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Chapter XI

Field Operations, Table of Contents



The great German offensive, begun March 21, 1918, had resulted in the enemy’s capture of Bapaume, Peronne, and a number of other communities of similar size and importance, and the establishment of a German salient toward Amiens and Compiegne. West of Reims, between May 27 and June 5, the Germans had launched another attackthe Aisne operationand had driven in a salient extending toward the southwest, which had reached the Marne and had its approximate apex near Chateau-Thierry. They had thus established another salient east of that mentioned above. Between June 9 and 13, in order to connect the apices of these salients they had attempted to widen this salient to the west, in the Montdidier-Noyon operation.1 Failing in this effort they attacked again on the night of 14-15, both east and west of Reims.

When, on July 15, the enemy began this his final offensive, the first phase of the second battle of the Marneusually spoken of as the Champagne-Marne defensiveAmerican troops were interspersed with the French on the front attacked. The American First Corps, under control of the French Sixth Army, held a sector 7 km. (4.2 miles) in length between Torcy and Vaux, both inclusive,2 having under its command the French 167th Division and the American 26th Division. East of the 26th Division was the French 39th Division, with the 56th Brigade, 26th Division, in support, and beyond it was the American 3d Division holding the south bank of the Marne for 12 km. (7.5 miles) east from Chateau-Thierry. Continuing the line eastward was the French 125th Division, with the 55th Brigade, American 28th Division, in support.3 The American 4th Division was in reserve, divided between the French Second and Seventh Corps.4 East of Reims the 42d Division, French Fourth Army, was in support of French troops in the Champagne sector.1

The brunt of this offensive, so far as American troops were concerned, fell upon the 3d Division, while the French were attacked to the right of that division and in the Champagne sector. Some small units of the American 4th and 28th Divisions gained front line service with our troops or with the French,1 the 26th Division had a moderate number of casualties,5 and five of the battalions of the 42d Division and all of its artillery soon became engaged.1

The enemy had encouraged his soldiers to believe that the attack of July 15 would conclude the war, with a German peace. Although he made

    aOur troops at this time were elements of French armies.


elaborate plans for the operation, he failed to conceal fully his intentions, and the front of the attack was suspected at least one week ahead. On the Champagne front the actual hour for the assault was known.1

After a violent artillery preparation by both explosive and gas shells lasting four hours in the Marne area, the German infantry attacked early in the morning of July 15.6 The right wing of the French Sixth Army met the attack between Dormans and Fossoy, on the front of the French 125th and the American 3d Divisions.6

Southwest of Reims and along the Marne to the east of Chateau-Thierry the Germans were at first somewhat successful, a penetration of 8 km. (4.8 miles) beyond the river being effected against the French division immediately to the right of the 3d Division.7 The attack continued on July 16 and 17, but on the latter date it became evident that the Germans had been stopped with heavy losses, and the next day began the great counteroffensive which was to continue until the enemy was compelled to sign the armistice.5


The First Army Corps was created by an order dated January 15, 1918.8 Its first headquarters were at Neufchateau, and until July 4, 1918, it exercised administrative command over the divisions assigned to it, tactical command being vested in the French units with which these divisions served. On July 4, however, this corps, under control of the French Sixth Army, assumed tactical command of the American 2d and 26th and the French 167th Divisions, and of the front held by the two last mentioned. Corps headquarters were then at Chateau de Lagny. In the Champagne-Marne operation, tactical command of the First Corps consisted of the American 26th and the French 167th Divisions, and 2d then having been assigned to the Third Army Corps, preparatory to the offensive of July, 1918.9


With the creation of the First Corps its surgeon began so to organize his office that it would include departments corresponding to similar elements of the offices of the division surgeons, with a view to promoting coordination. Though the frequent changes of the divisions assigned to the corps interfered very considerably with the full development of this plan, it nevertheless proved efficacious.10

As at first contemplated and as later developed, the corps surgeon’s office included the corps surgeon, the assistant corps surgeon, an executive officer, a sanitary inspector, consultants in medicine, surgery, urology, orthopedics, and psychiatry, a corps medical gas officer, and the commanding officer, corps sanitary train.10

The first mentioned of the professional staff joined on July 17, others joining at irregular intervals thereafter.11

The surgeon of the First Corps had moved, with corps headquarters, to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, on June 30, where the following plan for evacuation


of sick and wounded was published in secret Orders No. 6, Headquarters, First Army Corps, dated July 9, 1918.12

1. Sanitary organization.-(a) Battalion aid stations, relays of litter bearers, and regimental infirmaries will be established by regimental surgeons under supervision of the division surgeons. Additional sanitary personnel from divisions not in action may be obtained on application to the corps surgeon.

(bCollecting stations (triage) will be established as follows: 26th Division, Bezu-le-Guery; 167th Division (French), Cocherel.

(c) Stations for slightly wounded. Personnel to be taken from an ambulance company: 26th Division, Ventelet Ferme.

(d)Divisional field hospitals will be established as follows:

For treatment of gassed cases: 26th Division, Luzancy; 167th Division (ambulance), Cocherel.

Gassed cases get only preliminary treatment here, and cases will be evacuated as soon as possible to evacuation hospital from Luzancy to Montanglaust and from Cocherel to Coulommiers.

For treatment of ordinary sick, including venereal and skin diseases: 2d Division, Jouarre; 26th Division, Luzancy; 167th Division, Coulommiers.

For nontransportable wounded: 26th Division, La Ferte-sous-Jouarre; 167th Division, Perreuse.

(e)All military police should be advised as to location of the station for slightly wounded and the collecting stations, and will direct slightly wounded men and litter bearers to these points.

(f) Movement of sick and wounded: By the assignment of one S. S. U. unit in addition to the authorized allowance of ambulances, divisions are responsible for transportation of sick and wounded from the front line to the field hospitals and from field hospitals to evacuation hospitals.

Divisions requiring sanitary transportation additional to this will apply to the corps surgeon.

Movement and routes.-From station for slightly wounded: Those able to return to duty will be returned at once to the line. All others will be evacuated, by truck, if possible, to Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Montanglaust, by the road Ventelet FermeBezuCaumontChamignyLa FerteMontanglaust.

From collecting stations (triage): From Bezu-le-Guery (26th Division), ordinary sick to Luzancy; gassed to Luzancy. Route, BezuCaumontCourcellesLuzancy. Ordinary wounded to Montanglaust; nontransportable wounded to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. Route, Ventelet FermeBezuCaumontChamignyLa Ferte-sous-Jouarre.

From Cocherel: Ordinary sick to Coulommiers; gassed to Coulommiers; ordinary wounded to Coulommiers (H. O. E. 52/B); nontransportable wounded to Perreuse.

From field hospitals: 2d and 26th Divisions, all cases requiring and able to stand evacuation to Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Montanglaust. 167th Division, to H. O. E. 52/B at Coulommiers.

Only nontransportable cases will be held at the field hospital designated for nontransportable wounded. These will be evacuated, as soon as their condition will permit, to Montanglaust for the 26th Division and to Coulommiers for the 167th Division.

Contagious diseases will be evacuated: 2d and 26th Divisions to Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Montanglaust; 167th Division to Mauperthuis.

Mental cases will be evacuated: 2d and 26th Divisions to Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Montanglaust; 167th Division to Coulommiers, but will be immediately transferred to Mauperthuis.

(g) All evacuations for corps troops will be as prescribed for the nearest division.


When the enemy attacked on July 15, the line of the 26th Division ran, roughly, from Vaux northwest to a point on the northeast edge of Triangle


and one-half kilometer south of Bouresches; thence along the west edge of Bouresches to the east edge of the Bois de Belleau, to a point about one-half kilometer south of Belleau, and thence north of west to a point one-fourth kilometer west of Torcy.13 Though the Germans attacked this portion of the line, it was not the part that was most heavily involved, although it was subjected to harassing artillery and machine-gun fire. Some of the enemy took a part of the line by infiltration, but were repulsed.


Aid stations were established preferably in cellars of farm buildings, but if these were not available they were opened at suitable locations under stone culverts, in dry water courses, or in small, shallow excavations.14 The regimental and battalion aid stations of the 101st Artillery were set up at Montreuil and at D’Issonge Ferme, respectively.15

Battalion aid stations of the 102d Artillery were located in Domptin and one-half kilometer (0.9 mile) east of it.16Supplies were replenished by ambulances and bearers.


Dressing stations were established by Ambulance Company No. 104 at la Voie-du-Chatel and by Ambulance Company No. 103 at Villiers-sur-Marne. The former was very active, the latter only slightly so.17 United States Army Ambulance Section No. 502 evacuated to these stations from the ambulance head. At Bezu-le-Guery, just beyond the enemy artillery zone, Ambulance Companies No. 101 and No. 102 were stationed.17


Field Hospital No. 102 operated a triage at Bezu-le-Guery. Field Hospitals No. 101 and No. 104 together cared for the slightly wounded, gassed, and sick in a large school building at Luzancy, while Field Hospital No. 103, at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, received the seriously wounded. This hospital, with 6 operating teams and 35 female nurses, was completely equipped and was favorably established in a large convent, well lighted for its purpose.18

All field hospitals were evacuated by G. M. C. ambulances and by trucks of the sanitary train to Evacuation Hospital No. 7 at Chateau Montanglaust.18


The 3d Division occupied a frontage of almost 12 km. (7.4 miles) on the south bank of the Marne, from the eastern outskirts of Chateau-Thierry to the bend of the river about 2 km. (1.2 miles) east of Charteves. The front line of defense consisted of isolated pits and machine-gun emplacements dug near the river’s edge. Close in rear of this line, about 364 meters (400 yards) from the river, was the high embankment of the Paris-Metz Railway, which provided a much stronger defensive position and gave a continuous line of protection from rifle fire. Beginning at midnight July 14-15 the divisional


Infantry and all auxiliary troops stationed in the front line were subjected to bombardment by both high-explosive and gas shells.19 This bombardment was directed for a period of 10 hours against the areas along the crest of the hills, and for a shorter period against the foreground nearer the river.19 The enemy infantry attack commenced about 3.20 a. m., July 15, regiments seeking to cross the river by means of boats and pontoon bridges.19 The most violent attack was that between Fossoy and Moulins. The 6th Brigade, consisting of the 30th and 38th Infantry, defending the right flank, effectually frustrated the enemy’s contemplated advance to the south along the valley of the Surmelin River.20 "Although the rush of German troops overwhelmed some of the front-line positions, causing infantry and machine-gun companies to suffer in some cases a 50 per cent loss, no German soldier crossed the road from Fossoy to Crezancy except as a prisoner of war, and by noon of the following day there was no German in the foreground of the 3d Division except the dead."21 "On this occasion a single regiment of the 3d Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals. It prevented the Germans crossing at certain points on its front while on either flank the Germans who had gained a footing pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the Germans with counterattacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete confusion, capturing 600 prisoners."7

From July 16 to 19 the division remained in its sector on the Marne, with the right flank regiment facing to the east, as a measure of protection against the German line which had crossed the Marne.21


Evacuation of patients was facilitated, as the sector had good roads and this despite the fact that they were damaged to a certain extent by the enemy artillery barrage on the night of July 14-15.22This was placed as far back as Pertibout and Essises.22 Besides the casualties involved in the present engagement, 382 which had occurred in the infantry between June 4 and 14 were evacuated by the same route as that maintained during the engagement in question.23

The division surgeon directed the location of the various dressing stations and other Medical Department formations and moved them forward as occasion required.24

With troops the regimental aid station of the 4th Infantry was located at Grand Ballois Ferme, and those of its battalions at Blesmes, Etampes, Chierry, and in the woods neighboring Nesles. Total casualties taken care of in the five days, July 15 to 20, approximated 275. Amubulance service was prompt and patients were evacuated quickly.25

The regimental aid station of the 7th Infantry was established at Courboin, while battalion aid stations were placed at Le Houy Ferme, 910 meters (1,000 yards) northwest of La Rocq Ferme, and at a point 273 meters (300 yards) north of the latter farm. The wounded began coming in almost immediately, but were evacuated quickly as soon as the first shock of the attack was


over. Motor trucks, escort wagons, and other vehicles supplemented the ambulance service of the regiment.26

The regimental aid station of the 30th Infantry was located in Bois d’Aigremont below Crezancy, with the three battalion aid stations in the same woodland or in Crezancy. Of the 450 casualties (approximately) which the regimental stations cared for, the majority were seriously wounded, the slightly wounded and gassed making their way unassisted to the rear.27

The regimental aid station of the 38th Infantry was at St. Eugene, while those of its 1st and 2d Battalions were at Connigis, with an advanced aid station for the 2d Battalion at Moulins.28 A station was also operated at Paroy.28The stations at Connigis and Paroy were located in wine cellars which afforded ample space and some protection; that at Paroy accommodated 70 patients.28 On the 16th of July, as this part of our line was drawn back, the last named station fell into the hands of the enemy.28 Meanwhile a medical officer who had gone for assistance secured the aid of an infantry patrol party, two ambulances, and a Y. M. C. A. truck. The station was then soon recaptured and held until all patients had been evacuated.28 The aid stations of the 1st and 2d Battalions were then established at St. Eugene and the regimental station at Courboin, that of the 3d Battalion remaining at Connigis.28 On the night of the 17th the medical officer who had evacuated the station at Paroy returned there with his battalion, where he was killed on the following day.28

The aid station of the 8th Machine Gun Battalion was operated sometimes independently, sometimes in conjunction with those of other troops. On July 15, when located at Bochage Ferme, it was operated independently.29 That of the 9th Machine Gun Battalion was at Montbazen, where it gave refreshments as well as treatment to all wounded received.30 The 7th Battalion, on July 15, was ordered east of Courbon, where an aid station was established in an old farmhouse.31

The aid station of the 1st Battalion of the 10th Field Artillery waslocated at Le Moussete, 1 km. (0.621 mile) northwest of St. Eugene. As the road to the place wasblocked during the 15th (until late at night), it wasimpossible to evacuate all the wounded that came in.32 They were carried by litter to St. Eugene and thence by ambulance or truck. Disabled from Battery B were evacuated more easily through the aid station of the 2d Battalion at Greves Ferme, which was directly accessible by ambulance and was fairly well protected against shells and gas.32


Headquarters of the ambulance company section was at Verdelot from July 15 to 24.24 The excellent roads allowed ambulances to make good time in going to and in returning from the front. Although 60 ambulances were available, it soon became apparent that the number was insufficient and division trucks were secured for transporting the slightly wounded, as many as 80 of these vehicles being used at one time.23 During the period of intense


activity, beginning July 15, the sanitary train evacuated approximately 8,000 patients.24

Ambulance Company No. 5 was stationed at Essises, where it had been located since June 3. Here it operated a main dressing station, maintaining also an advance dressing station at Courboin, with 1 officer, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 8 privates.24 Its ambulance schedule, mentioned in the preceding chapter, was temporarily interrupted by this offensive, during which it evacuated all wounded to Field Hospital No. 27 at Verdelot and all gas cases to Field Hospital No. 5 at Ville Chamblon.24 One medical officer and 20 enlisted men of this company reinforced the regimental aid station of the 38th Infantry from July 15 to 17, when the regiment was relieved.24 One medical officer and 10 men were also sent on July 17 to the regimental infirmary of the 38th Infantry at Connigis. Of these, 10 became casualties.24 From July 15 to 22, when Ambulance Company No. 5 moved from Essises to Blesmes, it evacuated approximately 2,700 patients, of which number a little more than one-half were transported recumbent.24 One ambulance driver was killed, two were wounded, and four ambulances were put out of use by enemy shell fire.24

FIG. 54.-Dressing station operated by Ambulance Company No. 5, at Courboin

Ambulance Company No. 7 was located on July 15 at Pertibout, where it operated a dressing station until July 22.33 On the 15th it assigned 1


medical officer, 1 noncommissioned officer and 10 enlisted men with the 38th Infantry, working between Courboin and Crezancy.33 Ambulance Company No. 26 was located on July 15 at Verdelot, where it remained throughout the month, occupied solely with transportation.33 Ambulance Company No. 27, parked at La Ferotterie from July 15 to 20, evacuated with all available ambulances from Field Hospital No. 27, at Verdelot, to Field Hospital No. 26, at Coulommiers, and to Red Cross Hospital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin.34 United States Army Ambulance Section No. 524, from July 15 to 31, assisted in evacuating the wounded from dressing stations to field hospitals.35


From July 15 to 29 headquarters of the field hospital section was at Verdelot.34 The field hospitals had reached the Marne area on June 1 and had begun operations on June 3.36 Field Hospital No. 5, equipped as a gas hospital, was located at Ville Chamblon, about 10 km. (6.2 miles) behind the lines.34 Field Hospital No. 7 was in reserve at Chateau Villiers, near St. Barthelemy, with the following personnel on detached service with the organizations mentioned: 1 officer, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 4 privates with the 6th Engineers; 1 noncommissioned officer and 15 privates with the 4th Infantry; 1 officer with the 10th Field Artillery; 1 noncommissioned officer and 12 privates with the 7th Infantry.37

Field Hospital No. 27, at Verdelot, worked with a French hospital in a school building at that place, studied the triage system of the latter and so developed one of its own.36 At this hospital were treated nontransportable and slightly wounded, neuroses, sick (except contagious cases), and some others, including some gassed cases sent to it through error.35 About the middle of July it was reinforced by 1 shock team, 4 surgical teams, and 9 nurses.36 From July 15 to 28 it admitted 4,512 patients, of whom about three-fourths came from the 3d Division, the remainder from the 28th.35 Field Hospital No. 26, at Coulommiers, 30 km. (18.6 miles) from the line, had functioned at first and prior to this defensive as the divisional evacuation hospital,36 there being none near the sector until Evacuation Hospital No. 7 and Mobile Hospital No. 1 were established and began to receive patients at Chateau Montanglaust, 2 km. (1.2 miles) from Coulommiers, on June 13.38 This it will be noted was a month before the Champagne-Marne defensive action began.

To the rear of the 3d and other divisions near Chateau-Thierry, evacuations were effected through the Red Cross hospital at Juilly, Evacuation Hospital No. 7 and Mobile Hospital No. 1, at Chateau Montanglaust, and Army Red Cross Hospital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin.39 The hospitals at Chateau Montanglaust had a total capacity of 1,100 beds, with good facilities for evacuating by train. The hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin had some 800 beds and effected its train evacuation from La Ferte-Gaucher, 4 km. (2.4 miles) distant.40



When the enemy attacked on July 15, in the fifth and last German offensive, the 28th Division was in the general support line back of the French, one of its brigades being to the east, the other to the west of the 3d Division.41 Only small elements of the command actually participated in front-line service as tactical units. Four companies of the 109th and 110th Infantry were especially engaged in repelling the attack on July 15,41 and the 2d Battalion of the 111th Infantry attacked in the Bois D’Aigremont on the 16th. All troops in the support lines had been subjected on the night of July 14-15 to intense bombardment. As troops were forced back during the German assault, the support line became the front line, in which American and French troops were intermingled.41



The Champagne-Marne defensive was the first action in which medical units of the 28th Division were actively engaged. As a matter of fact its ambulance companies, Nos. 110, 111, and 112 (motorized), did not receive their vehicles until July 19, when 41 ambulances were hurriedly brought up from St. Nazaire.42 Ambulance Company No. 109 (animal-drawn) did not receive its transportation until August 13.43 During this defensive, the three motorized companies were held in reserve at Le Rousset. To serve the elements of the division engaged, Ambulance Company No. 110 established a dressing station at Union Chateau, near Artonges.44 Wounded, both French and American, were cared for here in large numbers.44


Field Hospital No. 109 was moved from Marlande on July 17 to La Ferotterie, where it immediately opened in a school building, but no patients were received.45 Meanwhile, on July 16, Field Hospital No. 110 moved to Fontaine Tige, where Field Hospital No. 111 had been located since July 12.46 The former unit loaned certain personnel to the latter, which had established an operating room and shock ward in an abandoned building, pitched tentage and begun receiving patients on July 16.46 On that date, Field Hospital No. 112 moved up from Marlande to a château on the outskirts of Artonges and established three ward tents in a cleared space in the wood surrounding it.47 Ambulance Company No. 110 utilized the first floor of the same château as a dressing station, and other parts were occupied by brigade headquarters. Patients began to arrive on the same day.47 Three additional ward tents were pitched, carefully camouflaged, and piped for water from springs on an adjacent hillside.47 Shower baths for mustard gas cases were improvised in the basement of the château, and great quantities of clothing made available for these patients.47 Only gas cases were sent to this point, other casualties in this vicinity being sent to Field Hospital No.


27, at Verdelot, with the result that from mid-afternoon of July 16 to July 23, inclusive, this hospital received but 59 patients.47 These were evacuated from time to time to Field Hospital No. 111, at Fontaine Tige.47


On June 21 the 42d Division was moved to a position east of Reims, in the Champagne sector, where it became a part of the French Fourth Army and occupied the support lines during the German offensive of July 15. With other troops, the division was subjected to intense preliminary bombardment. All of the artillery was engaged, and after the German infantry had penetrated the front lines, five battalions of the infantry in the support lines also became involved.48


The division surgeon’s office was located at Vadenay, but receiving a direct hit which caused several casualties, including three officers killed, it was moved to Ecury-sur-Coole.49

On July 15 the division surgeon secured the detail of 12 litter bearers from each company and battery to aid Medical Department personnel assigned to them. These men, who wore a blue brassard marked with the letters "L. B.," served as litter bearers in all subsequent engagements.50

Battalion and regimental aid stations of Infantry organizations were well protected and were able to operate satisfactorily, but those of the Artillery were not so fortunate. Personnel at the latter points was compelled to work practically in the open, in Adrian barracks, shallow trenches, or improvised splinter-proof shelters.51 The intensity of the bombardment caused heavy casualties at the beginning of the attack, and removal of the wounded became difficult. Back areas were so heavily shelled that the withdrawal of several Medical Department formations in the rear was necessitated, as noted below.51 The length of haul to these was thereby increased and evacuation proportionately retarded. It proved difficult to maintain proper liaison between ambulance companies and aid stations.51 Because of the damage to telephone lines, runners were used to maintain communication with battalion and regimental command posts. By 11 o’clock on July 16, the initial force of the attack had been spent and casualties then decreased.51 Thereafter evacuations proceeded more promptly, numerous and good roads facilitating removal of the wounded.51

Concerning the service of aid stations, special allusion is made in the divisional medical report to the value of light trestles which were brought up on the battalion medical carts.52 These were used to support litters, both in the open and in the narrow dugouts, and a "three-way fold" of blankets reaching to the ground allowed them to be used as shock tables. The carts, after delivering their supplies, withdrew to the echelon of horse-drawn vehicles in the rear.52


FIG. 55.-Aid station, 167th Infantry, 42d Division, Souain, France, July 17, 1918

FIG. 56.-Triage, 42d Division, near Suippes, France, July 17, 1918



Dressing stations had been previously established at Miomandre and Suippes, but up to July 15 they functioned chiefly as regulating points for the ambulance service.53 One ambulance was stationed with each battalion, except in the case of two battalions intermingled with the French, and these, by mutual agreement, were served by United States Army Ambulance Section No. 580 through the French poste de secours. Four litter bearers were detailed at each battalion aid station.53 As Suippes was heavily shelled on July 15, the dressing station withdrew from that place to a point just above Bussy-le-Chateau.54 When the field hospitals at Bussy-le-Chateau were forced to vacate that locality, this station collected and sorted patients, sending the most serious cases promptly to the rear, but sheltering, feeding, and treating the others until such times as more transportation became available.54 Trucks were used to move the slightly wounded, and all available vehicles in the train, as well as those of an evacuation ambulance company which reinforced this service, were used to work between Busy and Ecury-sur-Coole.55 The station at Miomandre remained at its former site.54 From time to time additional and relief litter bearers were dispatched to the front, where they served at battalion aid stations and also removed patients from the lines.55

FIG. 57.-French and American wounded being received at the dressing station at Epieds, operated by 117th Sanitary Train, 42d Division, July 27, 1918



Field Hospitals No. 165 and No. 167 had taken over a French barracks hospital at Bussy-le-Chateau, 18 km. (11.1 miles) behind the line, on July 7, and in conjunction with Mobile Hospital No. 2, at Vatry, had made preparations on a large scale for the treatment of wounded and gassed.56 During the morning of July 15 the hospital group at Bussy-le-Chateau received five direct hits, which killed some of the personnel and wounded many patients. The latter were moved to nearby trenches and abri and thence to Ecury-sur-Coole, where the hospitals had moved.49 As this move considerably increased the difficulty of evacuating from the lines, a detail from Field Hospital No. 168 and American surgical teams were sent to a French hospital at Chalons-sur-Marne, where nontransportable American wounded were received; but persistent bombing of this town rendered it a very unsuitable location for the accumulation of patients.57 On July 10 Field Hospitals No. 166 and No. 168 had been ordered to Ecury-sur-Coole to cooperate with Evacuation Hospital No. 4 in the establishment of another hospital group, and they operated here during this defensive.49 Enemy aviators frequently bombed this point, but hospital service was carried on uninterruptedly. A total of 2,949 cases were received here, of whom 2,519 were gassed.57 The sick and slightly wounded were sent by ambulance to a camp hospital at Mailly, and evacuations were made from Evacuation Hospital No. 4 and Mobile Hospital No. 2 by hospital trains to base hospitals in the interior.58


The medical organization which had gradually been built up in rear of our divisions has been described in some detail in the latter part of Chapter X. An officer representing the medical department with the fourth section of the general staff, as noted, had been appointed chief surgeon of the Paris group, as our divisions operating in the Marne area were now designated. The following units were under his jurisdiction on July 15, 1918:

    Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Chateau Montanglaust.
    Mobile Hospital No. 1, at Chateau Montanglaust.
    Army Red Cross Hospital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin.
    Evacuation Hospital No. 8, at Juilly.
    Army Red Cross Hospital No. 105, at Juilly.

Wounded from the 3d Division flowed naturally into the hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin, while Evacuation Hospital No. 7, at Chateau Montanglaust, received all cases from the 26th Division.59 The 28th evacuated to both points.59 United States Army Ambulance Section No. 578 reported to the 28th Division, which was assisted also by the French.59 Practically all the battle casualties from the 3d Division were wounded, while the majority of those from the 26th were gassed.59 As a result of the many wounded of the 3d Division, the hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin began to fill and unoperated wounded to accumulate there. One hundred and fifty of these slightly wounded were transferred to Evacuation Hospital No. 7 for operation.59 The


evacuation hospital at Juilly not being so situated that it could receive patients direct from the front, all its available surgical teams were sent to Evacuation Hospital No. 6, at Chateau Montanglaust, and to Red Cross Hospital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin.60 Every unit and every individual was now working to capacity, the latter securing only about 4 hours rest out of the 24. Those who suffered most were not the operating teams, hard driven as they were, but the litter bearers.60 At 11 p. m. of July 15, enemy aviators bombed the hospitals at Chateau Montanglaust and at Jouy-sur-Morin, without casualties at the former but killing 1 and wounding 18 patients and personnel at Jouy-sur-Morin, including 1 nurse.60 Four of those wounded by this attack died.61 The enemy volplaned downward toward the unit at Jouy-sur-Morin before releasing his bombs.61 Concerning this occurrence, the chief surgeon of the Paris group reported: "That the assassination of these wounded soldiers was premeditated, planned, and cruelly executed there can be no doubt. * * * Both hospitals were clearly marked by the large red cross, which must have been clearly evident on the night in question. Enemy planes had been over the place frequently, and it is safe to conclude that the hospitals were the direct objects of attack, for both were isolated from near-by villages."61

By July 16, hospital trains, mostly American, were constantly loading at Coulommiers, whose need of ambulances was alleviated by a French ambulance section of 20 cars.61 By morning of the 17th more than 3,000 patients had been evacuated, most of them from the 3d and 26th Divisions.62 On that date a trainload of unoperated cases was sent to Paris after due notice had been sent the hospitals there so that all would be in readiness for prompt treatment.62 By 6 p. m. of July 17 all evacuable wounded had been cleared from the field hospitals and all operations at the evacuation hospitals were up to the minute.62 During July 16 and 17, 3,564 patients were evacuated by Evacuation Hospital No. 7.63

Two new evacuation hospitals were now en route to this area, and sites for them were sought in the vicinity of Dammartin.63 No information concerning future troop movements was obtainable.68 The hospitals were secured and supplies replenished, and arrangements were such that with rapid supply of hospital trains and provision of more operating teams it appeared that requirements of the troops could well be met.63 About midnight of July 18 the chief surgeon, Paris group, was informed of the removal of the 1st and 2d Divisions from Dammartin to the vicinity of Soissons.64


(1) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, Sept. 1, 1919, 34.

(2) Summary history of the First American Army Corps from its creation January 15, 1918, to cessation of hostilities, November 11, 1918, edited by G-2, First Army Corps, November 15, 1918, 3. Copy on file, Historical Section, the Army War College.

(3) Situation Map, First Army Corps, July 12, 1918.

(4) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College, 10. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.


(5) Report of Medical Department activities, First Army Corps, Chateau-Thierry operations, by Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C., corps surgeon, undated, 50. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(6) Service de Santé pendant Les Opérations de la VI Armée dans la Région de Chateau-Thierry du 15 au 31 juillet, 1918. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(7) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, September 1, 1919, 35.

(8) G. O. No. 9, G. H. Q., A. E. F., January 15, 1918.

(9) War Diary, First Army Corps; F. O. No. 8, First Army Corps; Operation report 2nd Division in the attack of the Twentieth Army Corps, French Tenth Army. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.

(10) Report of Medical Department activities First Army Corps, Chateau-Thierry operations, by Col. J. W. Grissinger, M. C., Corps Surgeon, undated, 11. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(11) Ibid., 12.

(12) Ibid., 42.

(13) Map front line, 26th Division, July 10-26.

(14) Report of Medical Department activities, 26th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 63. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(15) Ibid., Part II, 46.

(16) Ibid., Part II, 56.

(17) Ibid., Part II, 20, 21.

(18) Ibid., Part II, 21.

(19) Report of operations, 3d Division, July 14 to August 1, by Col. Robert H. C. Kelton, General Staff, chief of staff, 3d Division. On file, with the Records of G-3. General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.

(20) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, The Army War College.

(21) Operation report of the commanding general, 3d Division, for July 15-17. On file, Historical Section, The Army War College.

(22) Report of Medical Department activities of 3d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part V, 2. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(23) Ibid., Part V. 1.

(24) Ibid., Part IV, 1.

(25) Ibid., Part IV, 49.

(26) Ibid., Part IV, 58.

(27) Ibid., Part IV, 75.

(28) Ibid., Part IV, 82.

(29) Ibid., Part IV, 111.

(30) Ibid., Part IV, 113.

(31) Ibid., Part IV, 109.

(32) Ibid., Part IV, 90.

(33) Ibid., Part IV, 2.

(34) Ibid., Part IV, 3.

(35) Ibid., Part IV, 5.

(36) Ibid., Part IV, 41.

(37) Ibid., Part IV, 4.

(38) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 7, by Col. W. H. Tefft, M. C., commanding officer. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(39) Exhibit "C" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1-September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 26. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.


(40) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., July 15, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section, (Chief Surgeon’s Files, 319.2).

(41) Special report of the operations of the 28th Division for the period July 15-31, 1918, by Maj. Gen. W. H. Hay, commanding officer, 28th Division. On file, General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.

(42) Report of Medical Department activities, 28th Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 4. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(43) Ibid., Part I, 15.

(44) Ibid., Part I, 6.

(45) Ibid., Part I, 21.

(46) Ibid., Part I, 2.

(47) Ibid., Part I, 14.

(48) Outlines of Histories of Division, U. S. Army, 1917-1918, prepared in the Historical Section. The Army War College, undated. On file, Historical Section, The Army War College.

(49) Report of Medical Department activities, 42d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 74. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(50) Ibid., Part I, 14.

(51) Ibid., Part I, 15.

(52) Ibid., Part I, 16.

(53) Ibid., Part I, 45.

(54) Ibid., Part I, 46.

(55) Ibid., Part I, 47.

(56) Ibid., Part I, 73.

(57) Ibid., Part I, 75.

(58) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F., by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C., December 31, 1918, 55. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(59) Exhibit "C" to report on activities of G-4-B medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.,: Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, undated, 26. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(60) Ibid., 27.

(61) Ibid., 28.

(62) Ibid., 29.

(63) Ibid., 30.

(64) Ibid., 31.