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Chapter X

Field Operations, Table of Contents



On May 27, 1918, the German Army began another great offensive, this time on the line between Soissons and Reims. Overwhelming the French divisions along the Chemin des Dames, the Germans advanced southward until, on May 30, they had reached the Marne between Mont-St.-Pere and Brasles.1 Turning eastward the next day they pushed forward some 6 miles along the Ourcq, and on June 2 and 3 continued their advance, though at a considerably slower rate, the offensive then soon spending its force.

The great salient made by this German offensive had a western front extending from a point on the Oise River about 4 km. (2.4 miles) southeast of Noyons southward to Chateau-Thierry, a southern front extending eastward from Chateau-Thierry, along the Marne to Dormans, and a southeast front extending from Dormans to the old German line north of Reims.

It was during this offensive, when Paris was again menaced, that American divisions entered the Marne region in increasing numbers to operate under tactical command of the French as part of their corps and armies. The 2d and 3d Divisions were hurried into the lines at the apex of the salient, the former to the west of Chateau-Thierry,2 the latter, after participating in the defense of the bridgeheads there, to the east of that town.3

Strictly speaking, the Aisne operation occurred between May 27 and June 5, 1918.4 It was the first phase of the German drive toward Paris, and the 2d and 3d Divisions were, as a matter of fact, the only American divisions engaged here between the dates in question. Between the close of this operation (Aisne operation) and July 15, the 2d Division took the towns of Bouresches, Vaux, Belleau Wood, and Bois de la Roche.2

On June 19, 1918, a fourth section of the general staff, known as G-4, Paris group, was organized and functioned as the fourth section of an army at that place. This section was charged with the supervision of the supply and evacuation, except the supply of artillery ammunition, of the American troops engaged in the operations of that period against the Marne salient with the French Seventh Army.5


On May 30, 1918, the 2d Division was suddenly ordered from Chaumont-en-Vexin to an area northwest of Meaux, leaving early the next morning.6 Moving 50 miles by truck to a location near its future position, the Infantry

aBrief mention will be found of the 4th, 26th, and 28th Divisions, which entered the Marne area during the period covered in this chapter.


reached Meaux and soon thereafter took position near Montreuil-aux-Lions, where it relieved exhausted French troops on a 12-km. (7.4 miles) front, blocking the Paris-Metz highway west of Chateau-Thierry.2 The Germans held the commanding Hill 204 and a line running through Vaux, along the railroad to Bouresches and thence through Bois de Belleau, Torcy, and Bussiares to Chezy-en-Orxois.6 They had been opposed by two depleted French divisions, worn out by five days of battle. On the right the French Thirty-eighth Corps had one division north of the Marne, and on the left was the French Seventh Corps.7

On June 1, French Army orders directed the concentration of the 2d Division around Montreuil-aux-Lions, in support of the two French divisions which held a line in the rear of Bussiares, Torcy, Hill 133, south of Bouresches, and Hill 138.6 The French had orders to drop back through the American lines.6 Early on the 2d day of June the 23d Infantry, with some other companies, was sent to the left to fill a gap between Gandelu and Bois de Veuilly.6

Command was taken over officially by the Americans June 4, the two French divisions going to the rear on the night of June 3-4.8

By June 5, the remainder of the organization of the 2d Division had arrived,6 and the division commenced a series of vigorous attacks on the following day.2 The line then extended from the southwest corner of Bois de la Marette on the right, through Bois des Clerembauts, Triangle Ferme, Lucy-le-Bocage, woods northwest of Lucy-le-Bocage, Hill 142 (a point on the Champillon-Bussiares road), 800 meters (872 yards) north of Champillon.6 Triangle Ferme was the dividing line between the two brigades.

Early in the morning of June 6, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines, in conjunction with the French 167th Division, attacked toward Torcy. The attack was successful and the enemy line penetrated to a depth of 1 km. At 5 p. m., the 4th Brigade attacked on the line Bouresches-Torcy. The town of Bouresches was captured, but the advance was stopped in the Bois de Belleau. On June 7, 8, and 9 attacks were continued, without artillery preparation. A little progress was made each day, but it was slow and expensive.6 On the morning of June 10, after thorough artillery preparation, the 4th Brigade again attacked in the wood and gained a line through Hill 169.6 Another attack, on the 11th, gained all of the wood except the northwest corner.6

French troops having taken over a part of the line of the 3d Brigade, that brigade extended its left northward to include Bouresches on the night of June 13-14, leaving the 4th Brigade only Belleau Wood.9

On June 15, the 7th Infantry, 3d Division, was brought into the sector of the 4th Brigade, and marines holding the line were relieved for rest. On June 23, the 4th Brigade attempted again, but unsuccessfully, to take the northwest tip of the woods, but on June 26th, with the aid of concentrated artillery fire, they finally cleared Belleau Wood of Germans.6

July 1, the 3d Brigade, after a 12-hour preparation by artillery, attacked and captured Vaux and Bois de la Roche.8 The enemy counterattacked next



 day against the 9th Infantry, but without success. From July 7 to 9, the 26th Division relieved the 2d, which had met most desperate resistance from Germany’s best troops.8


As explained, the infantry and marines left the concentration area around Chaumont-en-Vexin early on the morning of May 31. They were transported in trucks, and by noon of that day their motor trains were under way to Meaux. They included almost all the motor transport of the division, and moved slowly.

Upon arrival in the lines regimental and battalion aid stations were established, with their respective headquarters, as the troops moved into original or new positions. These stations, for the most part, were in stone buildings in abandoned villages or in farm groups which did not offer much protection against enemy artillery fire, though some were fairly well located in stone-vaulted cellars.10 During the latter part of the operations many of the battalion aid stations were in the woods, and some dugouts were constructed, but at the best these were only splinter-proof.10

Each station had one or more ambulances with it, or within call, as conditions required and permitted. Supplies were delivered to the stations by the ambulance companies or from the ambulance head by returning or special ambulances.10


No sanitary train headquarters had been organized, but each section (field hospital and ambulance) functioned under the direct orders of the division surgeon.11 These sections-less the Field Hospital and No. 16 Ambulance Company (both animal-drawn)-arrived at Meaux about 7 p. m. on May 31, and proceeded to their several destinations the same night.10 Because of lack of evacuation ambulances during the first few days, those of the division had to make evacuations to rear of the field hospitals in addition to performing the long haul from the front.10 United States Army Ambulance Section No. 502, with 20 Ford ambulances, arrived June 4, and working from the ambulance park at Bezu-le-Guery, evacuated from battalion and regimental aid stations, thus relieving the larger General Motor Company ambulances for the longer runs to the rear.10 By June 6, three United States ambulance sections, with 60 ambulances, were on duty with the division, in addition to its own vehicles (41 in number), not including 19 animal-drawn.11 Transport service within the division was also supplemented by trucks from supply and sanitary trains, and by touring cars, but despite all these the tax upon the evacuation service was severe.10

On June 1 Ambulance Company No. 15 proceeded to Dhuisy, where it established a dressing station and dispatched ambulances to the battalion aid stations near Marigny-en-Orxios, which served the troops on the left front, namely, the 4th and 6th Marine Regiments.12 On the following morning it commenced evacuations to Meaux. Owing to the great number of wounded,


 ambulances of this company were insufficient and they were reinforced by several from Ambulance Company No. 1, which had taken station at Bezu-le-Guery.13 On June 3, the station at Dhuisy was closed and Ambulance Company No. 15 moved to Coupru, and thence, on June 5, to Domptin, establishing a dressing station at each place, while its ambulances continued to serve the left front. On June 11, the company was ordered to Villiers-sur-Marne, and there operated a station for the slightly wounded, which it maintained until the division was relieved.14

Ambulance Company No. 1 had moved to Bezu-le-Guery on June 1 and established liaison with the front, but on June 2 it moved to Vendrest, where it established a dressing station at a place then occupied by a battalion aid station of the 23d Infantry.13 It distributed ambulances to the aid stations of this regiment and to those of other troops on the left front. On June 4 it returned to Bezu-le-Guery, and there remained during the rest of its stay in this sector.13 On July 1, in preparation for the offensive against Vaux, it sent ambulance dressing station personnel and equipment to the 9th Infantry to reinforce its aid stations.15 An advance medical supply dump was provided in front of the regimental aid station on the route of evacuation from battalion aid stations, and returning ambulances were utilized to carry needed material forward.16

In anticipation of needs that would develop when the attack should have progressed sufficiently, two large vaulted cellars in Monneaux were made ready for use as battalion aid stations.

Ambulance Company No. 23 began operating an ambulance post at Meaux on June 1, but the next day, leaving four ambulances to serve the 23d Field Hospital, it moved to Bezu-le-Guery, where it remained until the division was relieved. At this point it operated in conjunction with Ambulance Company No. 1.13

Ambulance Company No. 16 (animal-drawn) reached Cocherel by marching, on June 3. The next day it proceeded to La Sablonnieres and to La Longue Ferme, where it established a dressing station at 7 p. m. on June 6. This was moved next day one-half kilometer (0.31 mile) up the road to Vertelet Ferme, making it more accessible to the walking wounded. It remained at this location until the division was relieved.14 On June 4 the 19 animal-drawn ambulances of this company were distributed among the artillery regiments and permanently attached to the several batteries, thus securing them ambulance service when in positions not accessible to motor vehicles. These ambulances accompanied the batteries in their frequent shifts of position.10

The ambulance head was established at Bezu-le-Guery on June 3 and all ambulances were pooled for service directly under the orders of the director of ambulance companies.10 Location of the triage here also facilitated coordination and conservation of the ambulance service, both to forward points and to the rear. During attacks in which ambulances were insufficient for rapid evacuation of all wounded, trucks of the sanitary train were utilized, and if these did not suffice trucks from the supply train were called for.10


As all telegraphic communication had to be in code, a system of numbers was used to designate regiments, battalions, or places and their needs. Each regiment was given blocks of ten, so that the 1st regiment had Nos. 11 to 19, the 2d Nos. 20 to 29, and so on. A simple telephone call, "42-three Jones," indicated that the 4th Regiment, 2d Battalion aid station, desired three ambulances.10

From the outset ambulance company litter bearers were sent to the front to supplement regimental litter bearers as circumstances required and as the number available permitted. As many as 160 at one time were detached from their companies for this duty.17 They were usually sent forward in ambulances returning toward the front. Relay litter-bearer posts were established between battalion aid stations and ambulance posts when litter portage was long and ambulances could not reach forward stations.17

FIG. 50.-Church at Benzu-leGuery, France, used as a ward for wounded by Field Hospital No. 1, 2d Division, June 16, 1918


Field Hospital No. 1 established a triage at Bezu-le-Guery, where it remained, occupying the church, a neighboring school building, and tentage. It cared for the seriously wounded (until Field Hospital No. 23 was established at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre) and gassed cases, bathing, treating, and dressing the latter at the rate of 100 an hour.18 This location was from 1 to 8 km.


(0.6 to 5 miles) from the battalion aid stations, which were evacuated to it through two dressing stations about midway between it and the front.18

Field Hospital No. 15 established a dressing station at Cocherel, but as only a few patients were received there, it moved on June 4 to Chateau la Rue on the La Ferte-sous-Jouarre—Chateau-Thierry road.19 Here it operated an auxiliary triage and then, on alternate days, took over that duty entirely from Field Hospital No. 1 with a view to relieving the overdriven personnel of that unit; but this arrangement, proving unsatisfactory, was discontinued.19 On June 16 the unit moved to Luzancy, where it remained until July 6, operating a hospital for sick and gassed patients.10

FIG. 51.-Evacuating wounded by truck from Field Hospital No. 15, near Montreuil, France, June 7, 1918

Field Hospital No. 23 and, at first, Ambulance Company No. 23 utilized a large château in Meaux.10 Here a hospital was established which, with the addition of two Bessonneau tents, gave a capacity of 150 beds. This hospital received patients, especially the sick and slightly wounded, from the main sorting station at the front, Field Hospital No. 1, and evacuated them to the hospitals located at Juilly.10 It was, in fact, a relay station for all slight cases, and it rendered first aid to those en route to Juilly, the point farthest forward where definitive surgical treatment could then be given.10 As the distance from the various points at the front to Meaux was 40 to 50


kilometers (24.8 to 31 miles) and an additional 25 km. (15.5 miles) intervened to the nearest evacuation hospital, this second sorting or relay station proved very valuable for dressing, resting, warming, and feeding the disabled.10 This hospital was joined here on June 4 by Field Hospital No. 16 (animal-drawn), the two companies continuing to operate the hospital until they were sent to more forward stations on June 9 and 11, respectively.10

Cases received at this point were:10




Shell concussion




Field Hospital No. 23







Field Hospital No. 16














On June 6, Field Hospital No. 23 sent half of its personnel to Bezu-le-Guery to assist Field Hospital No. 1. There they remained until June 10, when the personnel was reassembled and the unit moved to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, where it operated a hospital for nontransportable wounded. This hospital was well equipped with surgical appliances, including an X-ray plant, and within a few days extra officers for surgical teams and 18 female nurses joined. From two to five surgical teams operated until the service here was taken over by the 26th Division on July 7.10 This hospital at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre admitted a total of 963 patients, classified as follows: Gassed, 4; wounded, 923; psychoneuroses, 9; injured, 30; sick, 17.10

Field Hospital No. 16 (animal-drawn) reached Meaux on June 4, operating there with Field Hospital No. 23 until June 11, then moving to Luzancy.10 Here a building, formerly used by the French for hospital purposes, was supplemented by tentage, and shelter was thus provided for 800 beds.10 Conjointly with Field Hospital No. 15, this unit operated a divisional hospital for gassed and sick. Admissions here were as follows:10








Field Hospital No. 15







Field Hospital No. 16














Of the foregoing, some 500 were returned to duty.


The divisional medical supply unit arrived at Meaux on June 1 and began immediately to issue matériel which was sent forward on returning ambulances.10 Its supplies were obtained in part from Meaux, where matériel brought from Soissons had been stored by the American Red Cross Mission after its retreat from the latter point. Other supplies came from the advance medical supply depot at Coulommiers, to which large quantities


of army supplies had been sent by truck trains from Cosnes and Is-sur-Tille.10 During the first part of the operations there was shortage of blankets, litters, and pajamas in divisional hospitals because of inadequate organization and facilities for distribution.10 After the establishment of a medical supply depot at Lieusaint, with excellent truck service distribution, less difficulty was experienced.10 On June 9 the divisional supply unit was moved to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and distribution to forward organizations was further facilitated.10

From June 15 until the division was relieved, no changes were made in the location of the sanitary units, and the same system of evacuation was maintained.10 Patients were removed by regimental and ambulance company litter bearers from battalion and regimental aid stations to ambulance posts, and thence to the triage at Bezu-le-Guery, where gassed cases were bathed and reclothed before being sent to Field Hospitals No. 15 and No. 16, at Luzancy, whither also the sick were sent. Nontransportable wounded were sent to Field Hospital No. 23 at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and after June 14 all others were sent to Mobile Hospital No. 1 and Evacuation Hospital No. 7 at Chateau Montanglaust, near Coulommiers.19


On May 27 the Germans began their offensive between the Aisne and the Marne, and within the next few days elements of the 3d Division, which had been placed at the disposal of the French, began their move toward Chateau-Thierry. The 7th Machine Gun Battalion was the first organization of the division to enter the lines, reaching the defenses of the bridgehead at Chateau-Thierry late in the afternoon of May 31, there reinforcing a battalion of the 10th Moroccan Division at a very critical moment.20 The main body of advancing German troops reached the Marne the next day, but were prevented from crossing at Chateau-Thierry.2 The prompt arrival and stubborn defense of this important point by untried troops (May 31 to June 1), are well worthy of special mention. Continuing operations through the following days, the 7th Machine Gun Battalion was relieved by the 9th Machine Gun Battalion on June 4. The first battle casualties of the 3d Division occurred here.21 Meanwhile, the main body of the division had reached the Marne and was posted in Chateau-Thierry and eastward therefrom to Dormans. From June 1 to 5 it took an active part in the Aisne-Marne operation.21

On June 15, the 7th Infantry was detached and placed in the sector of the 4th Brigade (2d Division), where it relieved the 5th and 6th Marines (4th Brigade).21Withdrawn on the night of June 23-24, it then rejoined its division.3 From June 4 to July 14, the remainder of the division held the south bank of the Marne.21


When the 7th Machine Gun Battalion began its participation in the defense of the bridgehead at Chateau-Thierry, its battalion aid station was


located in a cellar 200 yards to its rear, the next day (June 1) moving to a less exposed position across the street. Some of the American wounded belonging to the 3d Division were cared for in French sanitary formations.22


Ambulance Company No. 5 was located at Essises on June 3, with its main dressing station and ambulance park at that point. An advance dressing and ambulance station, with 1 medical officer, 1 noncommissioned officer, and 8 men, functioned at Courboin-les-Alloix.23 This company dispatched ambulances from both these points to the following: The 4th Infantry at Petit Heurtebise Ferme, Nesles, and Les Evaux, the 7th Infantry at Le Rocq Ferme, and the 6th Engineers at Bocage. It also evacuated sick and wounded at Viffort. There was a daily schedule of 4 ambulances at Courboin, 2 ambulances at night and 1 during the day at Les Evaux, and 2 during the night at Le Rocq Ferme and of 1 both day and night at Petit Heurtebise Ferme and at Nesles.23

Ambulance Company No. 7 had its main dressing station at Conde en Brie on June 3 and on June 4 at Pertibout.24 Ambulance Company No. 26 was located at Verdelot,25 Ambulance Company No. 27 was stationed at La Ferotterie, where it was occupied solely with transportation, employing all its available ambulances for evacuation service from Field Hospital No. 27 to Field Hospital No. 26 at Coulommiers and to the Army Red Cross hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin.26


The divisional field hospitals reached the Marne on June 1 and began operations on June 3. Field Hospital No. 27 was designated as the triage and located at Verdelot, about 17 km. (10.5 miles) back of the lines. Field Hospital No. 5, used as the gas hospital, was located at Ville Chamblon, about 10 km. (6.2 miles) south of Chateau-Thierry. Field Hospital No. 26 was located at Coulommiers, 30 km. (18 miles) from the front, to operate for a few days as an evacuation hospital, while Field Hospital No. 7 was held in reserve near St. Barthelemy. So far as possible the personnel of these units was divided into two shifts, each working 12 hours. About the middle of June, 1 shock team, 4 surgical teams, and 9 nurses joined Field Hospital No. 27.27 The mobile divisional laboratory operated in conjunction with the field hospitals.28


The medical supply unit established a depot June 2, with two truck loads of supplies, at Verdelot, but until July 14 there was no great demand for supplies other than medicines, dressings, etc. The American Red Cross established a divisional storeroom in the same building and worked in cooperation with the supply officer.29



The Medical Department subsection of the Fourth section-i. e., the coordination of transportation section, of the general staff-supervised and in general terms directed the activities of the Medical Department in the field, while a medical representative of this subsection was locally in charge of the field activities of the Medical Department, and performed the duties incumbent upon a chief surgeon of the forces in question.

As noted in Chapter IX, this officer had been detailed to act as liaison officer for the Medical Department between the 1st Division and the French Army, and also as liaison officer for the Medical Department between that division and our General Headquarters. On May 21 he was also appointed by General Headquarters as liaison officer for the Medical Department between the 2d Division and the French Sixth Army, to which that division would be attached.30 In this position he was to discharge duties altogether similar to those which he already had performed for the 1st Division, viz, to maintain contact between the divisional medical service and the French, and also between the division and our General Headquarters. On May 31, after the Cantigny offensive, this officer proceeded to the Chaumont-en-Vexin area, just south of Beauvais, where the 2d Division had been located, but learned there that it had suddenly moved to Meaux.31 Here he joined it the next day and learned that it might enter the line at any moment, behind such hastily constructed trenches as could be improvised.31 His arrival relieved the surgeon of the 2d Division as well as the 3d Division, of the necessity of providing for hospitalization and evacuation in rear of their respective commands. On the other hand, as these divisions had been thrown into the sector in question suddenly to meet an emergency, our General Headquarters had had no opportunity to provide hospitalization in their rear.31

The arrival of American divisions in the Marne area created a new problem for our Medical Department in their immediate rear, and also in providing base hospital facilities for their casualties. In their retreat, as mentioned elsewhere, the French had lost all their evacuation hospitals in that region, totaling some 40,000 or 45,000 beds,32 and were not in a position to care for their own wounded and to assume the additional burden of caring for casualties in American divisions, though they undertook to do so to the limit of their resources.32 This being the situation, the French, for the first time, permitted us to take charge of medical service to the rear; furthermore, having so decided, they assisted in every way in the establishment of American military hospitals behind our divisions, and in their evacuation by means of our own hospital trains to fixed American hospitals in their rear.33 Putting this plan into actual operation, however, was encompassed by almost insuperable difficulties. The number of our evacuation hospitals was far below the authorized quota, and as the sector originally selected for occupation by American troops was that facing Lorraine, some 256 km. (160 miles) to the east of Meaux, our efforts to construct base hospitals had been concentrated largely in that area and in rear thereof. The Medical Department of the


FIG. 52.-American Red Cross Military Hospital No. 1, Paris


FIG. 53.-American Red Cross Military Hospital No. 5, Auteuil, Paris, July, 1918


American Expeditionary Forces had been ordered not to establish military hospitals in Paris or its vicinity.34 Under such conditions the only recourse for the American medical service was to utilize the Red Cross institutions in Paris as base hospitals, with such expansion and additions as were possible.34 In anticipation of the great need for American hospitals in Paris, plans already started were continued and intensified to increase the Paris hospitals to their maximum capacity. These efforts were successful to the extent of a capacity of 10,000 beds.33

The entire period of our service in the Marne area was one of peculiar difficulties in the evacuation service from the divisions and in hospitalization to their immediate rear. Open warfare increased enormously the burden placed on the Medical Department, and only by the utmost endeavor to utilize every hospital available, as well as all transport, plus such assistance as the French could give in ambulance service, could the situation be met. The difficulties were greatly augmented by the fact that our methods, in rear of the divisions, had to be correlated with a system different from ours, operated by an ally speaking a different tongue and exercising tactical control. During the early phase of these battles in the Marne area our medical service was confronted by shortage of personnel, hospital equipment, and ambulances.33 The rapid German advance had so demoralized the railways that it was impossible to operate hospital trains in the early part of this period. Consequently, evacuation by ambulance, and, in lieu of ambulances, by truck, between the evacuation hospitals and the hospitals in Paris-a distance of from 40 to 100 km. (24.8-62 miles)-was at first necessary. By concentrating all our available resources, and borrowing from the French, some 200 ambulances were provided for the evacuation service of the 2d Division; but, owing to the great length of the route to be traversed, this number was barely sufficient to meet the needs.33

In view of our shortage in hospitals in rear of the 2d and 3d Divisions, our medical liaison officer immediately made arrangements with Médecin Inspecteur General Lasnet, chief surgeon of the French Sixth Army, to which these divisions were now attached, that American wounded be admitted to the French evacuation and other hospitals.35 Also, he undertook to provide hospitalization of our own for our troops in the area. A hurried survey showed that the only American hospital available was a Red Cross unit which was operating at Juilly-Domartin under the supervision of the commanding officer of Red Cross Hospital No. 1 at Paris.31 The Juilly hospital had bed space for 280 wounded, though its personnel was inadequate to care for that number.31 Efforts were made to increase its bed capacity at once to 800. To assure delivery of needed material, the liaison officer hurriedly visited Red Cross headquarters in Paris, and within 48 hours the supplies needed began to arrive at Juilly.31 Eventually this hospital, which was designated to care for the seriously wounded, was taken over by the Army, becoming Army Red Cross Hospital No. 7.36Meanwhile, the liaison officer had wired to the chief of G-4, G. H. Q., that there was no adequate provision for our wounded, and urged that operating teams, a mobile surgical unit, hospital trains, ambulance


transportation, and miscellaneous personnel be placed at his disposal.35 As Juilly was on the left flank of the Chateau-Thierry salient at a distance which would require a haul of 50 or 60 km. (31-37 miles) from the right flank of the American sector, it was decided that hospitalization should be provided also farther to the east.35 This need became even more apparent when, on June 2, it was learned that the 3d Division was at Viels Maisons.36 The liaison officer at once called up the Red Cross in Paris and asked that it establish a 600-bed hospital at Montmirail.35 For this Red Cross supplies, being stored in Paris, were much more quickly available than were those of the army, which were stored at Cosne.35 The Red Cross immediately undertook to supply the materials required and shipped them by truck on June 4, but the medical liaison officer was informed on that date that as Montmirail was outside the Sixth Army sector he would have to select another site for the hospital which these supplies were to equip. He then selected for it a château at Jouy-sur-Morin, about 20 km. (12.4 miles) south of Viels Maisons, and the Red Cross, at the latter point, directed its stream of trucks to the newly selected location. This château was in excellent condition and provided ample space for a surgical clinic, shock rooms, sterilizing rooms, kitchens, and rooms for personnel.37 Fortunately, the number of casualties from the 3d Division had been relatively few and had easily been accommodated in French hospitals, most of them entering the evacuation hospital which the French were operating at Coulommiers.38 On June 5, the hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin, American Red Cross Hospital No. 107, was ready to receive patients. Later it expanded to a capacity of 700 beds, and was operated by personnel from the army and from the Red Cross, its commissioned personnel coming from the former.39

On June 4 and 5 arrangements were made for evacuations by ambulance from the hospital at Juilly. As the personnel at that time was becoming physically exhausted, and as the X-ray equipment for the hospital for nontransportables of the 2d Division, now established at Meaux, had not yet arrived, the surgical teams which reached the latter unit on June 4 were transferred to Juilly.37 On the same date the officer in charge of the army medical supplies, which had now arrived, was directed to establish the advance depot for the Medical Department at Coulommiers. Information was received that two evacuation hospitals that had been asked for would join as soon as possible.37

On June 5 three United States Army Ambulance Service sections, with 20 cars each, which the liaison officer had requested, reported, but they were placed in the service of the 2d Division and not under his immediate control.38 On the same date, as it appeared that the hospital at Juilly would be overtaxed, the liaison officer called up the chief surgeon, district of Paris, and asked that he have all available space and operating teams ready to receive wounded the following morning and that he send all available ambulances to Juilly for their transport.38 The chief surgeon of the French Army was asked that he make arrangements to have American wounded received in all French hospitals, and he renewed his assurance that this would be done. On the morning of June 6 all available ambulances and numerous trucks were evacuating from


the front of the 2d Division into Juilly, where additional operating tables had been installed.38 Though the surgical teams there worked day and night, they were insufficient to care for all wounded received. As a matter of fact, not more than a fourth of the personnel needed by this hospital could be furnished it. Therefore incoming patients were carefully triaged here, and those able to stand the journey were sent on to Paris hospitals in several ambulance convoys.38 The next day the first hospital train arrived at Juilly. On June 6 and 7, by ambulance and train, 1,183 patients, practically all of whom had come from the 2d Division, were sent from Juilly to Paris.40 Of this total all but 199 were evacuated by ambulance.40 On the dates mentioned the small hospital at Juilly had received about 1,700 patients, and for a period of four days its personnel worked 20 hours a day.40 The litter bearers-most of whom were French soldiers unfit for front-line service-worked even longer hours.40 Their labors were supplemented by ambulance drivers. Finally all were too weary to lift a litter to the level of the upper tier of an ambulance. A detachment from the 2d Division then relieved them until the personnel of Evacuation Hospital No. 8 arrived-on June 8.40 This unit, then the only evacuation hospital in France, was assigned to assist the Red Cross hospital at Juilly until its own equipment arrived. For evacuation hospital service to the 3d Division, which was relatively inactive at this time, the divisional field hospital at Verdelot, caring for nontransportable wounded, was supplemented by a mobile surgical unit.41 The Red Cross hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin was on a good working basis and competent to take care of all the wounded of this division.41

On June 10 arrangements were made that the three Army Ambulance Service sections heretofore in the service of the 2d Division be placed at the disposal of the medical liaison officer.42 As soon as the order concerning this arrangement was received, one of these sections was ordered to remain with the 2d Division, one was sent to the 3d Division, and one was attached to Evacuation Hospital No. 743 (which arrived at Chateau Montanglaust June 12), with the understanding that it would be available for front-line work if required.

On June 11 information was received that the Quartermaster Corps contemplated the establishment of a large depot at Lieusaint and that the advance depot of the Medical Department at Coulommiers would soon be transferred there.44

The 2d Division moved its field hospital for nontransportables from Meaux to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, where it was operating to capacity by June 12, with greatly increased personnel.43

Evacuation Hospital No. 7, which had reached Chateau Montanglaust on June 12, was joined the same day by Mobile Hospital No. 1, and thereafter, so long as they remained in this locality, they operated as a consolidated unit, under control of the commanding officer of Evacuation Hospital No. 7.44As soon as they could be installed-June 14 and June 13, respectively-these units were worked to capacity, receiving among others the evacuable patients from the hospital for nontransportables of the 2d Division at La


Ferte-sous-Jouarre. They admitted more than 2,700 patients from that hospital during the next six weeks.45 By the use of tentage the number of operating tables for the consolidated formation in question was rapidly increased from 8 to 16 and later to 26, but because of the limited number of operating teams available the latter number was seldom utilized. On June 13 an X-ray team joined American Red Cross Hospital No. 107 at Jouy-sur-Morin.46

The medical supply depot at Coulommiers, meanwhile, was very active, its two autotrucks being constantly engaged in delivering matériel, especially litters and splints.44

On June 12, word having been received that other divisions had been ordered to this area, an inspection was made with a view to locating sites for the evacuation hospitals necessary to serve them should such hospitals become available.44 Suitable sites, however, were few for the reason that only a few railroad sidings were long enough to accommodate our hospital trains, and even when tracks were long enough, they might not be available for Medical Department use because of other military needs. After some delay a tentative selection of sites was made, but final decision was reserved until the last moment. Alternative locations were also selected, to be occupied in case our lines fell back.44

All Medical Department formations in rear of divisional formations as they became available were assembled in a semicircular disposition on either side of Chateau-Thierry. So far as possible, these hospitals occupied buildings, but frequently they employed tentage. On June 15 arrangements were made with the regulating officer at Le Bourget for the service of these hospitals by hospital train at Coulommiers.47

The 4th Division had now arrived in this area without ambulances and was centered around Meaux, evacuating to Juilly.

Casualties in the 2d Division from June 2 to 15, inclusive, had been 2,385 wounded, 345 gassed, 244 sick, and about 600 killed. All casualties from this division were now being received by Evacuation Hospital No. 7 and Mobile Hospital No. 1 at Chateau Montanglaust.47

By June 16 the liaison officer had requested six additional operating teams for Evacuation Hospital No. 7, as those of Mobile Hospital No. 1 with it were working day and night.48 Pending their arrival, American Red Cross Hospital No. 107, being relatively quiet, assisted in caring for the wounded of the 2d Division. At this time it was decided to expand the latter hospital’s bed capacity, and within 48 hours it was equipped to receive 500 and later 700 patients.48 The hospital at Juilly (Red Cross Hospital No. 7) was still working to capacity, but it was proposed that as soon as the operating teams and equipment requested for Evacuation Hospital No. 7 arrived, it would care for most of the patients from the 2d Division. Bed space in the former hospital now totaled 700 beds, and it was planned to increase it to 1,000.49

Though former experiences indicated that marking hospital sites by the Red Cross invited attack by enemy airplanes, evacuation hospitals and Red


Cross units acting as such were now ordered thus to designate their premises by red crosses, 104 feet in diameter, on a white base.48

The first hospital train evacuation from Evacuation Hospital No. 7 was made on June 17.50 On June 18 the medical supply depot moved to Lieusaint, where supplies to replenish its stock were expected. Such supplies as it still had at Coulommiers were left with Evacuation Hospital No. 7 for issue to the divisions, and the division surgeons were so notified. From June 4 to June 20 the hospital at Juilly received 3,274 patients, of whom it evacuated 2,863. The great majority of these were sent to Red Cross Hospitals No. 1 and No. 2, at Paris. Except in extremely active periods all these patients were given the necessary surgical treatment before being transferred.51 Meanwhile the capacity of Evacuation Hospital No. 7 had been increased to 850 beds, but its operating equipment had not yet been received. Mobile Hospital No. 1, attached to the latter, had been conducting four operating tables night and day in order to compensate for this deficiency.49 This delayed equipment was received on June 20.52 On June 23 the army surgeon, French Sixth Army, made available to AmericanRed Cross Hospital No. 107 radiological equipment until its own, which had broken down, could be repaired.53

As the 28th Division had now arrived at Gonnesse, in the area of the Marne, some distance back of the lines, instructions were given its division surgeon concerning evacuation of his sick and the obtainment of supplies. To each division newly arrived in this area a divisional gas unit was sent without requisition.51

By June 24 American Red Cross Hospital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin, was sending patients to Coulommiers by convoy, whence they were either sent out at once by hospital train, of whose arrival the unit was notified, or they were admitted to the hospital there to await the arrival of a train.54 Arrangements were made at this time with the French for the ambulance service of the 28th Division which, like the 4th Division, had reached the Marne area quite without these vehicles, and provision was made for the service of the division (should it enter a relatively distant section) by Mobile Hospital No. 1, which it was now possible to detach from Evacuation Hospital No. 7 for this purpose. On the 26th of June information was received that the sanitary trains of both the 4th and 28th Divisions were en route.55 At this time the United States had only 16 hospital trains in France, and it had become evident that if gassed cases were to be evacuated prone, as ordered, additional transportation, both trains and ambulances, would be required.54

When, on June 26, the 2d Division again attacked, the number of casualties became so great that the slightly wounded had to be transferred by ambulances and trucks from Evacuation Hospital No. 7 and Mobile Hospital No. 1 to Red Cross Hospital No. 107, at Jouy-sur-Morin.56 The latter unit had sent out several trainloads of patients by this time, while in the interval from June 17 to 26, inclusive, Evacuation Hospital No. 7 had evacuated 2,271 patients, including some sent for evacuation from Red Cross Hospital No. 107 when that unit did not have enough evacuables in its own wards to warrant


call for a train for its service alone. The medical liaison officer estimated at this time that one operating table should operate 25 cases in 24 hours.57 This was a general working average based on experience, but mutable according to the missile, the nature of the wounds operated, and the speed of the team concerned. In point of fact, it was greatly exceeded by some teams. It was found that wounds caused by shell usually required longer attention than those made by bullets.57 In the successful drive which the marines concluded June 26 in Belleau Wood 199 of the seriously wounded were operated within 22 hours in the evacuation hospitals, the others being cared for in the hospital of the 2d Division for nontransportables.58

The 26th Division came in during the night of June 29 and reported some ambulances lacking, but its transportation was much better than had been those of the 4th and the 28th Divisions when they entered the area.59 Arrangements were made at this time to have the laundry from evacuation and other hospitals sent by truck to Paris. Shortage of fresh linen had become a serious problem.58 With the assistance of the surgeon of the French Sixth Army, efforts were continued to hold the château at Meaux for the future use of the Medical Department.56

By July 1, Evacuation Hospital No. 8, at Juilly, was receiving but few patients. Enemy wounded, received in some numbers on the following day, were treated habitually with the American wounded, unless there was a rush of patients, in which case they were sent to the French evacuation hospital at Coulommiers.59

On July 2, the liaison officer for the Medical Department reported as chief surgeon for the Paris group, as the divisions operating in the Marne area were now designated.60

When the 26th Division was ordered to relieve the 2d Division in the line on July 3, United States Army Ambulance Section No. 502 and four additional ambulances, together with a gas outfit, surplus blankets, and litters, were turned over to the 26th by the 2d Division.60 All divisions were handicapped at this time by lack of transportation. Available trucks were just sufficient to transport the field hospital equipment as authorized before the war, but were insufficient for the portage in addition of the large numbers of extra blankets, litters and splints, and for the gas treatment equipment now carried. Arrangements were made with the French whereby they would supply transport for the 4th and 28th Divisions if they became engaged before their ambulances arrived.61

The medical supply depot, which had moved to Lieusaint, was ordered to assemble equipment for a 500-bed hospital, and on July 8 arrangements were made for parking a truck train there for the purpose of moving this unit and, if necessary, Mobile Hospital No. 1.62 Chief of a number of anxieties was that caused by shortage of ambulances. Despite frequent requisitions, the number furnished had been very limited because of limited supply, but on this date (July 8) a newly arrived evacuation ambulance company reported to Evacuation Hospital No. 7 to assist a similar unit already on duty there.


The latter had been loaned twice to the 2d Division and served both Evacuation Hospital No. 7 and the hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin. Until this time the shortage of ambulances had been very acute.62

The Red Cross hospital at Juilly was now placed at the disposal of the army, and orders were received concerning the establishment there of Evacuation Hospital No. 8 as soon as its equipment was received. Of the total beds, 225 were ordered reserved for the French.62

On July 11, consideration was given to the establishment of a hospital at Villiers-sur-Marne and the use of hospital barges, a few of which were idle at Meaux.63 In view of the expected German offensive, all hospitals were cleared as rapidly as possible, supplies replenished, and similar preparations made. Quest was continued for sites for additional hospitals, but definite selection was difficult because of lack of motor transport and of railroad facilities, and also because of the possibility of an advance by the enemy in the attack known to be impending. An exhaustive estimate of the situation led to the tentative selection of Jouy-sur-Morin and Meaux as the sites best suited for the establishment of additional evacuation hospitals.64


The story of the Aisne defensive and the succeeding operations might now be considered to have been completed save for the fact that the Medical Department was severely criticized and, in justice to all concerned, account must be taken of the criticisms and the investigation which followed.

A certain newspaper correspondent prepared a cablegram to his paper in which he bitterly scored the handling of the wounded of the 2d Division in the early days of June, 1918, stating, in substance, that "the Medical Department of the Army failed to meet its responsibilities."65 The cablegram was held up by the censor and immediately, when its contents were brought to the attention of the chief surgeon, A. E. F., he asked for an investigation by the inspector general’s department. This was made between July 1 and 7.

The senior representative of the Medical Department, with G-4, G. H. Q., made the following official statement to the inspector general:65

* * * * * * *

In order to understand what the responsibilities of the Medical Department were at this time it is necessary to know the agreement made by the American G. H. Q. and the French G. H. Q. when the American troops were turned over to the French to serve in the French armies. Under the terms of the original agreement the Medical Department was obliged to furnish the personnel and equipment of the sanitary units belonging to the division. All matters of supply, hospitalization, and evacuation were to be taken care of by the French. It became immediately apparent that the question of medical supplies for our divisions serving with the French could not be handled in a satisfactory manner by the latter. For this reason the agreement was modified to the extent that medical supplies and gas defense matériel would be furnished by the Medical Department, A. E. F., but the hospitalization and evacuation still remained for the French to accomplish.

When the 2d Division was withdrawn from the line and sent to the west of Paris it was originally understood that it would ultimately take position in the sector occupied by the 1st Division. Acting on this belief, a medical officer attached to G-4, G. H. Q.,


visited the 2d Division, then in the vicinity of Chaumont-en-Vexin, to make sure that the arrangements for hospitalization and evacuation were satisfactory. On the last day of May information was received which indicated that the destination of the division might he changed. Therefore, the same officer was sent to visit the division to see if other arrangements were necessary for hospitalization and evacuation. This officer was Lieut. Col. A. D. Tuttle, Medical Corps, and his last visit covered the days of June 1 and June 2.

On Sunday, June 2, word reached the A. C. of S., G-4, that the 2d Division’s orders had been changed and that it was moving from the area it had occupied northwest of Paris to the vicinity of Meaux, northeast of Paris, and that it might be expected to come in contact with the enemy at almost any time. It was also learned that the movement had been made in great haste, and that the sanitary train of the division had been very widely separated, and that it had been impossible to entirely reassemble it as late as the 2d of June.

On the 2d of June Colonel Tuttle visited the headquarters of the 6th French Army, with which army the 2d Division was incorporated, and was informed that due to the military situation it would be impossible for the French to do much in the way of discharging their obligation to hospitalize and evacuate the battle casualties from the American division, and, moreover, it was requested that the A. E. F. medical authorities do what they could in this respect.

Owing to the shortage of Medical Department personnel in France the situation presented many difficulties. Nevertheless, the following steps were immediately taken: (1) Operating teams were ordered by telegraph to report at once to the Red Cross hospital at Juilly, near Meaux, and two operating teams were ordered at the same time to report to the division surgeon at Meaux; (2) 10 large Bessonneau ward tents belonging to the Red Cross, which were in storage at Camp de Mailly, were ordered by the A. C. of S., G-4, to be sent overland by truck transportation to the vicinity of Meaux. This order was telegraphed personnally by the A. C. of S., G-4, at 11 o’clock at night (June 2d) to the commanding officer at Mailly; (3) on the morning of June 3d 10 truck loads of emergency medical supplies were ordered by telephone to be sent from the Medical Supply Depot at Cosne to Meaux; (4) a mobile surgical hospital in storage in Paris was ordered sent to the division surgeon at Meaux by automobile truck on the morning of the 3d of June; and (5) the A. C. of S., G-4, ordered a truck train to Is-sur-Tille to be loaded there with various reserve supplies, this also on the morning of the 3d of June. Included in these supplies were all the necessary drugs and appliances for the caring of gas patients, as well as 1,000 extra uniforms for both the 2d and 3d Divisions, the latter to be used for changing clothing of gas patients.

Col. Paul C. Hutton, Medical Corps, attached to G-4 was ordered in the latter part of May to report to the chief surgeon of the French Army with which it served. He was instructed to make all possible arrangements for the procurement of hospital facilities to meet the needs of this division.

On the afternoon of June 3d, an order was issued directing Lieut. Col. R. U. Patterson, Medical Corps, to report to the division commander, this for the purpose of placing the services of this most experienced officer at the disposition of the division surgeon. The chief surgeon, A. E. F., at Tours was notified by telephone of the disposition taken, and he was acquainted with the situation which existed regarding this division. I left G. H. Q. at 5 o’clock in the afternoon of June 3d and met the chief surgeon (General Ireland) in Paris on the morning of June 4th. Together we proceeded to Meaux and examined, with the chief surgeon, the disposition he had made to meet the situation. He went on to the division headquarters and had a personal interview with the chief of staff, the division commander being absent, who expressed himself as thoroughly well satisfied. On our return from division headquarters, we called on Medecin Inspecteur Lasnet, chief surgeon of the French Sixth Army. We then proceeded to the Red Cross hospital at Juilly, where the wounded were beginning to arrive. We found that there was a shortage of personnel although part of the personnel which was ordered on June 2d had arrived, and this personnel had been augmented by certain officers detached from the division sanitary personnel. It


was, however, perfectly apparent that steps should be taken to evacuate this hospital in the immediate future. The Juilly hospital, it might be well to state, had at that time facilities for only 225 patients, but a request had been made to the Red Cross to furnish the matériel to expand it to its maximum capacity, approximately 700 beds, and this was going on. Immediately upon his return to Paris (June 4), the chief surgeon requested of G. H. Q. that Evacuation Hospital No. 8, the only one available in France, and then en route from Brest where it had landed, be sent immediately to Juilly to furnish the necessary personnel. Upon our return to Paris, efforts were at once made to secure permission from the French authorities to send a hospital train to Juilly for the purpose of evacuating that hospital. This operation was attended with some delay, but a hospital train was sent on there the following day and relieved the congestion. However, it developed that owing to the limited amount of personnel at Juilly it would be impossible for the wounded to be evacuated by hospital train, inasmuch as this method of removing patients necessitated the handling of patients twice, placing them in the ambulance and carrying them to the station, and there handling the litters to place them in the trains. For this reason it was decided to make this secondary evacuation from Juilly to Paris by means of ambulances.

Colonel Bingham, Medical Corps, the medical officer of the hospital center of Paris, was informed of the general situation and instructed to organize the ambulance service to meet this need, Col. Percy L. Jones, Medical Corps, chief of the United States Army Ambulance Service, with headquarters in Paris, had been communicated with, and every available ambulance in Paris was placed by him at the disposition of the A. E. F. in this emergency. For the next four days the Ambulance Service, between Juilly and Paris, was very heavy and a considerable part of the personnel worked continuously night and day to keep the Juilly hospital evacuated. As has been shown by the statements of officers connected with this operation, there was at no time any lack of ambulance transportation, and neither was there any undue congestion of patients either at Juilly or at the Paris hospitals.

As stated above, the greatest difficulty experienced was in the shortage of personnel at the Juilly hospital. This was partially relieved by the early arrival of 45 army nurses. The evacuation hospital which was anticipated would arrive by June 5, did not reach Juilly until June 8. This delay was due, first, to the fact that the request for railroad transportation could not be filled by the French. On June 5, an urgent plea was made by A. C. of S., G-4, to the chief of the French mission to expedite this movement. On the morning of June 6, the necessary cars were made available at Bazoilles-sur-Meuse, but owing to the congested condition of the railroads the unit did not reach Juilly until 45 hours later, or the morning of June 8. The arrival of this unit made it possible to relieve the overworked personnel of this hospital. It was also made possible to detach from this unit certain of the enlisted personnel to assist the overworked personnel of the hospitals of Paris.

The 3d Division, which was in the line close to the 2d Division and only a little to the east of Chateau-Thierry, also required hospital facilities. The needs of this division were met by the installation of a hospital at Jouy-sur-Morin. This hospital was opened in some buildings which had formerly been used as a French hospital and was placed at the disposal of our army by the chief surgeon of the 8th French Army. The Red Cross furnished the matériel and part of the personnel, the balance being made up of casual Medical Department personnel of the A. E. F. By the addition of tent wards the capacity of this hospital was greatly augmented until it reached 600 beds. It was very well located for the 3d Division and received a few cases from the 2d Division. As it was about 20 km. from Coulommiers, the evacuation through the evacuation hospital established there presented no difficulties.

I remained on duty supervising the general problem of evacuation and hospitalization of the wounded for this division until the 12th of June, when the flow of wounded had become very small. During the 10 days I visited every sanitary formation, and every request for matériel and personnel was forwarded to the chief surgeon’s office. Every


such request received immediate attention with the exception that there was a limit on the available personnel which could be furnished. Surgical operating teams, which had been organized in anticipation of just such emergencies, were ready and available, and it only required a telephonic request to have them started for any given destination. The establishment of an advanced supply depot by shipping the matériel referred to above from Cosne prevented any shortage of the absolutely essential supplies.

Mr. ------ refers to the Paris hospitals as in no sense emergency institutions and not prepared to meet such a situation as was presented. In this connection it seems desirable to state that this situation as it developed had been foreseen, and that on the 8th of April, about two months before the emergency arose, the commanding officer of the A. R. C. Military Hospital No. 1, with his second in command, the commanding officer of American Red Cross Military Hospital No. 2, and Major Lambert, M. R. C., attached to the Red Cross, were requested to meet the writer in Paris. On that date I informed these officers that it was my belief that at any time the hospitals of Paris might be called upon to act as evacuation hospitals, and that they could expect to receive their wounded from the front directly. Moreover, it was stated that with this contingency in view both of these hospitals should be augmented to the maximum limit consistent with safety and so organized that a large part of the patients could be rapidly handled and cared for. At the same time a request was made of the Red Cross through Major Lambert that a tent hospital of 500 beds with a view to expansion to 1,000 beds to make ready on the Auteuil race track. It might also be stated that the Red Cross began the erection of such hospitals as soon as permission from the proper authorities could be obtained, and that a hospital was ready to operate and very materially assist in meeting the emergency which existed between June 4 and July 12. At the same time the question of automobile transportation was discussed and every possible contingency foreseen and provided for.

Criticism has been made that the selection of Meaux as a clearing point for the wounded of the 2d Division was a mistake, for the reason that it was too far from the front. I do not know who selected Meaux, but at the time it was chosen it was undoubtedly the best possible choice, for the reason that the enemy was approaching Meaux very rapidly, and to have placed the clearing point for the wounded nearer, until it was evident that the enemy could be held, would have been a most serious mistake. After the flow of wounded had become established, and because of the large number involved, it was impossible to immediately arrive at any other solution of the problem. However, as soon as this time arrived, which was about June 10, the establishment at Meaux was moved forward to La-Ferte-sous-Jouarre, where possession was taken of a small civil hospital. One of the division field hospital units was installed here and provided with first-class surgeons, electric lights, X-ray apparatus, etc. The nearest point where hospital trains could reach for the purpose of evacuation was at Coulommiers. This place had been visited several days prior by General Ireland and myself with a view to the possibility of moving hospital trains in and out. It was found that the French had no objection, as they were using it as an evacuating point for their own wounded. The question of sending our wounded to the French evacuation hospital at Coulommiers was also discussed with the French authorities. We were informed that this number (the total French resources in Coulommiers comprised about 1,300 beds) was not adequate to meet the probable needs of the French; and while it was stated that any American sent there would be given the best possible care, it was believed highly desirable that the A. E. F. establish its own hospital. A survey of this locality showed that the château of Montanglaust, about 2 km. north of the city, was the most desirable site. Possession was taken of this château and the surrounding ground. The Evacuation Hospital No. 7 was ordered to proceed there at once. At the same time Mobile Hospital No. 1, then in Paris, was directed to proceed to Coulommiers. However, as it had no transportation, it was necessary to provide approximately 30 trucks for this purpose. The A. C. of S., G-4, G. H. Q., was communicated with, and I was instructed to request the commanding general in Paris to furnish any truck transportation which might be available. It was found that there were ample trucks at the aviation camp a few kilometers south of Paris, but there were no


drivers. After considerable delay French drivers were borrowed, and the unit was finally started on its way. On the 12th of June both the mobile hospital and the evacuation hospital had reached Coulommiers, and on the 13th they were receiving patients. Within the three weeks this formation handled over 4,000 cases, the great majority of which were evacuated by hospital train from Coulommiers. The establishment of this hospital immediately relieved the overtaxed Paris hospitals and the hospital at Juilly and at the same time reduced by nearly one-half the automobile transportation of the wounded,

As has been indicated above, the Medical Department found itself faced with a difficult situation when on the 2d of June it was learned that the 2d Division had been shifted from the west of Paris to the northeast. At that time it was already coming in contact with the enemy and casualties were beginning to grow. Contrary to expectation, the French were able to do little or nothing toward evacuating and hospitalizing our wounded.

While it had been mutually agreed that, when an A. E. F. division was serving with the French, the latter would evacuate and hospitalize our sick and wounded, experience had shown that, for reasons which it is not necessary to detail here, the gaining control of our wounded at the earliest possible moment was so highly desirable that it must be considered as a necessity. Consequently, no effort has been spared to get our wounded into the A. E. F. hospitals at the first opportunity.

On June 2d the available hospital facilities which could be counted on consisted of: Juilly hospital, of 225 beds; A. R. C. M. H. No. 1, in Paris, of 1,000 beds; A. R. C. M. H. No. 2, in Paris, of 400 beds; A. R. C. M. H. No. 3, in Paris, of 75 beds; A. R. C. M. H. No. 5, in Paris, of 500 beds.

It was necessary to provide for increasing the capacity of Juilly and the rapid evacuation of the Juilly hospital to Paris hospitals. In addition it was necessary to provide for rapid evacuation of the Paris hospitals by hospital trains into the interior of France, where the base hospitals exist. This latter movement was under the direction of Colonel Bingham, Medical Corps, and never at any time created the slightest difficulty. Hospital trains were moved with smoothness and dispatch. The increase of the capacity of the Juilly hospital was accomplished by the Red Cross. This organization, having its own transportation and ample material, was able to deliver the necessary supplies at Juilly in the course of a few hours. Due to the difficulty of transportation, the Medical Department was not prepared to obtain this result in the same length of time.

The question of evacuation of Juilly was most difficult. As stated above, insufficient personnel prevented the use of hospital trains at first, and it became necessary to rely on ambulance transportation. Fortunately, ambulances in sufficient number were available, due to the fact that all of the available resources of the U. S. A. A. S. were placed at our disposition by the chief of that service, Col. Percy L. Jones, Medical Corps. In this connection it might be well to state that in addition to the measures taken on June 2, and noted above, three complete sections of the United States Army Ambulance Service were requested of the chief of the service, and were immediately dispatched by him to report to the division surgeon at Meaux. These three sections provided 60 additional ambulances for the use of the division surgeon. The work performed by these sections was of the highest order, and without them the transportation of the wounded from the front to the clearing point could not have been accomplished.

As statements have been obtained from a number of the officers who were directly concerned with the evacuation and hospitalization of our wounded, no detailed comment on this phase of Mr. * * * criticism is necessary. An attempt has been made merely to outline the measures which were taken to meet an existing emergency. If there was a failure to provide proper care for our wounded, then the responsibility rests entirely with the officers of the Regular Corps (Medical), as it so happened that all the planning to meet this emergency and the greater part of the execution of measures adopted rested with officers of the regular Medical Corps.

The value of an investigation such as the one in hand would appear to consist in the detection of mistakes made, and to learn how to correct them in the future. Whether better results could have been obtained in the present instance with the available resources


is not for me to decide, but whether a similar emergency can be better met in the future is pertinent, particularly as such an emergency is apt to develop at any moment. The French have recently lost many of their best hospitals, totaling many thousands of beds. What is of greater importance, however, that they have lost large quantities of matériel, which could be replaced only with great difficulty. Due to this loss they are seriously hampered in meeting the needs of their own service, and have been compelled to change their whole system of evacuation and hospitalization. It seems probable, therefore, that the A. E. F. will be forced to assume this responsibility for its own casualties. As to whether the A. E. F. is in a position to satisfactorily discharge this obligation, the answer must be in the negative.

In explanation of this statement the following points may be developed:

(1) Hospitalization.-The number of hospitals in France is insufficient at the present time to care for the sick alone at the sick rate of last winter. The rapid arrival of troops is steadily reducing the ratio of hospital beds to the total strength of the A. E. F. In case each of the divisions now in the line should sustain one-half of the casualties which have recently occurred in the 2d Division, it would require every A. E. F. hospital in France to take care of these cases, and there would be nothing left for the sick.

(2) Personnel.-The sanitary personnel, as has been developed above, is insufficient. The ratio of sanitary personnel to combat troops was fixed nearly a year ago. The figure adopted at that time was lower than that believed to be necessary. In addition, the shipment of sanitary personnel has never kept pace with the arrival of combat troops, with the results that at present there is a shortage of many thousands in the different ranks and grades. In endeavoring to meet the needs of the present situation it is necessary to shift the personnel from point to point, and in so doing to break up trained sanitary units. This personnel shortage is urgent, has become chronic, and is now becoming acute.

(3) Material.-The situation regarding material is fairly satisfactory, with the exception of automobile ambulances. The situation in this regard has become more acute, owing to the recent arrival of several divisions with no equipment for the sanitary trains. However, the allowance of ambulances is inadequate. This was illustrated in the matter under consideration. The division has a complete equipment of 41 motor ambulances. In order to move the wounded it was necessary to reinforce this number by 60 additional vehicles in order to keep the battle front clear of wounded. Even with this very large increase it was necessary to supplement the ambulance transport by using motor trucks for the movement of the more slightly wounded patients.

The secondary evacuations from the field hospitals have to be accomplished by 1 ambulance company of 12 ambulances. Actually 100 motor ambulances were required during the height of the fighting near Chateau-Thierry. There was therefore a total of 120 ambulances serving this one division. Even with this large number many drivers worked for 48 hours and some even longer without rest or sleep.

At the present time it has been necessary to rely to a considerable extent upon our ability to borrow from the French sections of the U. S. A. A. S. organized for duty with the French Army. Within 48 hours the chief of the United States Army Ambulance Service has received a telegraphic request from G. H. Q., A. E. F., to furnish more sections, and at the same time the French commander in chief, through the French mission, has asked for additional sections of this ambulance service. By using all of his replacement matériel and personnel the chief of this service will be able to furnish three sections to meet both demands, while no less than 40 are needed by the A. E. F. alone.

(4) Transportation.-In a situation such as the one under investigation, transportation from the Medical Department point of view becomes the crux of the matter. If ample truck transportation had been available and under the control of the Medical Department, the shortages of matériel and personnel would have been no serious obstacle. While on the whole there was excellent cooperation and a manifest desire on the part of all concerned to facilitate the care of the wounded, the fact remains that there was insufficient transportation and none at the disposition of the Medical Department.


The difficulties and delay in securing the movement of Mobile Hospital No. 1 from Paris to Coulommiers was mentioned above. As further illuminating this point, the difficulty in moving the Evacuation Hospital No. 7 to Coulommiers may be cited. This unit, with part of its equipment, was shipped direct from the medical supply depot at Cosne. This shipment was 10 days in reaching Coulommiers. It was urgent that this hospital should be put into operation, but as all the beds and bedding were included in the Cosne shipment nothing could be done until this shortage was made good. This was accomplished by requesting the Red Cross to furnish the supplies. Trucks were promptly sent from Paris and the necessary material was delivered at Coulommiers within a few hours. It is believed that the Medical Department, if it is to meet satisfactorily emergencies of this kind, must be in a position to accomplish the same results.

(5) Organization.-This has been discussed in a memorandum to the commander in chief submitted some months ago. It has not been considered necessary to take up this question here further than to observe that it is not believed that the Medical Department will ever be able to function satisfactorily, or to meet emergencies of this nature, so long as it is considered simply as a supply department. Under the existing organization of the A. E. F. the Medical Department functions under the same rules and regulations as a purely supply department, while as a matter of fact supply is only a comparatively minor part of its duties.

(6) Red Cross.-The criticism of Mr. ----- makes numerous references to the Red Cross, and it is clear that Mr. ----- was under the impression that the evacuation of the wounded and their hospitalization was entirely handled by the Red Cross. Due to the designation of the Paris hospitals as Red Cross hospitals, and the use of the Red Cross insignia on Medical Department material, the line of demarcation between the two is naturally confused in the public mind.

The Medical Department has the highest appreciation of the value of the Red Cross and the service which it can render. There is a most commendable spirit of cooperation on the part of the Red Cross officials, as is shown by Major Perkin’s statement. The Red Cross is considered a part of the Medical Department. There is no spirit of rivalry or competition, and all the Red Cross operations of a military nature are initiated and controlled by the chief surgeon, A. E. F. There are many things which the Red Cross, through having ample funds, material, and transportation, can accomplish more rapidly and efficiently than is possible for the Medical Department. It is hoped that the Red Cross resources will continue to be utilized to the maximum to the advantage of the sick and wounded.

It is believed that the sphere of activity of the Red Cross should be limited to the zone of the rear. This belief is founded on the basic principle of military organizations, that only military personnel should be permitted in the zone of active operations. Because of the existing conditions in France, it has been necessary to make exceptions to this generally accepted rule, and Red Cross hospitals have been established well toward the front.

As illustrating the necessity of making such exceptions, the requirements of the 1st Division, A. E. F., may be cited. When this division went into the line near Beauvais the sick and wounded, in conformity with our agreement with the French, were to be sent to French hospitals in the rear of the division. It soon became apparent that the arrangement was unsatisfactory due largely to the difference in language and the difficulty of communication between hospital personnel and American patients. A request that the establishment of an evacuation hospital be authorized from which American patients could be evacuated by A. E. F. hospital trains was disapproved by the French. Permission was, however, secured to establish a Red Cross hospital at Beauvais. This hospital has been placed in operation. It is manned entirely by A. E. F. personnel, but a French médecin-chef is nominally in control, inasmuch as the evacuation must take place by French hospital trains. Due to the congested condition of the railways, it was stated by the French that an attempt to move A. E. F. hospital trains in this area would seriously interfere with the movement of supply trains.


The result has been eminently satisfactory. Our patients are received in this militarized Red Cross hospital, cared for by A. E. F. personnel, and evacuated by French hospital trains. An agreement was made with the French Fourth Bureau, whereby it was made possible to stop French hospital trains outside of Paris, remove any American patients, and place them in Paris hospitals. This getting our wounded under our own control and in the care of A. E. F. personnel could have been accomplished in no other way than through the agency of the Red Cross.

NOTE.-In addition, 3 sections of the U. S. A. A. S. of 20 ambulances each, were ordered to report to the division surgeon at Meaux to augment the divisional ambulance transport. One evacuation ambulance company, which had just arrived at St. Nazaire, was ordered to proceed overland to Paris, there to be held in reserve.

    (Signed):         S. H. WADHAMS,
             Colonel, Medical Corps.

The conclusions of the inspector general were as follows:66

5. Conclusions.-First. That in no particular does this investigation, based either upon the sworn testimony of witnesses or the facts elicited by the inspector general and those associated with him, substantiate the statements made by Mr. — in his cablegram. Mr. — himself acknowledged this both in his testimony and in his letter attached hereto (incl. 2). It is only fair to say that Mr. — made a very frank acknowledgment of this, that he, being ignorant of the facts, had been misled by persons who were equally ignorant of conditions under which the evacuation of the wounded took place.

Second. That no incompetence was shown on the part of the Regular Army Medical officers, but on the contrary their work, as well as that of the Medical Reserve Corps officers and the Red Cross, is worthy of commendation. The situation was a very difficult one and I believe was well handled.

Third. That the conditions were aggravated by the inability of the French to provide the necessary hospitalization agreed to owing to a tremendous loss in beds of their own, the absence of available hospitals nearer than Juilly and Paris, congestion of the railroad lines, etc.

Fourth. I concur with Lieut. Col. Fred T. Murphy, M. C., N. A., that the care received by the wounded during the period in question was as good or better than that received by the soldiers of the other allied armies under similar battle conditions.

Fifth. That it can not be deduced from the evidence or from a study of the situation that reserve officers, had they been in complete charge of the preparations, would have improved the situation, and that if they had been in entire charge the results would not have been so satisfactory on account of their lack of experience as to military administration.

Sixth. I also concur in the opinion of Colonel Murphy that the statement of the Red Cross commissioner for Europe, Maj. J. H. Perkins, that a United States Army Red Cross militarized hospital represented a cooperative effort between the Medical Department and the American Red Cross to provide for the care of the sick and wounded, begun always at the suggestion of the Medical Department and administered by them and modified by mutual agreement to meet the special demands of local needs would seem to answer as satisfactorily as possible the question raised in third section of paragraph 4, in first indorsement (on Mr. -----‘s cablegram) of the chief surgeon.

Seventh. That the Red Cross rendered valuable aid in this emergency. In doing so they fulfilled in a very satisfactory degree their duties in the premises.

Eighth. That the relations existing between the regular and reserve members of the Medical Corps are harmonious and satisfactory.

Ninth. That differences of opinion as to the number of surgical teams and the amount of personnel necessary to take care of the wounded developed, but it was a matter of opinion, and did not, as it turned out, cause any loss of life or suffering.


Tenth. That the Paris hospitals were not emergency institutions, and that their facilities had been increased to meet just such emergencies.

Eleventh. That the French have recently lost many of their base hospitals, totaling many thousands of beds, and they have lost large quantities of material; that they are seriously hampered in meeting the needs of their own service, and that the A. E. F. is forced to assume the responsibilities of the entire hospitalization for its wounded; that at present it is not in a position to carry this out satisfactorily; that the number of hospitals in France is insufficient at the present time to care for the sick alone at the sick rate of last winter; that with the growing strength and increase of our sectors in the line and the casualties which may be expected after big operations the hospitals in France could not take care of all sick and wounded; that the sanitary personnel is insufficient; that this personnel has not been increased in proportion to the increase of combatant personnel; and that if this shortage is not made up it will be impossible to take care of the wounded as our people expect them to be cared for; and that grave situations will arise.

6. Recommendations.-(1) That the Medical Department be more fully represented on the general staff, to the end that it be more fully advised on the military situation in order to more intelligently meet its obligations.

(2) That further provisions be made for emergency reserve surgical teams to be held at such points where they will be available for use in active sectors; at present Paris is believed to be the proper point.

(3) That provisions be made for emergency transportation of personnel and material to move reserve medical personnel and material to the required points.

(4) That steps be taken to secure an increase of the sanitary personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, and establish more hospitals. These needs are believed to be urgent.

                (Signed)              A. W. BREWSTER,
                                        Major Gen’l, I. G., A. E. F.

The correspondent in question withdrew his charges, in testifying before the inspector general, as follows:67

I assure you this is an unique experience in my career. I have never, as Colonel Murphy knows-I have done a great deal of frank writing, but never have I seemed to have gotten so far from the facts as I have in this case. It has been a most enlightening morning and shows me how impossible it is to depend always on people who otherwise are entirely trustworthy, and with that information it is evident that they were quite as ignorant of the actual situation as I was; and it has also convinced me that never again shall I undertake to transport any facts or transmit any facts without going to headquarters to be sure that I am dead right; it also shows me the value of censorship. And I should like to add to that on record that I am very much pleased that-I am very thankful that cable of mine did not go to the editors of the —, because there is nothing that I should more deeply regret than to transmit any facts or statements that could not be borne out entirely and fully by investigation, and I certainly was as convinced of these things as I ever have been in my life. I have never received such a surprise as sitting in this chair this morning, because I didn’t suppose there was any question that the situation was thoroughly understood; the matters were given to me, stated positively, and I could not misunderstand them, and I am very sorry-also very glad-to have had this experience.

The following is a letter received from the correspondent:68

PARIS, July 6, '18.


I have been these two days getting in touch with the sources of my information-to whom I have given fully such enlightenment as I received concerning the circumstances controlling the situation at Chateau-Thierry (except, of course, such data as you gave me confidentially). But they prefer not to have their names further connected or revealed.


I should like to say over my signature how appreciative I am of the opportunity you afforded me of thoroughly understanding a situation which were statement of facts or partial facts—misjudged.

I am grateful to have been saved from doing what would have been an obvious injustice-not because of the consequence which might fall upon my head—but because I value above all else on this earth straight and fair speaking and writing.

                                    (Sgd.)                 ——     ——.

                     Room 114, 45 Ave. Montaigne.


(1) The Battle of the Aisne: A study by the second bureau, general staff, French G. H. Q. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.

(2) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1919, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.

(3) Report of operations, 3d Division, May 30 to June 20, 1918, by Lieut. Col. Raymond Sheldon, general staff, chief of staff, 3d Division. On file with records G-3, General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.

(4) Circular No. 188, W. D., May 20, 1920.

(5) Report of G-4, First Army, by Col. J. L. DeWitt, assistant chief of staff, First Army. On file, General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.

(6) Special report 2d Division, May 31 to July 9, 1918: Operation around Chateau-Thierry, by Maj. Gen. John A. Lejeune, U. S. M. C. On file, with records G-3, General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.

(7) F. O. No. 7, Headquarters 2d Division, A. E. F., June 3, 1918.

(8) Journal of operations, 2d Division, May 30 to July 2, 1918.

(9) Report of action of the 3d Brigade, June 1 to July 15. On file, with records G-3, General Headquarters, A. E. F., Washington, D. C.

(10) Report of operations, Medical Department, 2d Division, May 31 to July 10, 1918, prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(11) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 4. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(12) Report of Medical Department activities, 2d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part I, 22, 23. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(13) Ibid., Part I, 23.

(14) Ibid., Part I, 24.

(15) Ibid., Part I, 25, 26.

(16) Ibid., Part I, 26.

(17) Ibid., Part I, 25.

(18) Ibid., Part III, 16, 17.

(19) Ibid., Part I, 26, 27.

(20) Outlines of Histories of Divisions, U. S. Army, 1917-1918, prepared in the Historical Section, the Army War College, undated. On file, Historical Section, the Army War College.

(21) Report of Medical Department activities, 3d Division, A. E. F., prepared under the direction of the division surgeon, undated, Part V, 2. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(22) Ibid., Part IV, 164.

(23) Ibid., Part I, 48.


(24) Ibid., Part I, 50.

(25) Ibid., Part I, 51.

(26) Ibid., Part I, 52.

(27) Ibid., Part IV, 73.

(28) Ibid., Part II, 108.

(29) Ibid., Part IV, 70.

(30) Letter of instruction from commander in chief to Lieut. Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., May 21, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon’s Files, 211.01).

(31) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 1. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(32) Report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F., for the period embracing the beginning and end of American participation in hostilities, prepared by Col. S. H. Wadhams, M. C., chief G-4-B, December 31, 1918, 38. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(33) Ibid., 53.

(34) Ibid., 35.

(35) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report of medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 2. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(36) Military history of the American Red Cross in France, by Lieut. Col. C. C. Burlingame, M. C., undated, 43. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(37) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 3. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(38) Ibid., 4.

(39) Military history of the American Red Cross in France, by Lieut. Col. C. C. Burlingame, M. C., undated, 46. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(40) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 5. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(41) Ibid., 6.

(42) Ibid., 7.

(43) Ibid., 8.

(44) Ibid., 9.

(45) Report of Medical Department activities, Evacuation Hospital No. 7, A. E. F., by Col. W. H. Tefft, M. C., commanding officer, undated, 1. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(46) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 10. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(47) Ibid., 11.

(48) Ibid., 12.

(49) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., June 16, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon’s Files, 319.2).

(50) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 13. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.


(51) Ibid., 14.

(52) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., June 20, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon’s Files, 319.2).

(53) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 15. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(54) Ibid., 1.

(55) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., June 26, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon’s Files, 319.2).

(56) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 17. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(57) Ibid., 18.

(58) Memorandum from Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., to the chief surgeon, A. E. F., June 27, 1918. On file, A. G. O., World War Division, Medical Records Section (Chief Surgeon’s Files, 319.2).

(59) Exhibit "O" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report on medical operations at Chateau-Thierry and vicinity, June 1 to September 10, 1918, by Col. Paul C. Hutton, M. C., undated, 19. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(60) Ibid., 20.

(61) Ibid., 21.

(62) Ibid., 23.

(63) Ibid., 24.

(64) Ibid., 25.

(65) Exhibit "K" to report on activities of G-4-B, medical group, fourth section, general staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.: Report of investigation concerning charges of inefficiency on part of the Medical Department, from the inspector general, A. E. F., to the commander in chief, July 17, 1918, 84-93. On file, Historical Division, S. G. O.

(66) Ibid., 5, 6.

(67) Ibid., 59.

(68) Ibid., 60.