeast of Very on the road to Avocourt; but as it proved impracticable to evacuate by roads in the eastern part of the corps sector, this route was shifted to the Very—Cheppy—Varennes road. As this change stopped evacuations from the corps to Mobile Hospital No. 1 at Les Clairs Chenes, the latter unit was transferred to the Third Corps, and Mobile Hospital No. 2, at Chateau Salvange, was assigned to the service of the Fifth Corps and the First Corps conjointly.

Having entered the Fifth Corps on the night of October 6-7 in relief of the 91st Division, the 1st Division established its triage at Cheppy. When, on October 12, the 42d Division replaced the 1st it took over the triage site of the latter at Cheppy, but later moved its triage to Baulny.10

The 89th Division established its field hospitals near the site occupied by those of its predecessor 2 km. (1.2 miles) southwest of Montfaucon, but soon moved them to a point 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) north of Charpentry. When they were shelled out of this position, on October 20, the hospitals for sick and gassed patients were moved to the south of that village and the triage was established at La Grange-aux-Bois Ferme. United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 602 was now withdrawn from the corps.10

On October 27, the surgeon's office, Fifth Corps, moved to Cheppy. Two days later Mobile Hospital No. 4 was established 0.5 km. (0.3 mile) north of that town, and Mobile Hospital No. 6, 1 km. (0.6 mile) west of it, was made available to the Fifth and First Corps.11

The following memoranda were issued by the corps surgeon during the second phase of the Meuse-Argonne operation:

Memorandum No. 19

6 OCTOBER, 1918.
To division surgeons:

1. Establishment of field hospitals (so far as practicable following plan will be followed):

(a) One field hospital for triage, shocked cases, and nontransportables. Surgical and shock teams will be organized by drawing upon the personnel of other field hospitals.


All cases, except gassed, will be passed through this hospital and a careful sorting made so that there will be no confusion of cases in the evacuation; severely and slightly wounded and sick to be kept separate.

(b) One field hospital for gassed. At this hospital the division medical gas officer and an assistant will be stationed and examine and classify every case brought in. All doubtful and slightly gassed cases will be retained for a reasonable length of time with a view to the possibility of returning them to duty.

(c) One field hospital for ordinary sick. All serious cases will be evacuated, but those requiring only a few days in hospital will be retained until cured, if possible, and returned to duty. Cases of influenza will be retained and treated in a separate tent.

(d) One field hospital in reserve.

2. Field hospitals should be located in a sheltered spot where water is available, and near a good road; not at a crossroad or near an ammunition or supply dump, and not in or in the outskirts of a town which is within range of enemy guns.

3. Instructions will be given to insure the administration of antitetanic serum at the earliest possible moment. In addition to the notation on the diagnosis tag, the patient will be marked on the forehead with a "T" or a cross. In case a wounded man is received at triage without this notation or marking, a dose will be administered immediately. The man's statement that he has received a dose will not be considered. Great care will be taken to have diagnosis tag made legible and to have it securely fastened to the patient.

4. The greatest care will be exercised in the use of the tourniquet. The exact time of application will be noted on diagnosis tag and the ambulance orderly be directed to look after it during the trip.

Memorandum No. 20.                                             16 OCT. 18.

1. Beginning tomorrow at 8 a. m. a noncommissioned officer, Medical Department, will be stationed on the main road at Clermont at northern end of loop to direct the evacuation of wounded. He will have the necessary information as to aailable beds in the different mobile and evacuation hospitals.

Each driver of an ambulance or truck used for evacuation, upon departure from a field hospital, will be given a slip by the officer in charge, upon which will be stated the number and class of patients in his vehicle; e. g., "4 severely wounded," "10 slightly wounded," "4 postoperatives," "9 sick," "6 gassed," etc. Upon reaching the sergeant in Clermont, the driver will hand him this slip; the sergeant will give the necessary directions, note the destination on the slip, and file it to be turned in at this office at end of his tour of duty.

2. The greatest care will be exercised in sorting patients for evacuation; severely and slightly wounded, wounded and gassed, postoperative, and preoperative cases will not be mixed. All serious cases will be evacuated by ambulance whenever possible, and field hospital trucks or trucks returning empty to the rear used for slight cases when necessary.

An officer will be held strictly accountable for triage and evacuation at each field hospital functioning.

The following changes were issued by the corps surgeon, Fifth Corps, on October 25, 1918:


1. Organization:

Field hospitals for triage, gassed, and sick: 89th Division now established about 1 km. northeast of Charpentry. This site will be occupied by the field hospitals of 1st Division when the division goes in. If conditions permit, the establishment will be placed at La Grange-aux-Bois Ferme. Second Division will establish triage about 1 km.


southwest of Exermont. Field hospitals for gassed and sick and for nontransportable cases of 2d and 89th Divisions will be established on road running south from Charpentry, about ˝ km. from junction of that road with main road (Baulny—Varennes).

2. Evacuation:

Same as in previous orders except that Mobile Hospital No. 6, about ˝ km. west of Cheppy, will be used in conjunction with 1st Corps for operable, severely wounded.

Memorandum No. 22-A was published by the corps surgeon on October 27, 1918.

1. There will be available very shortly three hospitals near front line for nontransportable operative cases:

(a)  Groupe complimentaire of the 2d Division, 1 km. south of Charpentry;
(b)  Mobile Hospital No. 4, ˝ km. north of Cheppy (to be established October 29), and
(c)  Mobile Hospital No. 6, 1 km. west of Cheppy (to be used in conjunction with the First Corps in case of need).

Therefore, no surgery will be performed in advanced field hospitals except the absolutely necessary emergencies, but special attention will be given to the treatment of shock, especially at the triage, in order to prepare these cases for transportation and subsequent operations.

All transportable cases which will evidently stand the two or three hour trip to the rear will be sent to Mobile Hospital No. 2, Evacuation Hospital No. 10, or A. R. C. Hospital No. 114, in order to avoid clogging the forward surgical centers.

Great care will be exercised in sorting cases at the triage, only one class of cases being loaded into a vehicle, in order to expedite evacuation and return of the vehicles and prevent the necessity of further sorting.

2. The divisional gas officer and an assistant will be stationed at the division gas hospital, and every case entering will be carefully examined. All cases of a suspicious nature, very slightly gassed or exhausted, will be held for at least twenty-four hours and returned to duty if possible.

A supply of clothing will be kept at gas hospitals for those returned to duty.

3. All cases of slight illness and of influenza will be held at divisional sick hospitals for a reasonable length of time with a view of returning them direct to duty whenever possible.


On October 4, at 5.25 a. m., the 3d Division launched its attack, with the 5th Infantry Brigade in advance. Its point of departure was approximately the Mantillois—Cierges road.12

Its prescribed zone of action was, on the east, Nantillois—Cunel road (exclusive)—Cunel (exclusive)—Bantheville (inclusive)—Andevanne (exclusive)—Tailly (inclusive); and on the west, Cierges (inclusive)—Bois de Gesnes (east edge)—Bois de Bantheville (southwest edge). Its action was to assist the left division of the Third Corps to capture Bois des Ogons, Bois de Cunel, and the heights to the east of Romagne.13

The 5th Brigade comprised the 4th Regiment of Infantry on the right and the 7th Infantry on the left. Because of the strongly organized machine-gun and artillery resistance, the division line was advanced less than a kilometer.

On the morning of October 5, at 6.30 a. m., the attack was continued. By infiltration, the line was advanced slowly against stubborn resistance from many enemy machine guns in the Bois de Baloup, to the north edge of Woods



250 and the western edge of Bois des Ogons. During the night of October 5-6 the 4th and 7th Infantries advanced their lines to Hill 253 and organized outpost positions on Hill 253.12

On October 9, at 8.30 a. m., the 3d Division attacked, with the 6th Brigade in the front line. Its mission now was to capture the heights east and west of Romagne by noon. Tranchee de la Mamelle was gained, and the advance continued. The front line of the division advanced slowly throughout the afternoon, the front line at nightfall being approximately as follows: From just north of Tranchee de la Mamelle, at a point about 1 km. (0.6 mile) southeast of Romagne, northeastwardly to the Cunel—Nantillois road.12, 7

On the morning of October 10, at 7 a. m., the division continued its attack, its mission being to capture Bantheville and the heights east and west of that town. The advance developed slowly, being retarded by enemy concentrated machine-gun fire. On October 11 the attack continued, under the same general conditions as on the previous day. No material advance was made but the division line was improved.12

The 12th of October was spent in reorganizing units and positions, preparatory to continuing the advance upon receipt of orders. The 3d Division was transferred from the Fifth Corps to the Third Corps, and on the night of October 12-13, during a heavy rain and a thick fog, while the enemy was actively shelling the front line, relief of the 5th Division, on the right, was effected.12



The sanitary train had been parked at Bethelainville, September 27, whence the ambulance section moved, on October 1, to Montfaucon. Train headquarters with the field hospital section moved October 5 to a point 1 km. (0.6 mile) southeast of Very.   While there it was subjected to shell fire, but no casualties occurred.14

Headquarters of the ambulance company section remained at Montfaucon until the division was withdrawn, and here Ambulance Company No. 7 was stationed from October 4 to 31. It operated a dressing station at this point until October 15, which it turned over to Ambulance Company No. 27 after treating 4,426 sick and wounded and suffering 18 casualties, with 2 deaths.15 Ambulance Company No. 5, after evacuating a few patients to Souilly, in the interval October 1 to 4, was also located at Montfaucon, evacuating patients immediately in rear of the lines to the dressing station, and thence to the field hospitals.

Ambulance Company No. 27 moved to Montfaucon on October 4 and was engaged until the 14th in evacuating patients from the front to the several division hospitals. During this period it also maintained relief shifts in the dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 7.

Ambulance Company No. 26, after moving to Malancourt, on October 1, and thence, on October 4, to the northern edge of Montfaucon, withdrew


on the 7th to a point immediately south of that ruined village and there camped until October 31. During this action its duties were somewhat varied. From the 4th to the 7th it operated a dressing station at its first position, near Montfaucon.16

Headquarters of the field hospital section remained at Very from October 4 to 14, when, on the transfer of the 3d Division to the Third Corps, it moved to Bethincourt.17 At Very, Field Hospital No. 5 funtioned as a gas hospital and received 913 patients before moving to Bethincourt, on the 14th.17

FIG. 78.-Collecting point for wounded, 3d Division, near Nantillois, Meuse, October 12, 1918

Field Hospital No. 7 was in reserve at Very until October 14, when it took over the triage from Field Hospital No. 27 and, after evacuating all its patients, moved the same day to Bethincourt.17

Field Hospital No. 26 received the sick, neurological, and shock cases (582 in number) at Very from October 4 to 14, establishing an operating room in connection with the shock ward and performing all necessary surgical work. Though frequently under shell fire, it suffered no casualties here.18

Field Hospital No. 27 conducted the triage, except for gassed cases, at Very from October 4 to 14, receiving 3,601 patients, with 10 deaths. The location was very satisfactory, but evacuation to the rear sometimes proved difficult.19


FIG. 79.-Field Hospital No. 7, 3d Division, at Bethincourt, October 22, 1918


The hospital site at Very was exceptionally satisfactory, for not only was it a desirable location in itself but it was also on good roads to front and rear and it was only about 8 km. (4.9 miles) behind the lines. The concentration here of field hospitals and the medical supply unit facilitated prompt distribution of patients and supplies and proved as advantageous as did the concentration of ambulance companies at Montfaucon. This arrangement was the most satisfactory one effected by the sanitary train in the entire course of its activities.20

During the period October 5 to 12, divisional casualties received at the field hospitals were as follows:20 Wounded, 1,957; psychoneurotic, 124; gassed, 495; injured, 45; sick, 310; total, 2,941. These figures do not include patients admitted from other divisions.21


In compliance with Field Orders, No. 55, Fifth Corps, the corps front, during the night of October 3-4, was readjusted, the 3d and 32d Divisions taking over the sectors formerly occupied by the 3d, 32d, and 91st. Under this order the readjustment placed the 3d Division on the right of the 32d, and the 1st Division on its left. The 64th Brigade of the 32d Division moved forward and took over the sector held by the 91st Division. The 32d Division was then disposed with brigades abreast. The division line was thus extended considerably on the left, giving it a wider sector, about 5 km. (3 miles).22

On October 4, at 5.30 a. m., the division launched its advance. Its mission was to capture Gesnes and the heights west of Romagne, as well as to assist the 1st Division in the capture of Bois de Moncy, and, in turn, it was to be assisted by the 1st Division in the capture of the heights west of Romagne. At 9.55 a. m. the 64th Brigade reported that its right battalion had crossed the Ruisseau de Gesnes and was attempting to outflank the Bois de la Morine. At this time the right of the line was between Hill 239 and Hill 240. At 5 p. m. the 63d Brigade reported that it held the northern edge of Gesnes. During the day the division realized approximately 1 km. (0.6 mile) advance. The line at the end of the day extended in a generally northeast-southwest direction from the Romagne—Charpentry wood about 1.5 km. (0.9 mile) southeast of Gesnes; thence south of Gesnes; thence along the ravine extending southwest through Gesnes to the small road just north of Tronsol Ferme.22, 7

On October 5, at 6.30 a. m., the atack was continued. The 64th Brigade, in liaison with the 2d Brigade of the 1st Division, was given as objectives Bois de la Morine and Bois du Chene Sec. The 63d Brigade was to attack Hill 255, 1 km. (0.6 mile) northwest of Gesnes, and to work forward in liaison with troops on its right, with a view to the capture of Hill 240 and the trench system to the north of that hill. At 1.30 p. m. the division line was at or on the north edge of the Bois du Chene Sec. At that time Hill 255 was still in the enemy's lines. At the end of the day the line ran from east to west, just

aFor map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XL.


north of Gesnes, from a point on the Romagne—Charpentry road to the northern outskirts of Bois du Chene Sec, thence southwest to the south edge of Bois de Moncy.22, 7

No advance was made on October 6, 7, or 8. During the night October 7-8 the 63d Infantry Brigade was so disposed as to occupy the front and western edge of Bois de Beuge to Hill 255, exclusive, one of its regiments relieving the regiment of the 3d Division on the right. The 361st Infantry of the 91st Division was attached temporarily to the 32d Division was relieved the 64th Infantry Brigade on the front from Hill 255, inclusive, to the western boundary of the divisional sector. The 64th Brigade, thus relieved, took position as divisional reserve in rear of the 63d Brigade.22, 6

On October 9, at 8.30 a. m., the attack was launched with the 63d Brigade in advance, followed by the 64th Brigade in support. The mission of the division was to capture the Bois de Veloup, Tranchee de Dantrise, and a portion of Tranchee de la Mamelle within its sector, seize and hold the heights north of Romagne, and capture the heights west of Romagne by envelopment from east and southeast. At the end of the day the line followed the Kriemhilde Stellung, running just to the south of Tranchee de la Mamelle, through the Bois de Veloup, northwest to about 300 meters (275 yards) southwest of La Cote Dame Marie.22, 7

No attack was made on October 10, but on the morning of October 11, at 7. a. m., the division attacked, the troops closely following the artillery barrage. By 11.30 a. m. the left had advanced about 0.5 km. (0.3 mile), but the right had been unable to make any advance.22

During the night of October 11-12 the 127th Infantry Regiment relieved the 181st Infantry Brigade (91st Division), taking over the sector occupied by it.22

On October 14 the attack was launched at 5.30 a. m. During the morning there were hard fighting and severe losses, but there was continual progress. The left of the division was held up for some time. At 10.25 a. m. the leading battalion of the left regiment was held up on the south slope of Hill 286. At 10.45 a. m. the commanding general, 64th Brigade, reported trouble at La Cote Dame Marie and that his right flank was held up just south of Romagne by very heavy machine-gun fire. At 11.45 a. m. a battalion of the 128th Infantry was reported north of Romagne. At 2.45 p. m. the 127th Infantry was passing on both sides of La Cote Dame Marie. At 5 p. m. the 128th Infantry was in the Bois de Chauvignon. At 8.24 p. m. the division commander reported to the corps commander that the line in the left half of the division's right subsector extended across the secor about 1 km. (0.6 mile) north of the center of Romagne. At dark the regiment in the left half of the left subsector was pressing two battalions forward to get in touch with leading elements in the left half of the right subsector and to connect with the front line of the division on the left.22

On the night of October 14, orders were issued for the continuance of the attack on the 15th, with instructions to advance to objectives not gained on the 14th, and upon the arrival at the fourth objective to exploit vigorously to the


line Arbre de Remonville—Malmay—Cote 258. During the day of October 15, the division advanced and passed the third objective and held all of the Bois de Chauvignon except a little corner of the woods on the east.22

On the 16th the regiment on the left (127th) moved up on the western edge of the Bois de Bantheville and established its lines about 0.75 km. (0.4 mile) in advance of that held previously. On the right the division took the small remaining stretch of the Bois de Chauvignon. The 128th Infantry occupied this. For the remainder of that day and on the 17th, a line of resistance was oranized along the general line Tranchee de la Mamelle—Tranchee de la Dantrise—La Cote Dame Marie.22

On the night of October 19-20, the 32d Division was relieved from the front line by the 89th Division. The relief was completed at 7.55 a. m., October 20. The division then moved into the area of Bois de Cheppy, Bois de Very, and western part of Bois de Montfaucon, where it was held as corps reserve.22


Whenever it was possible to do so, provision was made at regimental and battalion aid stations for giving hot drinks, food, and rest, and many sick and exhausted men were returned from these stations directly to the line.23


Ambulance Company No. 125 established a dressing station at Montfaucon; Ambulance Company No. 126 established one at Very, and Ambulance Company No. 127 one at Ivoiry, while Ambulance Company No. 128 established a station for the slightly wounded at a crossroads near the command post. Later another station was established by the same personnel of Ambulance Company No. 128, near the crossing of the Cheppy—Autrecourt roads. A dressing station was established subsequently at La Grange-aux-Bois Ferme, with ambulance posts at Cierges, Gesnes, and at other points as the action developed.24


Field Hospital No. 126, for the reception of gassed and sick patients, and Field Hospital No. 127, to act as triage and to receive the nontransportable wounded, had been established at the southern edge of Bois de Chehemin on October 1. On October 4, Field Hospital No. 125 was ordered to establish in the vicinity of Very, where it received the sick and some of the walking wounded, as the lateral shift of the divisional front diverted some of the wounded through Very.25 Field Hospital No. 128 cared for the sick at first at Recicourt and later at Sivry-la-Perche. Except for the change in the site of Field Hospital No. 128, these hospitals retained these locations as long as the 32d Division remained in the sector.23 Field Hospitals No. 126 and No. 127 were thus in close proximity throughout the action, and equipment and personnel of all four hospitals were used interchangeably as conditions required. On account of the badly damaged state of the roads and in order that patients might be given hospital care as promptly as possible, field hospitals were lo-


cated farther forward than usual—for several days in advance of the Light Artillery—with the result that a number of casualties occurred in the hospital personnel. The triage plan previously developed was continued, proving satisfactory in its results and smooth in its operations, for at the end of each period it gave prompt data concerning numbers and names of casualties.25 The commanding officer of Field Hospital No. 127, which conducted this triage, reported in part as follows:26

Throughout our stay at Montfaucon we were shelled day and night, for we were situated very close to our own 155s and were exposed to such fire as was intended for American batteries. The triage was in an even more exposed position, and here, too, we found ourselves the target for shells. * * *

FIG. 80.-Medical Supply Depot, 32d Division, near Montfaucon, October 22, 1918. Field Hospital No. 126 in background

Cases remained in hospital an average of three days. In the triage patients were kept only long enough to be given a thorough examination, to have splints and dressings adjusted or changed, and were then either evacuated to Field Hospital No. 127 or to the rear. Whenever the condition of patients warranted, hot drinks and food were given. Three medical officers were stationed at the triage for the sole purpose of adjusting dressings and splints. The hospital had a capacity of about 300 and the triage about 400. (The hospital and the triage were situated about 1 km. (0.6 mile) part.)

Ample medical matériel was available at all times.

In addition to 4,193 casualties in the 32d Division from September 22 to October 19, 2,589 casualties of other American units, 107 French, and 50 Ger-


mans were cared for by the Medical Department of the division, making a total of 6,939. Of 32d Division casualties, 235 were cared for by other organizations. Casualties in the 32d Division as reported at the triage were as follows:23

  Officers Men
Severely wounded 15 628
Slightly wounded 48 2,110
Neuroses 4 26
Gassed cases 17 515
Injured --- 61
Sick 40 964
  124 4,304

The division surgeon interpreted these and other figures as indicating that medical officers were showing a keener discrimination than formerly when called upon to determine whether a case should be evacuated. As a matter of fact, very few were sent to the field hospitals who should have been returned to duty at the front. A considerable number, however, were sent to the rear from the field hospitals who could have been retained with the troops if there had been adequate provision for giving them rest, food, and reequipment.

Of 301 nontransportable cases admitted to the advanced surgical hospital, 176 were evacuated to the rear after operation or treatment, 125 died, 79 of these being in profound shock when admitted, and dying without surgical intervention. Forty-six patients died during or following operation. In addition, 13 were dead on arrival at hospital.27

Because of the insistence of surgical consultants, the amount of surgical work performed in field hospitals was greatly diminished. Some patients who had been evacuated from them without operation were either dead or moribund on their arrival at army hospitals.25

The percentage of wounds due to shell fire was very high in this operation.25

A peculiar feature of this action was the narrow division front and the lateral shifting of divisions, resulting in many wounded getting out of their proper evacuation lines. This resulted in the admission to the field hospitals of each division of a number of patients belonging to some other division or divisions. Complaint was made that men from the 32d Division were going to other hospitals, but triage reports showed that the division had cared for twice as many men from other divisions as its wounded numbered who sought aid elsewhere. Most of the wounded from other divisions seeking treatment in field hospitals of the 32d Division came from the 3d, 5th, and 89th Divisions. This interchange of patients was unavoidable, especially after a sector was shifted. The whole terrain was exposed to long-range artillery fire, and the walking a wounded naturally crept back by the safest route. These were tortuous, diagonal valleys, and in a strange country, with no map for his guidance, a wounded man was apt to lose his way. Then,


where, as was the case to a certain extent, the country was open, men left the roads patrolled by military police and thus missed the advantage of their directions. A number of men reaching hospitals were stragglers from the front. These were soon collected by the military police and taken back to their companies.25

Front-line evacuation was performed by litter bearers of the regimental medical detachments, by bearers detailed from ambulance companies as required, and by litter bearers assigned to such duty by the commanding officers of line organizations. Wounded men were carried on litters to battalion, regimental, and ambulance dressing stations, but in many instances and wherever it was possible ambulances went forward to aid stations near the lines. The wounded were transported to the field hospitals in divisional ambulances and were evacuated from field hospitals to rear hospitals designated in corps orders by an evacuation ambulance company furnished by the corps, supplemented as necessity required by ambulances of the division, by trucks of the sanitary train, and by trucks furnished by the Quartermaster Department.23

Evacuation from the front was usually prompt and satisfactory. In some instances evacuation from field hospitals to the evacuation hospitals designated in corps orders was delayed by traffic conditions at the rear and at times by the lack of sufficient ambulances; but no unusual or extraordinary delay occurred, and evacuation was generally satisfactory all along the line. The sanitary train met the demands made upon it, and only one ambulance belonging to it was out of commission for more than a brief period.23


On October 7 the 181st Infantry Brigade (91st Division) was assigned to the Fifth Corps, and was engaged in the attack until October 12.6 The two regiments of the brigade were assigned to the 1st and 32d Divisions. On the 8th the entire brigade was assigned to the 1st and 32d Divisions. On the 8th the entire brigade was assigned to the 1st Division. On October 10 the brigade passed from the control of the 1st Division to that of the 32d Division, and on the following day its place in the front line was taken by elements of the 32d Division. Its activities during the period, October 7 to 12, are considered in connection with those of the 1st Division. When the brigade was withdrawn it rejoined the 91st Division, now in the Belgian group of armies in Flanders.6


Casualties from the 181st Brigade were cared for in the Medical Department formations of the 1st Division. Their evacuation thence was facilitated by United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 593, which joined the 1st Division at this time and served with it until the 181st Brigade was withdrawn.28

bFor map of activities of this brigade for this period, see Plate XXXVII.


On October 7 the 1st Division, with the 362d Infantry Regiment (91st Division), was temporarily attached to the Fifth Corps.31

On October 8 the entire 181st Brigade, 91st Division, was attached. On October 9 the 1st Division, with the181st Infantry Brigade, was directed to strongly cover its front north of Hill 240 and to attack in the direction of Hill 263 and Le Petit Bois, and to assist the 32d Division (which had previously relieved the 91st Division) in clearing Le Petit Bois and Bois de la Romagne, north of Hill 263. This necessitated an extension of the front and a reinforcement of the front-line units from the divisional reserves. Because of the extension of the front-line units from the divisional reserves. Because of the extension of the front, the attack was made in three operations, thus permitting a barrage of sufficient intensity for each operation. Despite stubborn resistance on the part of the enemy, at the end of the day (October 9) the line reached was generally as follows: From just southwest of Fleville, northeasterly through the center of Cote de Maldah to Sommerance—Romagne-sous-Montfaucon road, thence to just east of Cote 263, in Le Petit Bois, thence southeastwardly to Cote 269 in the Bois de Moncy.6, 29, 7

On October 11 very little advance was made, and no concerted attack was ordered because of the exhaustion and depletion in the number of the troops. On this date the 1st Division (less its artillery) was ordered relieved by the 42d Division, to be effected on the night of October 11-12. After remaining for two days under First Corps orders in the Argonne, east of Rarecourt, the division moved to the Vavincourt area, near Bar-le-Duc.29


The sanitary train and Medical Department personnel with troops, functioned as described in the First Corps, with the following exceptions: Ambulance Company No. 13 established and operated an advance collecting and dressing station at Exermont. Field Hospitals No. 2 and No. 13 moved to Very on October 7 and remained in reserve, ready to push forward as the line advanced, relieving Field Hospitals No. 3 and No. 12, at Cheppy. Until the division was relieved, however, the advance was not sufficient to justify moving the triage or surgical hospital farther forward, and during the remainder of the operation Field Hospitals No. 2 and No. 13 remained inactive. Some of their personnel were distributed to other units to reinforce them as needed, but remained subject to recall to establish, if required, the hospitals to which they properly belonged.30

The area was in a highly insanitary condition, and though very determined efforts were made to remedy this with the few men available for the work and under the exigencies of war, it was impossible to do more than to try to enforce such sanitary regulations as were deemed essential and at the

cFor map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XXXVII.


same time possible. In nearly all parts of the area many dead bodies of men and animals were found, especially nearest to points of departure.31

A battalion of Pioneer Infantry was turned over to the division to help bury the dead, under direction of the division sanitary inspector, but as it had insufficient equipment was very much handicapped. Regular burial details of the division, in charge of chaplains, worked incessantly and as close to the front line as possible, often under heavy shell fire; but when the division left the area there was still an immense amount of work to be done to put it into proper sanitary condition.31

In the effort to provide sufficient drinking water for troops the army engineers established several chlorinating plants in the area. One of these was installed at a spring between Charpentry and Baulny, the reservoir consisting of a trench lined with tarpaulins. Water carts and water-carrying squads with canteens carried drinking water from these sources and distributed it to the men. On the third day of action a shell exploded close to the plant in front of Charpentry, cutting the supply pipe and doing so much damage that the plant was put out of commission for several days. Whenever a reasonably protected spot could be found accessible to water carts, Lyster bags were kept filled with chlorinated water, and at night canteen-carrying squads from the attacking line came back to these points to replenish the supply of drinking water for the troops. Locations of these chlorinated water supplies were indicated by signs at the places themselves and by other signs along roads leading to them. Because of the impossibility, notwithstanding these expedients, to supply an adequate amount of chlorinated water, many of the men filled their canteens or drank from any water source they could find, even from the shallow streams flowing in ravines and often containing dead bodies. The result of drinking bad water was manifest in the prevalence of diarrhea and other digestive disturbances after the division was relieved.32


On October 4, 1918 the 42d Division, assembled in the vicinity of Recicourt, was assigned to the Fifth Corps. On October 5, orders were issued by the Fifth Corps for the division (less the 67th Field Artillery Brigade and the 117th Ammunition Train) to proceed to Bois de Montfaucon. This was executed on October 5. The following day, October 6, the 67th Field Artillery Brigade moved to an area between Avocourt and Montfaucon. Upon arrival in this area, this brigade was immediately attached to the 32d Division, then in line. On October 9, the division moved to Bois Communal de Cierges and Bois Emont. On October 11, under instructions of the Fifth Corps, the 42d Division relieved the 1st Division, which was holding a position in the line generally as follows: From just north of Sommerance eastward to the Bois de Romagne, thence along the northern edge of the Bois de Romagne to a point just south of the Sommerance—Romagne road. The 67th Field Artillery was relieved from duty with the 32d Division, taking up positions in support of the 42d Division on the night of October 11.33, 7

    dFor map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XXXVII.


At the time when the 42d Division went into line, the enemy was holding strongly on the front of the Fifth Corps. Facing the 42d Division here was maintained a most stubborn resistance in the northern part of the Bois de Romagne, on Hill 288, Hill 242, on Cote de Chatillon, and along the line Landres-et-St. Georges—St. Georges, this being in general part of the Kriemhilde Stellung.33

On October 14 the 42d Division moved forward to the attack. The 84th Brigade on the right met stubborn resistance, almost immediately. The progress of the 83d Brigade on the right was met by light machine-gun fire until the troops of this brigade arrived within about 500 meters (545 yards) of the wire south of St. Georges—Landres-et-St. Georges. Here the brigade encountered very severe machine-gun fire from the front and from both flanks. Patrols penetrated the wire south of Landres-et-St. Georges and St. Georges, but were driven back by machine-gun fire.33

On October 15 at 7.30 a. m., the division again attacked; the 83d Brigade advancing to the corps objective, the 84th Brigade being engaged in exploiting Cote de Chatillon and the woods near La Tuilerie Ferme. In this operation the 83d Brigade, after advancing about 200 meters (218 yards), was again held up by severe frontal and enfilading fire. The 84th Brigade was progressing in its mission and by nightfall had taken Hill 288, Hill 242, and had one patrol in La Tuilerie Ferme. At the end of the day the front was, in general, along a line about 100 meters (109 yards) south of the wire in front of St. Georges and Landres-et-St. Georges, thence southeast to a point 100 meters (109 yards) south and east of La Musarde Ferme, thence east to La Tuilerie Ferme.33

On October 16, the exploitation of Cote de Chatillon continued. The division was held in readiness to move its left forward, in conformity with the movement of the First Corps, then attacking, but as the right of the First Corps did not progress the movement was not made. The clearing of Cote de Chatillon of the enemy was continued, and on the night of October 16 the division fronted along the line about 100 meters (109 yards) south of the wire in front of St. Georges and Langres-et-St. Georges, and thence along the north edge of Cote de Chatillon.33

From October 16 until October 30, the division was employed in organizing the front for defense and with continual pushing forward of strong patrols to develop the enemy organization.33

On October 30, support and reserve battalions were relieved by elements of the 2d Division. The two infantry battalions holding the line and both the brigade and divisional machine-gun battalions were held in the line. The 67th Field Artillery Brigade was attached to the 2d Division for the coming attack.33


In its march to its sector in the Meuse-Argonne area, mule-drawn ambulances were distributed in the column in the proportion of two of each regiment of Infantry and one to each regiment of Artillery and of Engineers.


These ambulances evacuated patients to points whence they could be moved by motor ambulance. This arrangement proved very satisfactory, both during the march of the division to this area and during its advance to the front line. Another innovation at this time was the assignment of each ambulance company to the evacuation service of the Infantry regiment having the corresponding number and the detail from each ambulance company of an officer and sergeant, to maintain contact between the regimental and ambulance company services. This personnel remained constantly with the regimental surgeon concerned when the organization to which he belonged was in action. Similarly, an officer from the sanitary train performed liaison service for the evacuation of the three regiments of Artillery, to whom the animal-drawn ambulances were assigned as needed. This arrangement proved satisfactory, especially in so far as the Infantry was concerned.34

Individual aid stations during the operation had very different facilities and shelter. A few fortunate enough to occupy partially ruined houses with splinter-proof cellars were able to function normally, others were in wooden shacks in woods or against hillsides, and a number had not even this shelter, but were forced to carry on in the open or in shell holes.35 In some regiments the aid stations of the advance, support, and reserve battalions were either with or in close proximity to the battalion post controls, thus in perfect contact with the line troops served. The regimental aid station was near that of the reserve battalion and had telephone connection with the three battalion stations, as well as with the regimental post command, with its ambulance company in the rear. With the regimental surgeon were the liaison officer and sergeant from the ambulance company designated to evacuate casualties of the particular regiment. If there was reasonable protection two motor ambulances were held at the regimental aid station. This arrangement had the advantage of not unduly exposing these vehicles and at the same time of keeping the regimental surgeon in close touch with Medical Department formations in both front and rear. As on former occasions, an enlisted man was detailed to render first aid with each company in the front line, but as the physical hardships were very severe there, he was replaced whenever possible after 24 or 48 hours' service.36

Four bearers (or sometimes eight, when relay or relief was necessary) struggled back over shell-torn, muddy paths to the animal-drawn ambulances, which were taxed to their utmost.37 The absence of roads that motor vehicles could use in the right half of the divisional sector made evacuation here especially difficult, for carries by bearers or by animal-drawn ambulances, or by both, over rough, hilly roads, knee deep in mud were necessary before motor vehicles could be reached. The roads north and east out of Exermont were impassable to motor vehicles, and until the road running east from Sommerance had been cleared and rendered reasonably safe, the front of the 84th Brigade was from 6 to 10 km. (3.7-6 miles) from motor ambulance heads. It was under these circumstances that the animal-drawn vehicles proved indispensable, for they bridged much of the gap between the battalion aid stations and Exermont, where patients could be transferred to motor vehicles.38


As the division moved into the line a dressing station was opened at Apremont on the main road to Cheppy, while the three other dressing stations were located at Baulny. Coincidentally with the infantry advance, motor ambulance heads were located at Fleville and at the crossroads east of that town. At the latter point, aid stations of the 165th and 166th Infantry Regiments were established, and within a short time there was a considerable accumulation of wounded here who were subjected to intermittent shell fire. So, an emergency-collecting station was opened at Fleville, and three ambulances were assigned to the task of evacuating sitting cases from the crossroads to this station, whence they were sent by trucks to the rear. At no time was there any delay in the evacuation of litter cases. Late in the afternoon of October 14, ambulances were able to gain entrance to Sommerance, whither an aid station of the 166th Infantry had moved in the meantime.38

On the right the use of animal-drawn ambulances as previously planned was adequate to meet the demands of the situation, though even these vehicles were unable to advance more than 3 km. (1.8 miles) beyond Exermont, thus necessitating a litter carry of from 4 to 6 km. (2.4-3.7 miles) from the front line to any kind of wheeled transportation. In addition to the long portage, litter carriers were hindered by the hilly character of the country and by deep mud, but by 9 o'clock on the night of October 15th the field had been cleared and 1,211 cases had been evacuated to the rear.39

After the division ceased its attacks, casualties were few and were cared for readily.


Two field hospitals were established at Cheppy and two at Baulny, where, in conjunction with them, a triage was manned and operated by ambulance company personnel. One of these hospitals received gas cases only, while the second, in connection with the triage, established a shock ward for non-transportable cases, and fed, sheltered, and treated the slightly wounded. All severely wounded who could endure the trip were evacuated to the rear.40 Although Baulny was subject to shelling and bombing, the hospitals continued to operate there, because of their convenient proximity to the front. As casualties decreased in number, the hospitals at Cheppy were closed and moved to Baulny, where they were held in reserve. Evacuation in rear of the field hospitals was effected by an evacuation ambulance company and by a number of French ambulances, which transported large numbers so readily that the proper service of the divisional ambulances which was, of course, in front of these hospitals, was not interrupted. A total of 2,394 cases passed through the field hospitals during this period.41

From October 8 to the signing of the armistice the 42d division was in the Argonne front, and casualties from gas were high, due in part to the wooded nature of the country. Of 1,129 patients received at the advance dressing station, 481 were returned to duty from the divisional gas hospital after from one to five days' observation and treatment.42



Upon its relief in the Lucey sector by the 37th Division, on October 8, the 89th Division proceeded to the Recicourt area, where it became a part of the reserve of the First Army for the Meuse-Argonne operation. On the night of October 19-20 it relieved the 32d Division in the front line as a part of the Fifth Corps.43

The division then held the line extending from the vicinity of Ferme de la Cavaniere, 3 km. (1.8 miles) northwest from Romagne, where liaison was had with the 42d Division; thence the line extended through Bois de Monteville to include Romagne.44

On October 20 the division made preparations for an advance to develop the enemy's main line of resistance and to complete the capture of Bois de Bantheville. This capture of the Bois de Bantheville proved to be quite an operation in itself, as the enemy defended his position with artillery and machine-gun fire and made a stubborn resistance until the afternoon of October 21. During October 21, 22, 23, and 24 the division remained in possession of Bois de Bantheville, maintaining contact with the enemy.

On October 25 orders were issued to adjust the right boundary of the division, thus turning over the western edge of the Bois de Bantheville to the 90th Division of the Third Corps. The remainder of the month was spent in making preparation for the advance of November 1.44


The field hospitals on October 15 were located 2 km. (1.2 miles) southwest of Montfaucon, 12 km. (7.4 miles) from the line, but on the 22d they advanced to a point 2 km. (1.2 miles) south of Eclisfontaine, where they were located on the road from that town to Charpentry, 7 km. (4.3 miles) from the front. Ambulance Company No. 354 established a dressing station at La Grange Ferme, 7 km. (4.3 miles) from the front, with all facilities for treating shock and for serving of hot drinks. To this point and from it to the rear two other ambulance companies carried wounded.45 Evacuation from Bois de Bantheville for the week preceding the advance of November 1 was extremely difficult, for all wounded unable to walk had to be carried by litter to two collecting points west of Romagne, on the road to Sommerance, 3.5 km. (2.1 miles) from the line, where motor ambulances could reach them. This carry averaged 3 km. (1.8 miles) in length, through mud knee-deep, over rugged terrain. The roads through Bois de Bantheville were impassable to horse-drawn ambulances, and the narrow-gauge railway through the woods was so badly damaged that it could not be utilized. Difficulties were aggravated by scarcity of litter bearers.46

During the interval October 15 to November 1, 2,228 patients passed through the triage, of whom 988 had wounds or injuries. Of this total, 1,441 belonged to the 89th Division, comprising 786 wounds and injuries and 655

    eFor map of activities of this division for this period, see Plate XL.


sick. On the afternoon of October 29 the field hospitals were shelled, some 15 or 20 high-explosive projectiles falling in and around them, wounding three men, of whom one died.45


(1) F. O. No. 55, Fifth Corps, October 3, 1918.

(2) Daily operation reports, Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation.

(3) Reports on operations in the Argonne, 42 Division, November 22, 1918.

(4) F. O. No. 56, Fifth Corps, October 8, 1918.

(5) Chronological statement of events, Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operations.

(6) Operations report of 181st Brigade, 91st Division, October 17, 1918.

(7) Map showing daily position of front line, Meuse-Argonne operation, G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F., May 24, 1919.

(8) F. O. No. 82, Fifth Corps, Meuse-Argonne operation.

(9) Operations report, Fifth Army Corps, St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.

(10) Report of Medical Department activities, Fifth Corps, A. E. F., by Col. W. R. Eastman, M. C., corps surgeon, Fifth Corps (undated), 6. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(11) Ibid., 13.

(12) Special operations report, 3d Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.

(13) F. O. No. 45, 3d Division, October 3, 1918.

(14) Report of Medical Department activities, 3d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, 3d Division (undated), Part IV, 46. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(15) Ibid., Part IV, 47.

(16) Ibid., Part IV, 49.

(17) Ibid., Part IV, 50.

(18) Ibid., Part IV, 51.

(19) Ibid., Part IV, 52.

(20) Ibid., Part IV, 53.

(21) Ibid., Part V, 127.

(22) Special report on operations of the 32d Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.

(23) Report of Medical Department activities, 32d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, 32d Division, undated, Part II, 15. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(24) Ibid., Part II, 14.

(25) Ibid., Part II, 43.

(26) Ibid., Part II, 66.

(27) Ibid., Part II, 16.

(28) Report of Medical Department activities, 91st Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(29) Report of operations of the 1st Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, October 17, 1918.

(30) Report of Medical Department activities, 1st Division, prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, 1st Division, undated, Part II, 44. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(31) Ibid., Part II, 47.

(32) Ibid., Part II, 48.

(33) Operations report, 42d Division, Meuse-Argonne operation, undated.

(34) Report of Medical Department activities, 42d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, 42d Division, undated, Part I, 22. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(35) Ibid., Part I, 24.


(36) Ibid., Part I, 23

(37) Ibid., Part I, 25

(38) Ibid., Part I, 58

(39) Ibid., Part I, 59

(40) Ibid., Part I, 80

(41) Ibid., Part I, 81

(42) Ibid., Part I, 103

(43) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College, 1700 (89th Division).

(44) Operations report, 89th Division, Meuse-Argonne operation.

(45) Report of Medical Department activities, 89th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, 89th Division, undated, 24. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(46) Ibid., 26