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Chapter XV

Field Operations, Table of Contents



As has been stated in the preceding chapter, the First Corps in the St. Mihiel operation, comprised the 82d, 90th, 5th, and 2d Divisions, with the 78th Division in reserve.1

On September 11, 1918, the First Corps held a 19-km. (11.8 miles) sector, from Limey to Port-sur-Seille. The 82d Division held the sector from Port-sur-Seille to Bois le Pretre, the 90th Division from the eastern edge of Bois le Pretre to Limey. The 5th and 2d Divisions were disposed in depth behind these detachments, the 5th Division from Mamey to Remenauville, the 2d Division from Remenauville to Limey.2

Artillery preparation for the attack began at 1 a. m., September 12. The infantry attack began at 5 a. m. the same morning, on a front extending from Limey to Fey-en-Haye.2

The advance to the first phase line was made according to schedule. Progress to the army objective was rapid, and by 3 p. m., September 12, this objective had been attained.2

The second day of the operation, September 13, the position of the 2d and 5th Divisions was organized. The 90th Division exploited its advance of September 12, took the town of Vilcey and the Bois de Presle, and established outposts 0.5 km. (0.31 mile) south of Norroy.2 The 82d Division, maintaining contact with the right of the 90th Division, captured Norroy.

On September 14, further exploitations by the 90th Division advanced the line beyond Villers-sous-Preny.2

On September 15, conditions were stabilized and the sector was fairly quiet.2

Throughout the operation, transportation of supplies and traffic control were the greatest problems. Previous to the attack, all movements were made at night to maintain secrecy of movement. As it had been generally cloudy and rainy for the week preceding the attack, the nights were exceedingly dark.2 After the advance across No Man’s Land, secrecy of movement was no longer essential, but traffic over the destroyed roads moved slowly, even by day.2

For the routes of communication, supply, and evacuation of the divisions of the corps, during the St. Mihiel operation, the following order was issued:


                                    6 September, 18—11.00 a. m.

Annex 7 (to F. O. 49)

* * * * * * *

8. Plan of evacuation of sick and wounded:

1. Sanitary organization.

(a) Battalion aid stations, relays of litter bearers, and regimental aid stations will be established by regimental surgeons under the supervision of their respective Division


Surgeons. In no case will a battalion or regimental aid station be located at the same place as the regimental P. C.

(b) Sorting and advance dressing stations (triages) will be established as follows:

        2d Division, Noviant-aux-Pres.
        5th Division, Martincourt.
        90th Division, Griscourt.
        82d Division, Dieulouard.

These stations will be located off the main traffic route, preferably just outside of the town. This to avoid congestion and traffic blocks.

Regulations governing evacuation from triages as prescribed in Memorandum G-1-48, these headquarters, September 3, 1918.

(c) Evacuation points:

Seriously sick and gas cases - Evacuation Hospital No. 45, Justice barracks, Toul.

All surgical cases (wounded and civil surgery), Evacuation Hospital No. 1, Sebastopol, just north of Toul.

(d) Evacuation routes:

2d Division, via its axial road as far as Royaumeix; thence on the Menil-la-Tour—Toul road to destination.

5th Division, via its axial road to Villiers-en-Haye; thence S. E. to the Dieulouard—Toul road, and on that road to destination.

90th Division, via its axial road to Dieulouard; thence on Dieulouard—Toul road to destination.

82d Division, direct from Dieulouard on the Dieulouard—Toul road to destination.

(e) Army and corps troops (both French and American) will use the evacuation system and units of the nearest division.

(f) The sanitary units of the 78th will be held subject to the call of the corps surgeon for use where needed. If this division reinforces the line it will use the sanitary organizations and system of evacuation of the division it reinforces or relieves.

(g)If additional transportation is needed, call will be made on the corps surgeon, who has at his disposition the ambulance companies of the 78th Division and those of the corps. If conditions warrant it the corps surgeon may use two ambulance companies of the 82d Division.

(h) The corps surgeon will make every effort to use returning empties on the narrow gauge line to assist in evacuation. Triages have been located with this in view, and as far as practicable in making forward locations of triages this point should be considered by division and the corps chief surgeons.

9. Evacuation of animals:

1. Corps advance collecting point.

In point of woods just south of the Rau d’Esch, between Gezoncourt and Griscourt.

The corps veterinarian will have charge of this station and the corps mobile veterinary hospital located there.

2. Emergency evacuations may be made direct on proper notification to the corps veterinarian. For other evacuations and evacuation of large numbers, arrangements will be made with G-1, these headquarters.

* * * * * * *


* * * * * * *

Paragraph 8, plan of evacuation of sick and wounded, changes and additions:

(a) Seriously wounded of all troops east of Moselle River: To Evacuation Hospital No. 13 at Chaligny, 10 kilometers, southwest of Nancy.

NOTE.—Overflow of seriously wounded from Evacuation Hospitals No. 1 at Sebastopol and No. 13 S. W. of Nancy go to Evacuation Hospital No. 3 in the Justice group of barracks just south of Toul.


(b) Slightly wounded:

1st Corps and army troops adjacent to 1st Corps.

Evacuation Hospital No. 14, in the Perrins-Richambault section of the Justice group of barracks just south of Toul.

All troops east of Moselle River

Evacuation hospital at La Malgrange, 1 kilometer south of Nancy on the Nancy—Richard—Menil road.

(c) Gassed:

All troops

Gas hospital, La Marche section of the Justice group of barracks just south of Toul.

(d) Contagious:

All troops

Hospital for contagious diseases in Justice group of barracks just south of Toul.

(e) Sick, nervous, and shell concussion:


All troops

Base Hospital No. 45, La Marche section, and Base Hospital No. 51, Favier section of Justice group of barracks just south of Toul.

(f) Evacuation route: For troops east of the Moselle River, Atton—Bezaumont—Autreville—Millery—Custines—Bouxieres—Nancy.

* * * * * * *


The Medical Department problems of the First Corps during the St. Mihiel operation were relatively simple of solution. There was a limited objective, distances were comparatively short, transportation was sufficient, and hospitalization ample, casualties being far below what had been anticipated and prepared for. The only real difficulties were those incident to road obstruction and consequent congestion. Prior to the opening of this operation, no traffic beyond what was normal had been permitted by day. Night traffic, however, was enormous, and as several nights were rainy, especially the night preceding the attack, roads became much congested and progress often was distressingly slow. However, there was no alarming check such as occurred later in the Meuse-Argonne operation.3

For transportation, in addition to the division ambulances and trucks, the First Corps had its sanitary train of three motor ambulance companies, and seven additional ambulance companies supplied by the First Army and placed under the control of the corps surgeon. This supply was ample. The three field hospitals belonging to the corps sanitary train were borrowed by the First Army and used by it as evacuation hospitals at Chaligny and La Malgrange during this operation. After the operation they were returned and functioned as an important part of the corps evacuation system during operations in the Meuse-Argonne.4 Evacuation worked smoothly. As the enemy’s resistance was feeble, battle-field conditions were at no time very insanitary. The corps medical service was faced with the same problems as in the operations near Chateau-Thierry, but they gave much less concern and their solution was less difficult.4


On August 26 the following circular was published by the corps surgeon:5

Memorandum to all division surgeons, First Army Corps:

For the purpose of securing uniformity in splinting and the best results in fracture cases, the following instructions are issued:

1. All fractures are to be splinted at the earliest possible moment. This means where the man falls, if possible. If this is impossible, the splint should be applied at the battalion aid post. No fracture should pass through the advanced dressing station unsplinted.

2. The Thomas full or half ring extension splint will be used for all fractures of the lower extremities from the pelvis to the ankle.

3. The Cabot posterior wire splint or wire ladder splint is to be used for all wounds of the ankle and foot and of the knee joint without fracture of the long bones.

(NOTE —All wounds of knee are to be splinted, no matter how slight they may be.)

4. The hinged traction arm splint will be used for fractures of the humerus, elbow, and upper forearm.

5. Ladder and wood splints will be used in fractures of the long bones where traction splints can not be efficiently applied and also to supplement such splints.

6. The fact that traction is the immobilizing factor in all traction splints should never be lost sight of, and the utmost care should be taken to apply the proper degree of traction to obtain fixation.

7. Bring this to the attention of the division orthopedist and see that these instructions are carefully followed.

When Field Order No. 49, September 6, 1918, was issued it was not known that ambulance companies mentioned under subparagraph "g," paragraph 8 above, would be available. Subparagraph "h" of the field order in question was added by A. C. of S., G-1, of the corps after consultation with corps surgeon. The latter notified G-1 of his desire to use these narrow-gauge railway lines if practicable and stated that triages had been placed with their utilization in mind. G-1 concurred and added the subparagraph to the order. As a matter of fact these "empties" were not used, ambulance transportation being ample and more practicable.6

One company of Pioneer Infantry to make burials was assigned to each division participating in the advance, except with the 90th Division.6 Only one-half a company was allotted to it, as this division had not been assigned as active a part as had others and it was not expected that it would suffer many casualties, its special mission being to protect the right flank of the southern advance.6 No Pioneer Infantry was assigned to the 82d Division, as it was simply to hold its position and it was not anticipated that the number of dead on the battle field would be large, and these the division could inter without assistance.6

The following was inserted as paragraph 12 of Annex 7, Field Order No. 49, September 6, 1918:7

12. Burials:

(a) Every effort will be made to promptly and properly bury the dead and to secure proper identifications.

(b) Dead animals will be promptly buried to avoid pollution of water sources.

(c) To assist in the burial of the dead and for salvage work within divisions the Corps Engineer will furnish labor as follows:

    To the 2d Division, 1 company of Pioneer Infantry.
    To the 5th Division, 1 company of Pioneer Infantry.
    To the 90th Division, one-half company of Pioneer Infantry.


These troops will work with divisional graves registration units and salvage units under the supervision and direction of division quartermasters.

* * * * * * *

Burial troops, it will be observed, were detailed to work under the division quartermaster. This plan did not prove entirely satisfactory, and they were detailed later to work under the division sanitary inspector, an arrangement which proved more so.7 With these special burial details available, battlefield conditions were much improved over those previously existing. The dead were buried promptly, and though dead animals were not disposed of as satisfactorily as was desired, conditions never became actually insanitary.

In addition to their burial duties, these Pioneer Infantry troops were required to do salvage work; but this was soon found to interfere considerably with prompt disposition of the dead, and later the troops in question were detailed for burial work exclusively during battle activities. During quiet periods they were utilized for other duties.7

The corps sanitary inspector was especially concerned in the supervision of burial groups and in examination and purification of water supplies.

The consultants, now well organized and familiar with their work, promoted appreciably the professional services within divisions. While, as hauls were short, no surgery was performed in advance of evacuation hospitals, the surgical consultant had little to do at the front. In other specialties, however, the consultants were very active in divisions and by continued inspections were able to discover and correct defects, to recognize and encourage good work, and to keep the corps surgeon accurately and promptly informed concerning professional service.

The prevention and treatment of surgical shock and hemorrhage were thus made the duty of medical officers generally in order that operating surgeons might devote themselves exclusively to surgical interference.8


Commencing on the night of August 15-16, the 82d Division relieved the 2d Division in the Marbache sector astride the Moselle River and held this sector in the St. Mihiel operation, September 12 to 16. During this operation it advanced the left of its line, to maintain connection with the 90th Division, at the same time retaining contact with the French 125th Division on the right. It captured Norroy, September 13, and Vandieres on the 15th.



Headquarters of the ambulance company section and of Ambulance Company No. 325 had been established at Millery, on August 15. The latter at once established a dressing station at Pont-a-Mousson, where it remained throughout the St. Mihiel operation. Subsequent to that action it assumed the character of a triage.10 United States Army Ambulance Section No. 647


was also stationed at Millery during this operation. Ambulance Company No. 326 was placed in reserve at Champigneulles.10

Ambulance Company No. 327, with headquarters at Dieulouard, established a dressing station at Blenod-les-Pont-a-Mousson, and after the operation located another at Norroy on the afternoon of September 16, there taking over the regimental aid station of the 328th Infantry.10

Ambulance Company No. 328 and United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 647 also established headquarters at Millery.10 Before the action, ambulances were pooled, the light ones being ordered to work between regimental or battalion aid stations and the ambulance company dressing station, and the heavy vehicles to work from this point to the triage. Patients were removed from the triage by evacuation ambulance companies.10


Field Hospitals Nos. 325, 326, and 327 were stationed at Millery in a large French hospital which had been turned over to them for the care of sick, gassed, and seriously wounded patients, respectively.

Field Hospital No. 328 was located at Dieulouard, where it established a triage for troops on the left bank of the Moselle. This unit occupied a tannery which afforded ample housing facilities and was situated beside a good road so that it was readily accessible to ambulances. The location was shelled during four nights and on the morning of September 17 was struck by a shell which killed 6 and wounded 4 of the personnel on duty. No patients were injured, there being but few in hospital at the time.11

Casualties did not begin to arrive at the triage until about eight hours after the preparatory barrage had begun, September 12. During this offensive the enemy used phosgene and mustard gases, and about 600 men affected by them were received. Many of these were evacuated to the rear, but some were held for 48 hours and then returned to duty. Apparently only a few were badly affected, though it was difficult to estimate delayed effects, as a number of these patients were evacuated very shortly after admission to hospital.12

The largest number of casualties in this division during the St. Mihiel operation came from the 328th Infantry. This was because the 328th Infantry was the only regiment of the division west of the Moselle and the only one involved in the attack.


On the morning of September 12, 1918, the 90th Division held an irregular front line which extended from a point west of Fey-en-Haye to a point northwest of Montrichard.13

At 5 a. m., the division attacked, with its two infantry brigades side by side, the 179th Brigade on the left and the 180th Brigade on the right. The right of the 180th Brigade did not advance on the first day.14

The advance of the 357th Infantry, 179th Brigade, kept well up with the barrage, and reached the first day’s objective at 1 p. m. The advance of the



358th Infantry was frequently checked by enemy machine guns and snipers, but at 11.27 a. m. the first day’s objective was reached.14

In its operations, September 12-14, the division occupied Vilcey-sur-Trey, Neuf Moulin Ferme, and Villers-sous-Preny; and from September 15-16 it advanced to and occupied Les Huit Chemins, and captured Hill 327, northwest of Vandieres.13


All sick patients had been evacuated from the field hospitals on the night of September 11-12.15 The divisional supply unit was located at Griscourt at the triage (Field Hospital No. 357), with instructions concerning exchange of litters and blankets, both at the triage and at the dressing stations. During the succeeding busy days there was very little complaint of litter shortage.15

During this offensive the division surgeon’s office was located at Villers-en-Haye in the rear echelon of division headquarters, in close touch with G-1.16

Collecting stations for advance companies and battalions aid stations were established by regimental surgeons after consultation with the division surgeon, but after the advance began they were located by battalion surgeons in accordance with their needs.16 The companies were served by two enlisted men of the Medical Department attached to each and by litter bearers detached from the line. Battalion aid stations were kept well supplied with medical department matériel. All regimental aid stations moved forward to their organization control posts.16

When, as was the case, a shortage of bearers in the battalions was reported, litter bearers from Ambulance Companies No. 357 and No. 359 were sent forward and assigned to the battalion surgeons in greatest need of their services.17 Ambulances returning to the point carried food and canteens full of hot coffee to the wounded and to litter bearers of organizations at the front. The battalion surgeons and their personnel worked under the most trying and exhausting conditions, with no rest, and, at times, little food.17

During the offensive, dental surgeons and their assistants were attached to regiments, where they performed first-aid service under the same conditions as other Medical Department personnel.17

Owing to the rapid advance and to bad roads, the medical carts could not go forward with their battalions, and supplies had to be carried to aid stations by enlisted men. For this reason much property was temporarily discarded; later it was collected by the supply officer.18

Liaison was maintained by means of runners, between dressing stations and regimental surgeons, who were relied upon to maintain communication with the battalion stations. Five selected men from Ambulance Company No. 357 and an equal number from Ambulance Company No. 359 were detailed for this duty with the surgeons of the 179th and 180th Brigades, respectively. Each of these groups was under the direction of one of its members, who was held responsible for results. The arrangement proved satisfactory and was continued throughout subsequent operations.15 Bicycles salvaged after the initial advance were of considerable assistance in main-


taining contact between forward stations, while between dressing stations, triage, and field hospitals, motorcycles and ambulances were employed for this purpose.15


Ambulance companies were distributed as follows: Company No. 357, with a dressing and degassing station, at Jonc Fontaine, served the 179th Brigade. Next day (September 13) it established an advance station at Fey-en-Haye.15 Until the road through Norroy was opened on the afternoon of September 14, only one road, that through Fey-en-Haye, was available for ambulances, and after the initial advance all forward roads were almost impassable because of barricades, wire entanglements, and other obstacles.15 As the road through Norroy was under enemy balloon observation and subject to direct shell fire, it soon had to be abandoned.15 On the 14th this company and Ambulance Company No. 359 were each aided by six ambulances from Ambulance Company No. 358.19

Ambulance Company No. 358, with a dressing station at Gezoncourt, served the Artillery, furnishing vehicles to other companies, as above noted.16

Ambulance Company No. 359, which had established a dressing and degassing station at Jezainville, served the 180th Brigade on the right of the line. The next day it advanced its station to Montauville.16

Ambulance Company No. 360 was located at Joli Ferme near Griscourt, where it was technically in reserve though actually occupied in the removal of the sick.15 On the night of September 11-12 it sent forward half its bearer section to reinforce Ambulance Company No. 359.15

On the morning of September 12 the litter bearer sections of Ambulance Companies 357 and 359, supplemented by 80 men from Ambulance Company 360, went forward to battalion aid stations, and by 8 o’clock patients were arriving at the triage. From that time the flow of casualties was constant, most of the first day’s patients coming from the 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments. During the first few days there were comparatively few gassed patients, but subsequently the percentage was high.15

Throughout the occupation of the Toul sector, ambulances drove directly to battalion aid stations, almost without exception, and carried the wounded to the triage. Much tedious drudgery was thus saved the litter bearers, and wounded men reached the triage from one to three hours earlier than otherwise would have been the case. In one instance patients loaded near Norroy reached Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at Sebastopol barracks within three hours after being wounded.20 On an average, patients received at battalion aid stations were at the triage an hour and a half later. The average time consumed in getting a patient from the place where his wound was received to the triage was not more than four hours.20

During operations in this sector all truck transport for the ambulance companies was pooled under the supply officer of the sanitary train, subject to G-1, section headquarters, 90th Division, and trucks were sent where needed. Ambulance companies furnished drivers but were not assigned trucks except upon requisition.20



During September 12 it became necessary to call on G-l of the division for additional transportation to evacuate the triage. Several touring cars were furnished in addition to those in use by the division surgeon and the sanitary train; trucks were also used to transport slightly wounded men to Sebastopol. At 3.30 p. m. an appeal was made to the corps surgeon for ambulances and trucks, but none were available. At 1 a. m., on the 13th, 15 large trucks were furnished by G-1 of the division, for one trip only, to be returned in five hours. This necessitated evacuation of patients to Field Hospital No. 359 at Rosieres-en-Haye instead of to Toul.20


Field hospitals were located as follows: No. 357 at Griscourt operated the divisional triage, its personnel being supplemented by the consultants in surgery, orthopedics, and psychiatry and by the divisional gas officer.21 Field Hospital No. 358 at Rogeville, received the gassed and slightly sick.21 Field Hospital No. 359, near Rosieres-en-Haye, had been designated as the unit to care for severely wounded patients, but owing to a corps order forbidding major operations in field hospitals, it received only minor cases.21

Field Hospital No. 360 was ordered to transport its equipment to Camp Jonc Fontaine, but its personnel was on duty at Field Hospital No. 357, where it assisted the triage personnel by serving as night relief.21

Patients passing through the triage were evacuated as follows: Gas and slight medical cases to Field Hospital No. 358; surgical cases to Evacuation Hospital No. 1, Sebastopol; psychoneuroses and serious medical cases to Base Hospital No. 45, Toul, for further distribution.21 Except for limited transportation facilities, evacuation was easy, for roads were direct, in good condition, and free from shell fire.21


Commencing on September 8, the 5th Division took its place on a line running from just southeast of Remenauville to about 1 km. (0.6 mile) northeast of Regnieville, on the southern face of the St. Mihiel salient.22

The divisional order concerning the plans of communication, supply and evacuation read as follows:

Secret Field Order No. 41.

                            5TH DIVISION, 9 Sept., 18-12 hours.

Maps: Commercy, 1/80000

Bois de Prete}1/20000

* * * * * * *

Annex No. 7 to Field Orders #41


* * * * * * *

2. Roads.

(a) Corps axial road: Saizerais—Villers-en-Haye—Griscourt—thence northwest through the Foret de Puvenelle to Mamey—Regnieville—Thiaucourt—Charey.


(b) Axial road of the Fifth Division: Ferme Boyer—north to the Manoncourt—Royaumeix road—east to Manoncourt—Tremblecourt—northeast to Villers-en-Haye—Griscourt—northwest through the Foret de Puvenelle—Mamey—Regnieville—northwest to cross roads one kilometer east of La Griziere Farm—one kilometer east of La Griziere Farm—thence to Vieville-en-Haye—northwest to Jaulny, thence north to Rembercourt and northeast along railroad.

* * * * * * *

9. Evacuation of sick and wounded.

(a) Battalion and regimental aid stations will be located in the rear of their organizations at places designated by regimental surgeons after consultation with regimental commanders.

(b) Regimental surgeons will keep in touch with the units of the sanitary train in the rear. Upon location of the regimental dressing stations, they will notify the officer in charge of the ambulance dressing station as to its whereabouts. Routes from regimental aid stations will be marked by the regimental medical personnel.

(c) An ambulance dressing station will be located on the Metz road near the bridge crossing the Ache River. Those who are wounded during the early part of the engagement will be brought to that point.

(d) As the advance is made it may be found that a number of casualties occur and that the litter bearer force is insufficient for their transportation to the rear. Regimental surgeons will then establish collecting stations for twenty (20) or more wounded making use of such shelters as are available, preferably near roads, and will notify the ambulance dressing stations where the wounded are to be found.

(e) Upon receipt of such notification, ambulances will be sent to evacuate the wounded or, if the numher of wounded is sufficient, an ambulance dressing station will be established by the director of ambulance companies at the place.

(f) The first ambulance dressing station will be established by personnel of Ambulance Company #17 on the Metz road. The second ambulance dressing station may be established in the vicinity of Regnieville-en-Haye. The third ambulance dressing station a point about two kilometers in advance of the second. As soon as the first dressing station is cleared, its personnel will be available for establishment of another dressing station. This work will be conducted by the director of ambulance companies under supervision of the commander of the sanitary train.

(g) The triage will be located at Camp-de-Cirque, eight hundred (800) meters north of the cross roads at St. Jean. Messages to the commander of the sanitary train and the director of ambulance companies will be sent to the triage by returning ambulances.

The following information will be sent:

(1) The number and location of wounded and gassed to be evacuated.

(2) Notification of establishment of advanced ambulance dressing stations.

(3) Requests for splints, dressings, and other material.

(4) Such other data as may be necessary to enable the commander of the sanitary train to promptly furnish required transportation and assistance.

(h) Tetanus antitoxin will ordinarily be administered at regimental dressing stations, notation being made upon the diagnosis tag of the patient. Administration of morphine will likewise be noted.

(i) Severe casualties will be evacuated by ambulance, preference being given as follows:

(1) Severe hemorrhage.
(2) Abdominal wounds, not in shock.
(3) Severely gassed.
(4) Wounds of thorax.
(5) Fractures.

(j) Slight casualties who are not returned to the line will be evacuated by truck. All wounded will pass through the triage at Camp-de-Cirque, near St. Jean, one kilometer



northwest of Martincourt, where they will be given such immediate treatment as may be required.

No casualty will be evacuated from a divisional area without a diagnosis tag.

(k)Vehicles used for evacuation will follow the routes and directions of the circulation map furnished herewith.

(1) In addition to troops of the 5th Division engaged in combat at the front line, medical attention will be given to troops of the French Tank Service, troops of the divisions operating on each flank, and enemy wounded. Casualties occurring among other troops will follow the same routes of evacuation as those prescribed for troops of this division.

(m) A station for slightly wounded will be established at St. Jean. Considerable delay is anticipated in opening truck roads in advance of the present front line positions, as barbed-wire and road obstructions must be removed. For this reason, it is desirable that as many of the slightly wounded as are able to walk return to the rear on foot. None will be allowed to pass the military police who are not marked with a diagnosis tag.

(n) Tetanus antitoxin will be administered at the triage and station for slightly wounded to all wounded who have not already received it.

(o) A reserve of medical officers and medical department personnel from ambulance company #30 will be held at the triage at Camp-de-Cirque, near St. Jean, to replace casualties in regimental medical department personnel.

Request for personnel to replace casualties will be made to the commander of the sanitary train at the triage.

(p) The commander of the sanitary train will render reports to the division surgeon at Martincourt, viz:

(1) The approximate number of casualties reported.
(2) The report of casualties in Medical Department personnel.
(3) The number of patients evacuated to the field and evacuation hospitals.

(q) The surgeons of artillery organizations operating in the 5th Division area will report to the division surgeon of the 5th Division at Martincourt—

(1) The name and location of the organization with which they are on duty.
(2) Its approximate strength.
(3) The medical department personnel, officers and enlisted men attached.
(4) Request for necessary transportation and material.

The initial report on these subjects will be rendered as soon as possible after receipt of this order and additional reports regarding casualties to be evacuated and service required will be made as occasion demands.

(r) At the triage at Camp-de-Cirque, near St. Jean, will be stationed Field Hospital #25 and Ambulance Companies #17, 25 and 30, with such part of the additional ambulance transportation furnished by the corps surgeon as may be required for service in the advanced section. Trucks belonging to the sanitary train and trucks furnished for evacuation service by the commander of trains will be sent to St. Jean to report for service under the direction of the director of ambulance companies. The director of ambulance companies and the A. P. M. will together select the place at St. Jean for the park of waiting ambulances.

(s) Ambulances and trucks will be parked off from the usual traveled road in such a way that traffic will not be obstructed.

(t) Evacuation from St. Jean will be via Martincourt, Manonville, Domevre-en-Haye, Tremblecourt, Manoncourt, Avrainville, to Dieulouard—Toul road, and thence to evacuation hospitals located in or near Toul.

(u) Hospital for nontransportable wounded and gassed and for slightly sick.

(1) The hospital for nontransportable wounded and gassed and for slightly sick will be located south of Domevre-en-Haye on the western side of the Manonville—Tremblecourt road. At this place there will be located Field Hospital #17 and operating team #17 for treatment of nontransportable wounded.


(2) Field Hospital #29 for treatment of gassed.
(3) Field Hospital #30.
(4) The division medical supply depot.
(5) The field laboratory.
(6) Ambulance Company #29.
(7) Ambulances of the 1st Corps, designated for evacuation service, together with trucks allotted to this hospital by the commander of the sanitary train. The director of field hospitals will be stationed at Domevre. He will supervise the hospitalization, triage, and evacuation service for the corps and army. Artillery operating with the division, as well as evacuation from hospital to Domevre to evacuation hospitals.

These hospitals will make use of the buildings and bathing facilities which are available at that place. In addition it will be necessary to make use of hospital tentage. Tents will not be pitched until after dark on the night before the attack.

(v) Evacuation service for army and corps artillery:

An evacuation service for army and corps artillery will be established from the hospital at Domevre-en-Haye. Ambulances and trucks starting from Domevre-en-Haye will proceed via the route to Tremblecourt, thence northeast to Rogeville, thence to Griscourt to Gezoncourt, thence west to Martincourt, from Martincourt to Manonville, thence southeast, returning to Domevre-en-Haye.

Surgeons of artillery organizations operating in the 5th Division area exclusive of 5th Artillery Brigade will establish collecting stations for wounded and gassed along this road. They will notify the director of field hospitals at Domevre-en-Haye of the number of casualties and location of these collecting stations.

(w) The director of field hospitals will keep the division surgeon informed with regard to casualties and evacuations as prescribed in paragraph 16 of this order.

(x) A collecting place for casuals and soldiers who have become separated from their organizations will be established by the military police at Avrainville. These men will be used for furnishing details for laboring parties, burial parties, and additional litter bearers. Requests for additional litter bearers may be made to the commander of military police, at Avrainville, by the commander of sanitary train at Camp-de-Cirque, at St. Jean, or by the director of field hospitals at Domevre-en-Haye.

(y) Evacuation service for 5th Artillery Brigade:

Surgeons of the 19th, 20th, and 21st Field Artillery will utilize their own ambulances for evacuation so far as possible. Should additional ambulance service be required, they will send request for same to the director of ambulance companies at Camp-de-Cirque, near St. Jean. There is a short road, one kilometer north of Martincourt, connecting St. Jean with the Martincourt—Mamey road. This road may be used for quick evacuation of patients from 5th Artillery positions.

(z) On the morning of the day before the anticipated action, all ambulances except those belonging to the 19th, 20th, and 21st Field Artillery, the ammunition train, and the motor supply train will be sent to report to the director of ambulance companies at St. Jean.

(a-1) Evacuation hospitals.

(1) At Sebastopol barracks, about four kilometers northwest of Toul; Evacuation Hospital #1, for treatment of wounded. (Capacity about 8,000).

(2) At La Marche barracks, "The Caserne," just south of Toul. Hospital for gassed.

(3) At Justice group of barracks, just south of Toul. Hospital for contagious diseases.

(4) Hospital for sick, nervous, and shell concussion. Base Hospital #45, at La Marche section, and Base Hospital #51, at Favier section of Justice group of barracks, just south of Toul.

NOTE.—Overflow of seriously wounded from Evacuation Hospital #1, at Sebastopol, go to the Evacuation Hospital #3 in the Justice group of barracks, just south of Toul.

In the service of the evacuation of wounded, effort will be made to load vehicles so that as little loading and unloading as possible will be required at the triage and at the field hospital.


Vehicles which are filled with patients destined for the same hospital may thus be enabled to pass the triage with no longer delay than that incident to examination of diagnosis tags.

Gassed and wounded patients will not be loaded in the same vehicle

(a-2) While it is understood that ambulances carrying wounded are to be given all of the right of way possible on the roads, when they are not actually transporting wounded, they must clear the road for traffic the same as other vehicles. The parks of waiting ambulances must be on side roads off of the main route of travel.

* * * * * * *

At 5. a. m. on September 12, the division moved to the attack and, meeting little resistance, rapidly advanced its lines to north of Vieville-en-Haye. When relieved on the night of September 16-17, it occupied a line about southeast of Rembercourt.22


Prior to the attack the division surgeon had held repeated conferences with his medical officers, defining in detail the duties of each.23

On September 9 the sanitary train was at Villey-St. Etienne, 20 km. (12.4 miles) in the rear, and because of troop movements and road conditions it was impossible to bring more than a small part of it forward at that time.24 On September 10 Field Hospital No. 25 (triage) and Ambulance Company No. 30 (animal drawn) were advanced to St. Jean, giving opportunity for the establishment of the triage and for feeding the animals before the engagement began. The hospital here consisted of two barracks and a ward tent.24

During the night of September 11-12 the remainder of the sanitary train moved from Villey-St. Etienne to Domevre, arriving next morning. One motor ambulance company was sent forward to the dressing station at Metz bridge. The other companies which were also posted there were held at the disposition of the director of the ambulance company section, then at St. Jean.25

Medical department personnel with advancing troops accompanied the units to which they were assigned, rendering service as planned. In order to preclude shortage of supplies, so far as possible, regimental detachments carried pouches filled with surgical dressings.26 As it was impossible for the battalion medical carts to go forward, medical officers replenished their supplies, by means of litter bearers, from the advance medical supply depot on the Metz road.26

In the early part of this engagement the wounded were removed entirely by litter, but there were not enough litters at first to meet requirements. Their inadequacy was due to the fact that bearers detailed from the companies threw away their litters on the march during the night of September 11; to the inability of battalion medical carts to get forward through other traffic; and to the impossibility of the ambulances moving beyond the points where roads were cut by trenches or obstructed by wire entanglements, until the way had been made passable. Shortage of litter bearers was met by using in that capacity a large number of German prisoners.27


Regimental surgeons reported every afternoon whether or not the field had been cleared in order that additional searching parties might be sent out if needed to complete this service before nightfall. If necessary, these parties continued their work through the night until the field was reported by them to have been cleared.28

Roads were fairly good to within 4.8 km. (3 miles) of Regnieville; from that point they had been practically obliterated. North of this belt were the roads which the Germans had used, and these were found to be fairly good, except that all roads were deep with mud.25 Advance information concerning enemy hospital sites proved of value by facilitating the discovery and use of their supplies, especially by regimental detachments. Information obtained from road maps taken from captured German officers showed what roads the enemy had improved, and this knowledge facilitated the effective disposition of ambulances.24


The projected disposition of Medical Department formations is given in the order above quoted. On the evening of September 11 Ambulance Company No. 17 established a dressing station on the Metz road, 200 meters (216 yards) west of the bridge over the Ache, while the other companies were still moving from Villey-St. Etienne to Domevre-en-Haye. By 10 o’clock on September 12 the troops had advanced 4 km. (2.4 miles), and orders were given that Medical Department organizations move forward. Those at Domevre-en-Haye were advanced to St. Jean, and ambulance company dressing stations were established at Regnieville-en-Haye, Bois-des-Saules, Vieville-en-Haye, and later in the former German dressing station at Bois de Gerard.29

Ambulance Company No. 17 organized its station as follows: One officer was in general charge and in immediate control of the degassing section, which was operated by one sergeant and two privates; two men were detailed to administer antitoxin; one officer, one sergeant, and six men applied dressings, and four of the personnel were cooks.30 Of the rest of the company, 12 were assigned as ambulance drivers, 12 as ambulance orderlies, 2 as mechanics, 2 noncommissioned officers (alternating) in charge of evacuation, 2 privates as truck drivers, 2 as orderlies, and the remainder as litter bearers. In the last days of the offensive the kitchen staff was composed of 3 regular cooks and 10 assistants, who ministered not only to the company and its patients but also to a large number of line troops, especially runners, exhausted men, and men who had lost their way.30 Advanced dressing stations established by this company were usually in line with the majority of the battalion and regimental aid stations, but occupied as central a position as the terrain permitted. It was appreciated early that a dressing station would not function unless placed on a natural evacuation route, for litter bearers would turn to some other station more conveniently located. Usually the litter-bearer squads brought in the wounded to dressing stations direct from the front lines, but sometimes from aid stations only.30 Whenever possible, ambulances cleared the aid stations, and if the route of evacuation was long, as in the later stage of this operation, after stopping at the dressing station continued on to the triage.


In Ambulance Company No. 17, as in other companies, ambulances were sent on demand to any aid station accessible to them.30

Ambulance Company No. 25 was at first kept in reserve near Camp-de-Cirque, later "leapfrogging" Ambulance Company No. 17, and established a dressing station in the woods near Vieville, close to a regimental dressing station. Within 2.5 km. (1.5 miles) of this site were all the aid stations of Infantry, Artillery, and machine gun battalions, and this dressing station was located at a point which all incoming and outgoing transportation had to pass. Here a medical supply "dump" was maintained and issues were made largely on requests brought in by ambulance drivers or on information they conveyed, though runners also were employed by regimental personnel to carry requests for supplies.31

Ambulance Company No. 30 was the animal-drawn unit of the ambulance section. It was impossible to get any vehicles past enemy trenches until these had been filled in, but by noon of September 12 animal-drawn ambulances could be advanced to the immediate rear of the front. As road improvement progressed these ambulances were replaced by motor vehicles; and of the 1,500 sick and wounded transported, only 60 were removed by animal-drawn vehicles. At this time, on account of the few animals and their poor condition, it was possible to operate only 7 of the 12 vehicles available. During the operation the company was stationed at St. Jean, Metz bridge, and Vieville.32

During this operation Ambulance Company No. 29 was held in reserve at the triage, its personnel loading and unloading ambulances and serving as military police, while its ambulances operated with those of other companies.33

The following units were supplied the 5th Division by the First Corps:

United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 598 - Not being needed by the corps in the rear, it was sent to the front where, on September 12 and 13, it evacuated wounded from the 2d, 5th, and 90th Divisions; then, being no longer needed, it was relieved at noon of the 13th.

United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 570 - Rendered service on September 12, after which it returned to its station at Liverdun.

United States Army Ambulance Service Section No. 603 - Rendered service during the entire offensive, returning to its station at Liverdun on September 16.


During the night of September 11-12, Field Hospitals Nos. 17, 29, and 30, Surgical Operating Team No. 17, and the division supply unit were moved to Domevre-en-Haye.23 Field Hospital No. 25 was located at St. Jean to function as a triage. There was also a station for slightly wounded at St. Jean and a reserve of medical officers from Ambulance Company No. 30. On the morning of the 12th, the other field hospitals reached Domevre-en-Haye, where No. 17 received the nontransportable cases, No. 29 the gassed cases, and No. 30 the slightly sick.

The hospital for the nontransportable wounded had one operating team attached. Here also were the medical supply unit, the division laboratory,


and additional United States Army Ambulance Service sections from the army and corps, as well as the trucks belonging to the division sanitary train.

At 10 o’clock on the morning of September 12 the triage was advanced to Metz bridge and the other field hospitals were brought up to St. Jean, retaining their sites there through the remainder of the operations.29 The sanitary train served in the field two days after the line troops had been withdrawn, in order to maintain hospitalization for incoming troops until new medical organizations were established.34

Among other items in the medical history of the 5th Division, the following should be mentioned here:

In the early part of the engagement wounded were transported entirely by litter.27

Gas casualties received were comparatively rare, for the area was too large to be drenched with gases, the weather too cool for their rapid spread, and our troops were too seasoned to suffer from gas fright.35

Dental surgeons and their assistants on duty with the various organizations assisted throughout the operation in rendering first aid and helping in the evacuation of the wounded. Several of these officers accompanied advancing troops and served at battalion aid stations.36

As only 2 of the 12 medical carts reached their battalions at the front on the 13th of September, it was at first necessary that all regimental supplies be carried forward by the medical personnel.29 This had been anticipated and was met as far as possible by having the division medical supply maintain "dumps" at the dressing stations. These in turn were replenished from the dump at Metz bridge.34

A feature of the work of the Medical Department was the establishment of kitchens at all dressing stations and field hospitals, where hot meals were served to any soldiers needing food. These meals were prepared from Army rations, of which two truckloads were used for the purpose, and were supplemented by delicacies furnished by the Young Men’s Christian Association.34 Food was supplied day and night during the period of greatest activity, when between 3,000 and 4,000 men were served.34 Soldiers reporting without authority at the dressing station were instructed to get a good meal before seeking medical attention. As a result most of them, after being fed, returned on their own initiative to the front line for duty.34 The food service produced a considerable increase in efficiency in the fighting force and materially reduced the sick rate.

On the afternoon of each day the fact that the field had been cleared was verified by searching parties. Thus, on the morning of September 17, after a night engagement, the field was reported clear at 8.30 a. m., though the sanitary units remained at Metz bridge and assisted units of the 78th Division in the evacuation of their wounded.34


On September 11, the front line of the 2d Division extended from Remenauville to Limey (both inclusive).37



The Infantry of the division attacked promptly at 5 a. m., September 12, preceded by an artillery barrage. Although the ground was wet and heavy underfoot, the troops pushed forward rapidly, encountering very little opposition, except, occasionally, an enemy machine-gun nest made a stubborn resistance. The first phase objective was reached at 9 a. m.37

The Infantry advanced from the first phase line at 11 a. m., September 12, the hour set in the division attack order. By noon it was in possession of Thiaucourt, only slight enemy resistance having been encountered. By 2.50 p. m. the army objective, the line Jaulny—Xammes, was reached.37

During the succeeding three days the division consolidated its gains; on the night of September 15-16 it was relieved by the 78th Division and withdrew on September 20-21 to the Toul area.38


Battalion aid stations were established in the trenches on the night of September 11, and as the attack progressed others were opened close to the lines. Stations left behind by the advancing Medical Department personnel were taken over by the corresponding formations of support and reserve troops. Through this system, battalion surgeons kept near their men and the troops they served, and litter bearers from line companies had to transport patients but short distances.39

Mindful of the delays in the removal of wounded which had occurred during the offensive against Soissons, when litter-bearer companies were retarded in reaching the front on account of road congestion and because of imperfect liaison, certain innovations were now introduced into the evacuation service. An active lieutenant (Medical Department) was appointed litter-bearer officer for the division, and two others, similarly designated, were selected from each ambulance company to work with their litter-bearer sections under his direction.40 These officers, in their respective jurisdictions, knew the exact location of battalion aid stations at the jump-off and had located the points where such stations would probably be found later and where dressing stations should be established in case the attack progressed as expected. They acquainted themselves with paths from battalion aid stations to the ambulance posts and with the roads which vehicles would use. Their squads were at the battalion posts before the jump-off in order that they might begin to function immediately. These litter-bearer officers were required to cover many miles afoot before and during an advance in order that they might locate stations to the best advantage through personal examination of roads and terrain, but the results proved well worth the effort. This system of evacuation for the regiments and in their immediate rear was very successful and a noteworthy improvement on previous practice.41


Headquarters of the ambulance company section was located at Noviant-aux-Pres.41 At daybreak of September 12 a dressing station was established by Ambulance Company No. 23 at Limey, about 273 meters (300 yards) back


of the front line, while the other companies in reserve evacuated to the triage at Noviant-aux-Pres.42

Roads through No Man’s Land were in a frightful condition, but a dressing station and three ambulances of Ambulance Company No. 23 followed the attacking lines.43 That road conditions were so bad was not surprising, as the Germans depended largely upon narrow-gauge railways, using the roads but little and repairing them still less. In addition, many "tank pits" had been dug in the roads.43 Nevertheless, by 4.30 o’clock Ambulance Company No. 23 had established a dressing station at Thiaucourt.43

A little later the same evening seven ambulances of Ambulance Company No. 15 arrived with the company’s dressing station equipment. The mule-drawn vehicles of Ambulance Company No. 16 arrived the same day and evacuations began.43 Animal-drawn ambulances proved of great value when roads were at their worst, but as each ambulance had only two mules and roads were very rough and heavy, a single trip nearly exhausted the animals for a day.

On September 13 Ambulance Company No. 15 took over the station of Ambulance Company No. 23, at Thiaucourt, and the following day established a station at Jaulny in a château which the Germans had used as a hospital.43 This place was shelled several times during the night, and wounded were removed only after several interruptions and with considerable danger. On the same date, Ambulance Company No. 16 established a station at Xammes, about 1.5 km. (0.93 mile) behind the trenches.42 During this period the roads were being repaired with material taken from the ruined villages of Limey and Remenauville, and evacuations became progressively less difficult.43 After September 14 the dressing station of Ambulance Company No. 23, at Limey, became the rear limit of evacuation by the Fifth divisional train; from that point patients were carried to the rear by the ambulances of the 78th Division.44


At the commencement of this offensive Field Hospital No. 1, the triage, was at Noviant-aux-Pres, while Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23, for nontransportable surgical cases, and Field Hospital No. 16, for gassed and sick, were on the Minorville—Royaumeix road, 2 km. (1.2 miles) from Minorville.41 At noon of the 13th, Field Hospital No. 1 was closed and was moved to Thiaucourt during the night, Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23 joining it the next day, and the medical supply unit on the 15th. Field Hospital No. 16 remained near Minorville.43

By this time the several field hospitals of the division had been specialized. No. 1, the permanent triage, carried portable baths, both tub and shower, with gas soap, soda, extra pajamas and underwear, and a large supply of splints, litters, blankets, and dressings.45 Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23, combined into one, for the nontransportable wounded, were augmented by a mobile surgical unit which afforded X-ray facilities and electric lights.45 This consoli-


dated unit had a capacity of 250 beds. Field Hospital No. 16 was equipped to care for gassed and ordinary sick, carrying no surgical equipment.45

While stationed at Thiaucourt frequent shelling obliged Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23 to seek shelter underground. They utilized vaulted cellars, which made good and safe operating rooms.44 Because of their proximity to the lines and the efficiency of the new method of evacuation, the wounded were often in this combined hospital within half an hour after they had been wounded.44 This prompt but unhurried removal doubtless saved many lives, especially among those suffering from abdominal wounds. On account of its more central location this consolidated unit here relieved Field Hospital No. 1 of triage duty.44 That organization, with the litter bearers of Ambulance Company No. 3, which had been on duty here, left for Ansauville on the night of the 16th. The next day Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 23, and the dressing stations, turned over their sites to units of the 78th Division and withdrew to Grand Mesnil, where the train was reunited.44

The château at Thiaucourt, with numerous barracks of the Adrian type, had been a German medical and surgical hospital. Its equipment included a portable X-ray outfit, blankets, dressings, many paper bandages and sponges, and two completely equipped medical wagons. These wagons were unpacked and their contents stored in the château. On the 20th four officers went with a truck to salvage X-ray outfit and supplies, and, in spite of enemy bombardment, succeeded in removing them. Two German ambulances, with litter trailers, were captured in this sector. Only the rear wheels had rubber tires, the front wheels being provided with spiral springs. Trailers had but two wheels each, with pneumatic tires. The capacity of these ambulances was three litter cases placed lengthwise, and four sitting patients, placed vis-à-vis, amidships. All these vehicles had canvas tops and side curtains.46


During the St. Mihiel operation the division was in the reserve of the First Army Corps and was in support of the 2d and 5th Divisions, with headquarters at Rosieres-en-Haye. It remained in reserve until the nights of September 15-16 and 16-17, when it relieved the 2d and 5th Divisions, respectively (less Artillery). The organization of this sector, just taken from the enemy, and the frequent raids carried out to divert the attention of the enemy from the approaching Meuse-Argonne operation, made its occupancy a particularly active one.47


On September 10 and 11 almost the entire sanitary train concentrated in the woods in the rear of the 2d Division.

On September 12, the 78th Division furnished 12 ambulances, which evacuated to Toul patients of the 2d, 5th, and 89th Divisions. On the 13th and succeeding days, these ambulances were used to transfer patients to Toul from the


dressing station of the 2d Division at Limey. The sanitary train was now stationed in Bois de Mort Mare until September 16.48

Field hospitals were located at St. Jacques, where No. 309 received surgical cases, No. 310 gassed, No. 312 general, medical, venereal, and psychoneurotic, and No. 311 was held in reserve, part of its personnel assisting other units.49


(1) Battle Instructions No. 1, Headquarters First Army, A. E. F., September 2, 1918.

(2) Operations report, First Army Corps, St. Mihiel operations.

(3) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps in the St. Mihiel operation, by Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C., corps surgeon, undated, 7. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(4) Ibid., 8.

(5) Memorandum from the corps surgeon, First Army Corps, August 26, 1918. On file with report on Medical Department activities of the 90th Division, A. E. F., Historical Division, S. G. O.

(6) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, in the St. Mihiel operation, by Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C., corps surgeon, undated, 3. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(7) Ibid., 14.

(8) Ibid., 17.

(9) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College, 1700 (82d Division).

(10) Report of Medical Department activities, 82d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 9. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(11) Ibid., 31.

(12) Ibid., 24.

(13) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919. Prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College, 1700, (90th Division).

(14) Operations report, 90th Division, St. Mihiel operation.

(15) Report of Medical Department activities, 90th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part II; 6. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(16) Ibid., Part I, 11.

(17) Ibid., Part I, 14.

(18) Ibid., Part I, 15.

(19) Ibid., Part I, 13.

(20) Ibid., Part II, 7.

(21) Ibid., Part I, 12.

(22) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.

(23) Report of Medical Department activities, 5th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part V, 22. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(24) Ibid., Part I, 24.

(25) Ibid., Part I, 30.

(26) Ibid., Part I, 32.

(27) Ibid., Part I, 37.

(28) Ibid., Part I, 39.

(29) Ibid., Part I, 31.


(30) Ibid., Part IV, 2.

(31) Ibid., Part IV, 12.

(32) Ibid., Part IV, 19.

(33) Ibid., Part IV, 16.

(34) Ibid., Part I, 33.

(35) Ibid., Part I, 38.

(36) Ibid., Part I, 34.

(37) Journal of Operations May 1 to November 30, 1918 (2d Division).

(38) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College, 1700, (2d Division).

(39) Operations report, Medical Department, 2d Division, A. E. F., from the division surgeon to the commanding general, 2d Division, September 17, 1918. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(40) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon (undated), Part I, 34. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(41) Ibid., Part I, 35.

(42) Ibid., Part II, 4.

(43) Ibid., Part I, 36.

(44) Ibid., Part I, 37.

(45) Ibid., Part II, 14.

(46) Ibid., Part I, 39.

(47) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College, 1700, (78th Division).

(48) Report of Medical Department activities, 78th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, 25. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(49) Ibid., 2.